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Abstract 
As information technology pervades our lives we have increasingly come to rely on these 
evermore sophisticated and ubiquitous items of equipment. Portability and the desire to be 
connected around the clock has driven the rapid growth in adoption of mobile devices that 
enable us to talk, message, tweet and inform at will, whilst providing a means to shop and 
administer bank accounts. These high value, high risk, desirable devices are increasingly the 
target of theft and improvement in their protection is actively sought by Governments and 
security agencies. Although forms of security are in place they are compromised by human 
reluctance and inability to administer them effectively. With typical users operating across 
multiple devices, including traditional desktop PCs, laptops, tablets and smartphones, they can 
regularly find themselves having a variety of devices open concurrently. Even if the most basic 
security is in place, there is a resultant need to repeatedly authenticate, representing a 
potential source of hindrance and frustration. 
This thesis explores the need for a novel approach to user authentication, which will reduce 
the authentication burden whilst providing a secure yet adaptive security mechanism; a so 
called Authentication Aura. It proposes that the latent security potential contained in 
surrounding devices and possessions in everyday life can be leveraged to augment security, 
and provides a framework for a distributed and cooperative approach.  An experiment was 
performed to ascertain the technological infrastructure, devices and inert objects that 
surround individuals throughout the day. Using twenty volunteers, over a fourteen-day period 
a dataset of 1.57 million recorded observations was gathered, which confirmed that between 
6am and 12pm a significant device or possession is in near proximity 97.84% of the time. 
Using the data provided by the experiment as the basis for a simulation of the framework, it 
suggests a reduction of up to 80.36% in the daily number of required authentications for a user 
operating a device once every 30 minutes, with a 10 minute screen lock in place. Examining 
the influence of location alone indicated a reduction of 50.74% in user interventions lowering 
the average from 32 to 15.76, the addition of the surroundings reducing this further to 13.00.  
The analysis also investigated how a user’s own authentication status could be used to negate 
the need to repeatedly manually authenticate and it was found that it delayed the process for 
up to 90 minutes for an individual user. Ultimately, it confirms that during device activation it 
is possible to remove the need to authenticate with the Authentication Aura providing 
sufficient assurance. 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
In the fast paced world that exists today individuals are utilising mobile electronic equipment 
consistently throughout their daily lives both whilst at work and during their leisure time. On 
average users are reported as accessing their mobile phones (or cell phones as they are known 
in America) more than 1,500 times a week and it has become the de facto “go-to-gadget” of 
choice (Woolaston, 2014). These highly desirable expensive devices are becoming fashion 
icons and inhabit an evermore centric role in 21st Century life. The research presented in this 
thesis is aimed at improving the protection of these valuable items and the personal 
information they hold by producing a novel and robust approach to mobile device security that 
will adapt to location, and leverage the detected presence of other personal items and 
equipment that are ported on a daily basis. 
This chapter will introduce weaknesses in the current security methodology and how users and 
even governments are unanimously calling for improvements to be made. It will then proceed 
to further describe the motivation for this research, its aims and objectives and finally outline 
the structure of this document. 
1.1 Mobile Insecurity 
As smart phones and other sophisticated mobile items are widely adopted, technological 
boundaries are stretching and the devices are evolving with expanding storage capabilities and 
processing power, enabling the porting of greater amounts of information and personal 
details. With this becoming the norm for us all, these expensive personal items are an ever-
growing target for theft, and the consequence of loss is increasingly severe (CPP, 2010; Home 
Office, 2009). In 2012 more than 10,000 handsets per month were reported stolen in London 
every month, a rise of 12% on the previous year (Prynn, 2013). Correspondingly in the USA as a 
whole more than 3,000,000 devices were stolen in 2013, although 44% of these were because 
the owner had unwittingly left the item in a public place (Eadicicco, 2014). With the scale of 
these figures commonplace the consequential requirement to protect and secure the 
potentially large volumes of sensitive and personal information contained within these 
desirable pieces of equipment is imperative, and even acknowledged and supported by 
Government (DARPA, 2012; Design Council, 2010; Rohde, 2001). 
Authentication of the user’s identity by any device provides the first line of defence in the 
battle to maintain data confidentiality following theft or loss. Although different, identification 
and authentication both rely upon the recognition of the identity of a user interacting with a 
device at any given moment. Hand held mobile devices typically assume the identity of the 
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user and utilise personal identification numbers (PINs) to authenticate this at point-of-entry, a 
documented frailty (Clarke, 2011; Vu et al., 2007). Establishing as far as possible that the 
operator is whom they purport to be provides a device with the necessary degree of 
confidence to allow unrestricted access and service utilisation. Once access has been gained 
the ability to view emails, activate banking apps and view sensitive documents is readily 
available without further challenges being made. However, although steps have been taken to 
ensure the devices are only accessed by accredited individuals, the ubiquitous point of entry 
user identity code and password has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability 
or unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this sensitive information correctly 
(Albrechtsen, 2007; Clarke and Furnell, 2005). Indeed a survey in 2013 revealed that 36% of 
mobile phone users had not activated either password or PIN protection for their mobile 
phone, and 30% of respondents admitted attempting to hide passwords in notes held on the 
device (Siciliano, 2013).  
The current inadequacy of security on mobile devices and the inherent risk to personal 
information provided the primary motivation for this research. However, during the initial 
phases other potential benefits such as delaying authentication whilst maintaining high 
security materialised and are now described in the following section. 
1.2 Motivation 
As introduced above the threat of theft, forgetfulness or individuals’ lackadaisical approach to 
the protection of their mobile devices has provided the majority of motivation to undertake 
this research. Additionally, with the repeated use of mobile devices throughout the day and 
the requirement for many to utilise PCs and other equipment requiring authentication to be 
performed, the recurring intrusive accreditation process becomes laborious and inconvenient. 
The implementation of security is a necessity but the consequence of doing so maybe a factor 
in the observed reticence of many to use it. There must be a route via which this burden can 
be lessened without negatively affecting the level of security being provided. 
People regularly carry a number of electronic devices and pseudo intelligent items such as 
contactless payment cards simultaneously during everyday life. This personal bubble of 
technology and possessions travels with the individual throughout their waking hours and is 
omnipresent even when they sleep. As disparate items, each in its own right is vulnerable and 
exists in isolation. However, if a cooperative route could be identified that would enable these 
pieces of equipment and possessions to know about each other, reassurance could be 
imparted and leveraged to bolster security. As a caveat to this, if communication channels 
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were established it should also be possible for sophisticated devices to perform authentication 
on behalf of items that are unilaterally incapable of doing so, enhancing their security. 
The final factor that has directed this research is the movement of people throughout their 
daily lives. Typically they commence their day at home, have a period at work either in a 
specific locale or whilst remaining mobile, and then return home again in the evening. Current 
security treats all situations and locations identically; it is a one-size-fits-all approach that with 
modern technology and associated processing power need not be the case. It is reasonable to 
propose that a device’s security can be more relaxed when in familiar surroundings, yet exhibit 
heightened levels of caution when in an alien environment.  
In summary the motivations for this research are improved convenience, adaptability and 
robustness whilst producing a security approach that is easy to utilise but cooperates with the 
user, their working practices and their environment. 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to produce a novel method of security that will provide the user 
with heightened confidence, yet lessen the burdensome inconvenience of performing 
repeated authentication across multiple devices, whilst improving overall device security. It 
investigates current techniques employed on mobile devices, identifying shortcomings before 
proposing a novel solution and approach that will enable simulation and analysis to be 
performed, whilst providing a route to prototype production. 
The objectives for this solution are drawn from the motivations outlined in section 1.2, the 
detail above and are presented in the following points: 
1. To fully investigate the true meaning of identity and the current approaches to 
authentication. 
2. To assess the potential held in users’ equipment and possessions to provide 
information that can be leveraged for security enhancement. 
3. To design an architecture that will enhance device security via mobile devices and 
personal items, that is resilient to equipment development and will incorporate 
new and emerging authentication techniques. 
4. To simulate and evaluate a security mechanism that will cooperate with familiar 
trusted devices, adapt to location and adjust security responses accordingly. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
To fulfil the aims and objective stated in section 1.3 this thesis commences in Chapter 2 by 
investigating the development of personal electronic equipment from its humble beginnings to 
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the near ubiquitous adoption that it has today. It examines current approaches to security and 
the risks associated with the information contained within and devices’ installed applications. 
Chapter 3 then explores the true meaning of the term identity from philosophical, 
psychological and technological standpoints, to establish the elements that combine to make 
one individual distinguishable from another. The section then continues to outline the 
fundamentals of authentication and explores the techniques that are currently employed upon 
state-of-the-art devices. 
Continuing from this, Chapter 4 introduces the concept of a new approach to cooperative 
security that utilises surrounding devices, personal items and the user’s current location. To 
ascertain the potential contained within these elements the chapter details an experiment that 
has been performed in cooperation with 20 volunteers, who were recruited in four groups of 
five individuals, with each participating continuously for two weeks. Analysing the gathered 
data it investigates the significance of the findings and establishes if there is unharnessed 
potential that can be leveraged, and the categories of items that can be used. 
Chapter 5 builds upon the experiment and further explains the general concept, outlining the 
requirements that must be met. It then investigates elements of cooperation and how 
information can be exchanged between devices. It also discusses erosion of service availability 
over time and the influences that will contribute to this function and even potentially reverse 
the process. 
The framework is presented in great detail in Chapter 6. All the logical elements are described, 
the anatomy required to produce a functioning agent is illustrated, and the vocabulary for 
efficient and effective communication specified. The framework is neatly divided into 
individual autonomous sub-agents that have designated functions, are easy to develop, yet 
unite to provide an effective solution to the aims and requirements outlined in Chapters 4 and 
5. 
Chapter 7 utilises mathematical modelling software to simulate an operational framework and 
assess its efficacy. It utilises the data gathered during the experiment to simulate 
authentication requests and graphically illustrates how service availability can indeed be made 
dependent upon the elements discussed above. Mathematical analysis quantifies the potential 
improvement achieved through the implementation of this novel approach to security and 
reports significant reduction in quantity of authentications that a typical user might expect to 
make. Device cooperation and the messaging system are also validated, laying the foundation 
for further work. 
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Finally, Chapter 8 reviews the detailed research and assesses how the aims and objectives 
have been met. It further recounts difficulties that were encountered during the undertaken 
work and how they may have influenced the produced results. It concludes by suggesting 
research that can continue beyond the findings detailed in the preceding chapters and work 
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2. Personal Electronic Devices 
Modern computing can be traced back to Charles Babbage’s model of a mechanical calculating 
device or “difference engine” which he proposed to the Royal Astronomical Society in 1822 
(Computing History, 2012; MacTutor, 1998). However, it was not until the launch of R2E’s 
Micral in 1973 and the Scelbi “personal computer” kit in March 1974 that computing truly 
became personal (Bellis, nd; Howard-Spink, 2008; Freiberger, 2013). In comparison, mobile 
communication finds its roots in recent history when the first vehicle based telephone call was 
made on 17 June 1946 (AT & T, 2012) although it was not until 1979 that the first commercial 
cellular telephone network was launched in Tokyo (Connected Earth, nd). Ameritech took a 
further four years to open the first American based service in Chicago (Connected Earth, nd) 
and the UK two years more, when in January 1985 Vodafone and Cellnet launched their 
respective networks (Salford, 2010). 
From these humble and very different beginnings personal electronic devices have converged 
and developed into the sophisticated and computationally powerful devices that are ever 
present in today’s connected world. For the invention of the integrated circuit in 1958 and its 
successors miniaturisation has been the evolutionary catalyst (Fairchild Company History, 
2014; IEEE Global History Network, 2013), supported by Moore’s Law that correctly predicted 
the exponential rise in computational power for minimal extra cost (Moore, 1965; Moore 
1975). 
This chapter starts by examining the development of the mobile phone and how the 
technological improvements have been reflected in the astronomical rise in worldwide sales. 
With the security of these devices being of utmost importance, the next section reviews 
service access and how devices generally operate on an “authenticate-and-forget” (Clarke, 
2011, p.216) principle. A thorough review of current approaches to device security is then 
made, outlining weaknesses in both employed techniques and device design, and providing a 
comprehensive understanding of the state-of-the-art. Finally the chapter concludes with a 
summary of the presented information and indicates how it forms a basis for this research. 
2.1 Evolution of Mobile Phones 
The mobile phone has been subject to a rapid evolutionary process during the past forty years. 
The drive to innovate has been the desire to miniaturise whilst providing increased battery life 
and corresponding talk-time. The disappearance of the pavement based telephone box is 
apparent to the majority of the population within the UK, further underlying the speed of the 
technology’s adoption and how it has become a ubiquitous accessory for most. This section 
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briefly reviews the history of the mobile phone, examining the development in technology and 
illustrating its global spread. 
On 3rd April 1973 Motorola’s inventor of the mobile phone made the first call choosing his 
perceived chief rival at Bell laboratories to receive it. On that day Martin Cooper dialled Joel 
Engel and is reported as saying: “Joel, this is Marty. I'm calling you from a cell phone, a real 
handheld portable cell phone” (Seltzer, 2013). This historical event was undertaken on the first 
mobile phone weighing over 1.1kg, with a maximum talk time of 30 minutes, was 250mm in 
length and took over 10 hours to recharge; not a convenient pocket sized device (Goodwin, 
2013). 
In the USA the potential for commercial mobile phone use was unleashed when the Federal 
Communications Commission allocated analogue frequencies upon which the networks would 
operate in 1982, establishing the parameters for the first generation or 1G technology (Kaur et 
al., 2011). The following year, the first commercial model not designed for a car was produced 
by Motorola, the DynATAC (Dynamic Adaptive Total Area Coverage) 8000X (Motorola, 2014). 
“The Brick” as it became fondly known on release cost $3,995 ($8,700 at today’s prices), could 
store 30 numbers and had a talk time of 30 minutes (Buck, 2013; Goodwin, 2013). 
1989 witnessed the first flip phone, the Motorola Microtac 9800X; a pocket sized device that 
was easily transportable although the convenience still came with a high cost to the consumer, 
a price tag of $3,000 (CBR, 1989; Motorola, 2014). Until this point mobile phone 
communication had been restricted to within regional borders. However in 1991 this changed 
when Motorola demonstrated the first Global System for Mobile (GSM) communication 
working prototype in Hanover. This second generation or 2G of mobile phones brought 
additional capabilities; text, picture and multi-media messages became standard and text 
messages now had the additional advantage of being encrypted (HSW, 2000; Kaur et al., 2011; 
Motorola, 2014). 
In 1993 technology took another step forward when collaboration between Bellsouth and IBM 
introduced the Simon personal communicator costing $899. This was the first to exhibit 
additional smartphone capabilities such as a stylus controlled calendar, e-mail, calculator and 
clock; setting a new benchmark for the competition (MPN, 1993; Sager, 2012). Mobile phones 
started to crossover into the world of fashion as prices fell and they came within affordable 
reach of the image conscious younger population. In 1998 Nokia launched their 5100 model 
which came with colourful snap-on covers, giving the owners the ability to personalise their 
mobile to a small degree (Salford, 2010). 
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The new millennium saw the introduction of the 3G technological specification, supporting 
mobile and fixed wireless internet access, video calls and mobile television (Kaur et al., 2011). 
Additionally, the first mobile phone to be sold with embedded Bluetooth technology, the 
Ericsson T36 was shipped with tri-band GSM capability and ready for Wireless Application 
Protocol (WAP) (Rohde, 2000). This meant that it could be used across all three GSM regions 
and was able to browse information from the emerging internet whilst on the move. Another 
first for 2000 saw Samsung releasing the first phone with an in-built camera, when in June they 
brought the SCH-V200 to market in South Korea (Hill, 2013; Salford, 2010). 
2005 witnessed the introduction of to date the largest selling mobile phone of all time, the 
Nokia 1110; it subsequently sold an enormous 250 million units and exhibited an incredible 
standby time of up to 380 hours (Delaney, 2013; GSM Arena, 2014; Telegraph, 2013).  
In 2007 the smartphone truly arrived when Apple ventured into the mobile phone market and 
released the iPhone running the iPhone OS (Apple, 2010). Having released a software 
development kit (SDK) to the developer arena and encouraging the submission of applications 
(apps) to their App Store, owners were invited to purchase and download apps to customise 
the functionality of their iPhone. The era of the app had dawned (Block, 2007; Kempster et al., 
2014). 
Consumers’ desire for high bandwidth mobile data requirements such as mobile video 
streaming were serviced in 2009 when the first 4G (4th generation) mobile network was 
launched late in 2009 in Stockholm and Oslo by TeliSonera. It was based on the Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) international standard and a complete IP based data transmission protocol 
(Jansson, nd). 
Microsoft made their biggest leap in phone technology when they marketed their Windows 7 
OS on a Samsung Omnia 7 handset in May of 2011. It finally broke with their tradition of 
producing a mixture of PDAs both with and without the ability to be used as a phone. It was 
the first mobile phone to exhibit “live tiles” which displayed calendar appointments, weather 
and information such as news headlines updated in real time. One downside was that the new 
OS was not backward compatible and so users who were on an upgrade path could not utilise 
their pre-owned applications and software (HardwareZone, 2011). 
Since the introduction of 4G a rapid increase in worldwide mobile phone sales has been 
witnessed as reflected in Figure 2-1 below. With increased competition driving prices down 
and ever expanding coverage opening new marketplaces, the appetite for these devices is 
unabated (Statista, 2014). More recently the development of mobile phone technology has 
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concentrated upon revisiting the physical appearance and ergonomic design of the human-
phone interface. With the introduction of curved phones and flexible displays, manufactures 
are promoting ease of use, manageable size increase and unbreakable screens as the next big 
evolutionary step (Kelly, 2013; Woollaston, 2013a). Couple this with Google glass and its ability 
to provide the wearer with continuous internet interactivity and messaging (both text and 
voice) capability, the next few years will witness another paradigm shift in mobile phone 
technology (Glass Almanac, 2014). 
 
Adapted from Statista, 2014 
Figure 2-1. Worldwide mobile phone sales in millions per quarter 2009-13 
2.2 Service Access 
The introduction and prolific adoption of the smart phone as discussed above has witnessed a 
consequential surge in installation and use of apps and services. Currently there are more than 
1.2 billion smart phones in use worldwide, accounting for 16.7% of the total mobile phone 
population, with an average of 26 apps installed on each of the disparate devices 
(MobiThinking, 2014; Richter, 2013).  
This uptake of smart phones is further supported by the adoption of app running tablet 
computers throughout the population. An extremely rapid growth has been witnessed since 
the introduction of the Apple iPad in 2008 with worldwide sales spiralling to 116 million units 
in 2012 and then almost 207 million units in 2013, a year-on-year growth of 78% (Apple, 2010; 
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Apps and services vary hugely in sophistication and use, ranging from simplistic games on 
which users spend a few minutes a week or month, to those that are accessed more often such 
as weather apps and news feeds. The majority of these will access and utilise some personal or 
location details and usage data but even so remain relatively low risk because of their potential 
to do little harm and low cost of utilisation. Overarching these are the apps and services that if 
compromised and access gained by unscrupulous persons, have the potential to do serious 
harm or have excessively high cost implications; phone calls, bank account management, 
payment portals, text messaging (Short Message System, SMS), email and social networking 
sites all fall into this category. Compound this with research indicating that 72% of available 
Android apps have access to at least one high-risk system permission and the logical 
conclusion is that their protection should be paramount (Sverdlove and Cilley, 2012). 
Ledermuller and Clarke (2011) presented a mechanism to assess the risk associated with 
particular apps and services (assets) and their results are shown below in Table 2-1. 
Asset category Risk level 
E-Mail (corporate) 8 
E-health 8 
E-banking 7 
Remote access (corporate) 7 
Stored business documents 7 
Remote access (private) 6 
Voice communication 5 
Physical device 5 
Personal information (online synchronised) 4 
E-Mail (private) 4 
Messaging 4 
Web access (browser) 4 
Social networking 3 
Personal information 3 
Stored documents 2 
Maps & Navigation 2 
News client 1 
Utilities 1 
Adapted from Ledermuller and Clarke (2011) 
Table 2-1. Mobile device assets with associated risk level 
The Federal Reserve published a report on mobile banking habits in 2014 which indicated that 
customer use of this service was on the increase (Federal Reserve, 2014). They found that 33% 
of mobile phone users and 51% of smartphone owners had utilised this facility within the 
preceding twelve months. Although of those customers 93% used the portal for reviewing 
statements and recent payments, 51% acknowledged that they had used the facility to transfer 
money between accounts. Indeed, these findings from America are reflected in statistics from 
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the UK, where 51% of smartphone owners use mobile banking and 50% shop online as 
illustrated in Figure 2-2 below (Styles, 2013). 
 
Source: Styles (2013) 
Figure 2-2. Profile of app usage by UK smartphone owners 
When utilising mobile and indeed most computing devices, once a user has gained access via 
enabling the device and passing any authentication measures, the ability to use services, 
applications and programs is generally unrestricted and the user is free to navigate the system 
unchallenged; it is very much an authenticate-and-forget approach to device security. 
Although the individual applications may have in built security requiring the user to log on or 
authenticate during activation, this layers an extra level of inconvenience upon the user, whilst 
the actual ability to initiate the process is open and unrestricted, remaining so for the duration 
of the activated session.  
Even when point-of-entry security is available, many device owners do not choose to invoke it. 
In a recent survey 36% of respondents aged over 44 confessed to not using any form of 
security on their mobile phone, although overall across all age groups 81% employed a 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) as a safeguard on phone activation (ContinuityCentral, 
2014). When a PIN is implemented human beings are predictably unimaginative with over 10% 
of all users choosing 1234 as their security gateway (DataGenetics, 2012). There is clearly 
scope for a better approach to be implemented and adoption encouraged amongst device 
owners. 
2.3 Current Security Approaches and Limitations 
The previous sections have reviewed the evolution of mobile devices, how they have been 
universally adopted and briefly discussed service access and its associated security. This 
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section builds upon this by reviewing the limitations of currently implemented security on 
mobile devices and the associated weaknesses. 
The majority of mobile device security is based upon secret knowledge that is supposed to be 
kept private and confidential by the device’s owner. It is usually achieved via three common 
methods, password, PIN or pattern entry. Although these are listed separately they are simply 
variations of a single method; a password is generally regarded as an alphanumeric string of 
characters, a PIN is a numeric sequence as outlined above, whilst a pattern or sketch is 
depicted by the dragging of a user’s finger across the device’s touch screen in a recognisable 
shape. 
By their very nature personal electronic devices are highly mobile, ported consistently by users 
and accessed frequently because of human nature’s tendency to communicate in 
“inhomogeneous or bursty” patterns (Jo et al., 2012). If the user is in any way security savvy it 
is likely that they will implement a screen lock and although this is superficially secure, the 
combination of this with the frequency of use introduces frailty. Repeated unlocking of the 
device whilst in close proximity to others provides plentiful opportunity for password entry to 
be observed, rendering the secrecy ineffective (Dunphy et al., 2010).  
Mobile phones generally differ in their use of passwords and although they have the capability 
to utilise the full character set, historically manufacturers have limited security to a four digit 
PIN which can be applied to both the phone and the SIM card within (Furnell et al., 2008). 
Immediately it is clear that this method will drastically restrict the number of possibilities 
available to the user to a relatively tiny 10,000 (104). This is further compounded by the 
inconvenience of repetitively entering the pass code which subconsciously encourages the 
user to select a PIN that is easily typed (Bonneau and Preibusch, 2010; Florencio and Herley, 
2007). Even so it is surprising how humans exhibit their lack of imagination with the most 
common PIN found to be 1234 in a sample of 3.4 million numbers, when other combinations 
such as 8068 are used by only 0.000744% of individuals with twenty five occurrences in the 
extensive sample set (ContinuityCentral, 2014; DataGenetics, 2012). 
Some manufacturers of mobile devices with touch screens have introduced longer PIN options 
under the guise of pattern entry. To achieve this, the device owner drags their finger across 
the screen in an established pattern, over a grid of nine nodes (these can be regarded as digits 
1-9 1) with the start point, end point and all points visited in between constituting the 
                                                          
1
 Digit 1 is the top-left corner of the grid with numbers progressing sequentially from left to right, top to 
bottom. 
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password. For example, in Figure 2-3 below the entered pattern would equate to 321456987 
but intuitively to the observer the created ‘S’ pattern is much easier to remember than the 
longer nine digit PIN (Meitiv, 2010). 
 
Source: (Meitiv, 2010) 
Figure 2-3. An example of screen pattern security 
There is however one restriction in using a pattern as opposed to a straight forward PIN and 
that is the number of available permutations. When entering a pattern the user is restricted in 
choice and movement from all but the centre node, for instance at digit position 3 the user has 
only three choices available 2, 5 and 6, it is impossible for them to move directly to 9 because 
6 is in between. As such the available permutations for a six digit PIN reduce from 1,000,000 
using a standard ten digit keypad to 92,448 utilising pattern entry with the described nine 
node layout, less than one tenth (Meitiv, 2010). 
To counteract pattern entry weakness researchers have also combined approaches and 
incorporated elements of keystroke dynamics to assess the speed and style with which the 
user swipes their finger across the screen. Using dynamic time warping De Luca et al. (2012) 
outlined how they were able to distinguish between users entering the same pattern on an 
iPhone regardless of the sketch’s simplicity, reducing the consequence of pattern compromise. 
Another frailty of the pattern entry system is created inadvertently by the human body. As a 
user swipes their finger across the touch screen from one node to another the oils that lie on 
the surface of the skin have been shown to leave a smudge on the screen that can be revealed 
under certain lighting conditions. Although this will not immediately reveal the code, the start 
and end nodes are relatively easy to identify which consequently restricts the number of 
feasible possibilities and makes a security compromise much more likely (Aviv et al., 2010).  
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More recently in an attempt to overcome the smudging and shoulder surfing weakness of 
pattern and traditional password entry some manufacturers have introduced a pictorial 
approach. In this the user is urged to select a busy image with a large number of significant 
elements, numbers are then randomly superimposed on top of the image and the user has to 
drag them around until one digit is at a pre-designated location. Tapping the confirm button 
then validates the selections and either permits or declines access to the device (Halevy, 
2014). Being able to move several digits before and after the significant one prevents 
spectators from knowing which is the vital movement to unlocking the phone, protecting the 
device and the information held within. 
 
Source: Anthony (2014) 
Figure 2-4. A user scanning their fingerprint on a Samsung Galaxy S5 
Other manufacturers have introduced technology to enable users to employ fingerprint scans 
as their security mechanism. Rather than a static scan, the user swipes their finger across the 
scanner to capture the fingerprint and authenticate (Drummond, 2014). Both Apple and 
Samsung actively promote this as a secure method of protecting their devices (Apple, 2014; 
Lynch, 2014; O’ Boyle, 2014) although researchers have managed to circumvent this approach 
with the use of false fingerprints (Kerr, 2014; Prabhu, 2014). During the research the tested 
Apple iPhone 5S’s fingerprint security was able to be circumvented but did limit the 
investigators to only five attempts before it locked. More concerning, the Galaxy S5 as shown 
in Figure 2-4 permitted an unlimited number of attempts and also allows the user to provide a 
fingerprint as a means of accessing payment applications and secure data (Kerr, 2014). 
Google and Apple have also both implemented facial recognition in their respective Android 
and iOS mobile phone operating systems as part of their security regime. Although vitality 
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tests were built into the process, requiring the user to blink, it was demonstrated that a 
photograph could be doctored to simulate this process and subsequently open the device 
(Colon, 2013; Kelion, 2013). In 2013 Google filed a patent application which extends the 
process and requires the user to stick their tongue out, wrinkle their nose or pull a strange 
facial expression in an attempt to counteract the flaw (Gorman, 2013). Figure 2-5 illustrates 
Google Android’s face unlock feature in operation. 
 
Source: Woolaston (2013b) 
Figure 2-5. Google Android’s face unlock feature © Google 
Other aspects of mobile phone technology also pose a security flaw in their own right. For 
instance, many handset manufacturers are embedding voice control into their products or 
providing routes for app developers to do the same; these enable users to unlock their device, 
dial contacts or even send text messages (Cozma, 2012; Velazco, 2012). However, this 
capability is not matched to a specific voice, rather a recognised specific command or word 
and will function if used by almost everybody (Culzac, 2014). Another technological weakness 
is the use of accelerometers in handsets. Data from these has been captured by researchers 
and analysed to ascertain if this gave any indication of passwords or entered PINs, it did. 
Although it was not possible to precisely determine the entered character string, it did give an 
indication of likelihood that at worst would vastly reduce the list of potentials (Ward, 2013). 
With these methods all demonstrating weakness and the ability to be compromised, 
researchers have been investigating transparent and even continuous user identity 
authentication as a means of securing mobile devices. As far back as 2002 Clarke et al. 
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proposed key stroke dynamics as a method of transparently authenticating users whilst they 
were typing on their handset.  Although they investigated several approaches because of its 
overall performance and technology restrictions at the time, they deemed this the most 
suitable candidate (Clarke at al, 2002). As technology advanced and the corresponding 
processing power of mobile devices increased this research was developed into a proposed 
Intelligent Authentication Management System (IAMS) which introduced the concept of 
degrading service availability and invoked non-intrusive transparent authentication when 
confidence in the user’s identity fell below an operational level (Clarke and Furnell, 2007). A 
further evolution then saw this renamed as a Non-Intrusive Continuous Authentication 
framework (NICA) and developed into a functioning prototype, although even at this time 
widespread use of the system was still restricted by technological limitations (Clarke et al., 
2009; Furnell et al., 2008). 
Transparent authentication was given a further endorsement in 2009 when Jakobsson et al. 
argued that because of the mainly monogamous relationship that mobile devices have with 
their user, they have an ideal opportunity to harvest behavioural data which can be leveraged 
for authentication, and security and usability will be improved when compared with traditional 
intrusive methods (Jakobsson et al., 2009). Behavioural information was also proposed as a 
method of authentication by Briggs and Olivier in 2008 when they outlined a so-called 
“biometric daemon”. In their proposal once an enrolment process of initiation had been 
performed, their “electronic pet” monitored the user and grew its knowledge of the operator’s 
behaviour, refining its identification ability as it learnt; it even started to “die” if left 
unattended for any length of time but they saw it as “the basis for secure, usable and engaging 
identification and authentication” (Briggs and Olivier, 2008). The “ePet” approach is further 
supported by the work of Tanviruzzaman et al. (2009) who indicate that mobile phones will 
learn to recognise their owner. 
Crawford et al. (2013) also suggest that because of mobile devices “are generally used by a 
single owner” they enjoy “a long term, persistent relationship with a user that can be exploited 
for authentication purposes” supporting the feasibility of the electronic pet. In their 
behavioural biometric approach to authentication they propose a framework to collect 
behavioural data during use of the handset which transparently learns the patterns of 
interaction that the device’s owner exhibits (Crawford et al., 2013). Once a user profile has 
been built the framework monitors and records keystroke or voice data and compares this 
with the known characteristics, which in turn either increases or decreases the device’s 
confidence in the user’s identity. This maintained numeric value is then used to either permit 
or deny the activation of services based upon either system default or user defined thresholds. 
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Without use, the system degrades the identity confidence, invoking a specific request for 
authentication upon reuse by the owner. With the “bursty” usage patterns exhibited by users 
it is however likely that authentication will be frequent and intrusive, although during 
experimental research with a user invoking an action every ten minutes they observed a 67% 
reduction in authentications (Crawford et al., 2013). 
The overriding issue with this all these approaches to security is that it focuses upon the single 
device. With methods that learn and continuously monitor the user’s actions as intimated 
earlier they die if unused for any length of time irrespective of how many other actions the 
user is performing. An individual might be concentrating on using another device, logging on 
and authenticating as required but all this potentially useful information is ignored and going 
to waste. The weaknesses of a lone device fighting and repelling threats harks back to Aesop 
when he suggested that “united we stand, divided we fall” (Your Dictionary, nd), a route to a 
united security solution is surely advantageous. 
2.4 Summary 
During the past 40 years, miniaturisation and increased performance has driven the incredible 
advances witnessed in both personal computers and mobile phone technology. The review 
given in the previous sections reminds one of the distances that have been travelled and yet 
the journeys appear to be far from over. With Google glass and other wearable technology, 
convergence and amalgamation of currently disparate products is the future; couple this with 
increased connectivity and already our surroundings are being seen as an “internet of things” 
(Randewich and Carew, 2013). 
This chapter has examined the evolution of the mobile phone and the prolific rise in its 
adoption throughout society at large. Both these and other personal electronic devices are 
becoming omnipresent in everyday life, both inside and outside of the home, being ported in 
individuals’ handbags and pockets, and growing into status symbols and even items of fashion. 
They enable the population to be virtually continuously contactable and are viewed as a vital 
component of modern society. As size has diminished, capability has inversely grown, 
providing the means to execute processor hungry applications and perform tasks which until 
relatively recently could not have been envisaged. 
This section has also investigated the security mechanisms that are used to protect these 
desirable and ubiquitous items of equipment, highlighting the shortcomings of the employed 
approaches. Building upon this a review of the research that is aimed at counteracting the 
weaknesses is presented, which in addition to providing understanding illustrates how most 
approaches are unilateral and only use information on a single device. There is a great deal of 
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detail that could be employed but is currently going to waste, providing an opportunity to 
leverage this in a novel security implementation. 
In the next chapter a comprehensive examination of what constitutes identity is made, yielding 
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3. Identification and Authentication 
This chapter will address identification and authentication, although it is important to highlight 
that within the scope of this document authentication refers to the process of user 
authentication (human to system) rather than machine authentication (system to system). 
Machine authentication (e.g. the use of the secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol that is used to 
create a secured connection to a web-site) simply verifies machine identities for a given 
communication session and gives no assurance of the identity of the person using the machine 
(O’Gorman, 2003). This is the role of user authentication; the process via which a user can 
confirm their identity to an electronic device, allowing them to authenticate and utilise the 
services and information held within. 
Firstly however, an exploration of philosophical and psychological approaches to identity will 
be made, establishing a detailed understanding of the meaning of identity and the human 
processes involved in recognising an individual after a period of time. Continuing from this, the 
chapter will then examine individuation and how any given person can be differentiated from 
another. Finally it will then proceed to review the methods and approaches used to perform 
physical identification and authentication of a user’s claimed identity, examining current 
techniques, their strengths and weaknesses, and how these are employed on personal 
electronic devices. 
3.1 Identity 
This section explores the meaning of the term ‘identity’ and how it relates to individuals in two 
distinct phases. Initially the psychological and philosophical approaches and understanding of 
identity are examined, succeeded by an exploration of identification and authentication from a 
physical perspective. 
It further reflects upon the interaction people have with their environment and indeed the 
way in which the environment can dictate behaviour, both of which are routes to identity 
determination. Establishing these concepts at this stage provides a solid foundation for this 
research and potentially a route for an alternative approach to authentication. 
3.1.1 Philosophical and Psychological Identity 
Varela (1997) suggests that “the entire enterprise of defining life, the organism and cognition 
scientifically is doomed to fail”, however whilst not attempting to define ‘life’ this section 
considers the philosophy and psychology of identity in its true and strict sense. Examining this 
view of identity and the discussions held within that tranche of academia enables a fuller 
understanding of individuation to be obtained. 
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The noun ‘identity’ from a philosophical perspective, literally refers to an object, fact or person 
being the same or exactly alike to itself and nothing else (Shoemaker, 2006). However, there 
are two views of identity that require clarification, numerical identity and qualitative identity. 
Numerical identity refers to something being one and the same thing as defined above, for 
instance a cat is intuitively identical to itself. By contrast qualitative identity refers to entities 
that are exactly similar in a way that one twin may be exactly similar to their brother or sister. 
They are qualitatively identical but because they are separate human beings with individual 
thoughts, beliefs, motivation and concerns they are not deemed to be numerically identical. 
This research is focused upon the identification and authentication of specific individuals and 
hence this discussion will address numerical identity. 
Some of the earliest philosophical work into identity and its properties was conducted by the 
German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). From his writings on this matter 
has been drawn what is now known and commonly accepted as Leibniz’s Law (derived from his 
work the Indiscernibility of Identicals) which states that, “A is identical to B if, and only if, A has 
every property that B has, and B has every property that A has” (Feldman, 1970). 
Interpreting this principle from a mathematically logical standpoint, identity has three 
properties; 
 Reflexive: if object A is identical to object B, then object B is identical to object A; 
 Transitive: if object A is identical to object B and object B is identical to object C, then 
object A is identical to object C; 
 Symmetrical: everything and anything is identical to itself. 
(Shoemaker, 2006) 
Although Leibniz’ opus is hard to dispute, René Descartes in his Meditations on First 
Philosophy attempted to undermine the principle by stating that he could not doubt his own 
existence2 (his being) but he could doubt the existence of his body as it could simply be a 
figment of his imagination. He argued that his being and his mind were consequently not one 
and the same because one possessed a trait that the other did not and therefore he was 
different from himself; a contradiction of Leibniz’ work (Veitch, 1901). However, following the 
publication and circulation of his manuscript numerous counter arguments (supporting Leibniz 
Law) have been proposed using reasoning based upon reductio ad absurdum (reduction to the 
absurd). 
                                                          
2
 The now famous “I think therefore I am” 
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Over time the term identity has become skewed to signify the way we look and the way we 
appear to others. Additionally in modern language identity is interpreted to mean an entity, 
something that is possessed or an object that can be lost or stolen. In this sense it is also even 
possible to refer to identities (in the plural) indicating that an individual can be expected to 
own more than one and manage a multiplicity. A person that loses their identity is still the 
same person that they were before the loss and so in examining the contemporary 
terminology what is lost is not what makes the person what they are3. In a strict sense their 
identity remains and to acquaintances they are still easily recognisable as the person known a-
priori to the event. Hence as Shoemaker (2006) suggests “instead of thinking of an identity as 
an individual essence, we might do better to think of it as something, perhaps a set of traits, 
capacities, attitudes etc., that an individual normally retains over a considerable period of time 
and that normally distinguishes that individual from other individuals”.  
The unique set of traits (so called identity matrix) that an individual possesses and retains over 
time is what individuates them from the next person. However, recognition can only be 
successful with existing personal knowledge. “In its ordinary everyday sense, to recognise 
means to re-cognise, to discern someone or something with which we are already acquainted” 
(Jones, nd). This principle underlines the requirement for some familiarity and basis upon 
which to form a judgement of recognition; one must have met and mentally stored a unique 
identity matrix which is sufficiently unchanging over time to enable them to recognise a 
particular individual in the future. 
Quine (1950) argues a similar point using the analogy of a river in answering Heraclitus’s 
problem that “you cannot bathe in the same river twice, for new waters are ever flowing in 
upon you”, suggesting that a river’s identity is ever changing as water flows through it. He 
suggests that you can bathe in the same river twice but not the same river-stages, where river-
stages are sections of a river defined in space and time. We understand bathing in the same 
river twice as bathing in two river-stages that are indeed stages of the same river. A river is a 
process through time, its stages are the momentary parts and it is only possible to recognise 
and identify a river if we truly understand what constitutes different sections of the same river 
and therefore its ontology (Quine, 1950). In terms of Identification and Authentication this can 
only be done successfully if a thorough understanding of each element of the identity matrix 
and how they interact is achieved. 
                                                          
3
 To clarify, identity theft should be thought of as the act of someone acquiring the ability to pose as the 
person whose identity was taken away. In terms of physical possessions the victim is no worse off than 
they were prior to the intervention of the perpetrator. They are of course more vulnerable to fraud and 
monetary loss but they are not necessarily immediately disadvantaged. 
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One of the major issues is the temporal effect on identity determination. “People are likely to 
change substantially over time or, more precisely, that the degree of change depends on the 
stability of context” (Fraley and Roberts, 2005). The simple question is persistence or 
“sameness” - if an individual exists at a historical point in time and is encountered again on 
some future occasion what has persisted that enables the decision of sameness to be reached? 
(Bullot and Rysiew, 2007)  Indeed, is it that the same person has been encountered twice or 
have there been two separate encounters of different people? (Xu, 2007)  Over a long period 
of time a person’s appearance can change dramatically, weight can be gained, hair can change 
colour or be lost, and without exception ageing will have occurred. Of course, these are all 
physical attributes but equally an individual can undergo a personal trauma or significant event 
in their life that colloquially makes them not the same person they were. Qualitative 
differences have evolved but numerical identity has remained. 
In philosophical literature there are three responses to the question of persistence and how it 
may be established: 
i. Psychological approach 
A person P on a particular day D1 has specific memories and experiences PD1. The 
following day the identical person PD2 remembers what they knew the day before but 
additionally gathers new memories and experiences. Thus the person has persisted 
across the time span of a single day. By extrapolating this theory to some point in the 
future Dn the person is considered identical if they have the same memories
4, 
experiences etc. that they had at D1. Continuity of identity can then be tracked and 
established through time from PD1, PD2, PD3,…, PDn-1, PDn. 
ii. Somatic approach 
A person P on a particular day D1 has a specific body PD1. The following day the body 
PD2 can have its origins traced with very little change from the body PD1. Through this 
argument persistence was maintained via the near unchanging physicality of the body 
in question during the two days. Again this can be extrapolated to a third day, a fourth 
and onwards to some future point Dn, with continuity being confirmed by tracking PD1, 
PD2, PD3,…, PDn-1, PDn. 
  
                                                          
4
  Some of the specifics of the memory may have faded with time but the core impression remains 
Chapter 3: Identification and Authentication 
- 25 - 
iii. Simple approach 
This third approach does not discount the first two but rather states that although 
physical continuity and/or psychological continuity are usually present in persistence 
of identity they are not enough to guarantee it. Only continuity of identity itself is 
enough to guarantee true and unequivocal identity; for any object there are no criteria 
for identity through time (Merricks, 1998). 
Arguments have been proffered to support and counter all three approaches ranging from 
brain transplants (both whole and as two separate hemispheres (fission), to rebuilding a ship 
at sea plank by plank (Blatti, 2007; Shoemaker, 2006; Merricks, 1998). To get entrenched in a 
full and extensive investigation of identity, its true and strict philosophical meaning and all the 
discussions for and against is beyond the scope of this document. Arguably, for the purposes of 
this research, persistence of identity across time will be found in a mixture of the first two 
approaches (i and ii); part psychological, part physical and an element of epistemic tracking5. 
3.1.2 The Person and Their Environment 
A person will incur a detectable impact upon their immediate locale when carrying out an 
action, caused by their physicality and psychology. The impact can be directly upon the piece 
of equipment that is being used, or equally upon the environment in which the individual is 
working. In this latter instance the environment can be both the immediate physical 
surroundings such as an office or workspace, or more covertly the technical infrastructure such 
as a network or database. These result in the ability to approach the measurement of impact 
from a number of perspectives, however it initially divides into two distinct aspects, the person 
and the environment. 
The factors listed in the two tables below range from those that can be immediately measured 
from the individual during a session of interaction (e.g. physical attributes or memory), to 
those that require a considerable amount of time to ascertain (e.g. temperature). Further, 
some factors are considered to be unique and will function well in isolation, whilst others 
although individually collectable will perform best in combination. By establishing the 
existence of such factors or combinations, the recognition and measurement of identity 
becomes more tangible. 
                                                          
5
 Epistemic tracking refers to cases in which the target individual cannot be perceived but can be located 
or identified on the basis of indirect information gathered by such sources as reasoning or 
communication. For instance, historians and archaeologists are expert epistemic trackers because they 
routinely locate and identify bygone individuals (persons and artefacts) on the basis of indirect evidence, 
such as archives or archaeological vestiges. (Bullot and Rysiew, 2007) 
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Person-centric traits and attributes that can be considered for inclusion in the identity matrix 
are shown in the table below.  
Attribute Trait 
Physical attributes 
Measurement of an individual’s physicality and 
bodily structure 
Behavioural attributes 
Assessing the way in which an individual uses 
their body 
Reaction to stimuli Reaction to light or sound 
Intelligence Gauging an individual’s mental capacity 
Approach 
Closely tied in with personality traits shown 
below, how one person reacts and interacts with 
another   
Personality 
Measurement of the universally accepted five 
main personality traits i.e. Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, 
and Openness (John, 1990) 
Memory Recall of significant knowledge 
Language Linguistic profiling (Pennebaker and King, 1999) 
 
Table 3-1. Identity matrix person-centric indicators 
Similarly to the person-centric indicators (Table 3-1) environmental factors6 can also be 
measured and used as part of the identity matrix; these are outlined in Table 3-2 below. 
Environmental factor Indicator 
Temperature 
Individuals adjusting the temperature of their 
working environment 
Lighting 
Brightness of lighting, lights may be switched off 
or additional lamps used 
Network traffic 
How much an individual impacts upon the 
network 
Data trail 
Databases accessed, websites visited, 
applications used 
Man-machine interface Methods of working, keyboard shortcuts 
Furniture 
Arrangement of furniture within the working 
environment 
Noise level How much noise an individual makes 
Personal items What items are carried at any given time 
 
Table 3-2. Identity matrix environment indicators 
3.1.3 Affordance 
Affordance dictates a user's orientation to the physical environment and the social world 
(Gibson, 1979). That is, an individual is restricted and influenced by their immediate 
surroundings and the people they interact with, constraining and creating purveyed multiple 
identities. 
                                                          
6
 The environmental ‘footprint’ that an individual incurs when performing an action 
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During the formation of the identity matrix it is imperative that consideration to affordance is 
made because the criteria that are selected may limit or affect the behaviour of subjects 
during data acquisition. The projected influence must be minimised and if at all possible 
eliminated to enable true and accurate readings to be obtained. Removing this skew factor will 
allow consistency in evaluation to be achieved, aiding the identification process. 
However, assessment of affordance is subjective. Different elements of the environment will 
influence action and reaction to varying degrees and in numerous ways (Amatrudo, 2008). No 
single approach will scientifically be able to accurately measure and appraise the cause and 
effect of all environmental variables to facilitate irrefutable minimisation. 
Figure 3-1 has been constructed to highlight the relationship between the person and the 
environment as it passes across an interface. This interface will change depending upon the 
combination of activity and object for any given task. For instance, the act of an office worker 
initiating a telephone call utilises the numeric keypad as the interface. Equally though, once 
the call has been connected and the conversation initiated the mouthpiece then acts as the 
interface to the network beyond that carries the digital voice data.  
 
 
Figure 3-1. Diagrammatic representation of a person's interaction with their environment 
The diagram additionally demonstrates how the environment offers affordance to the person 
across the interface and therefore will affect and even limit the action that can be taken. 
Continuing with the phone call analogy from the previous paragraph, once the call has been 
connected, during the act of holding the conversation, only the voice is available as a 
contribution to the identity matrix and therefore afforded. Interaction with the keypad would 
not be afforded at this time and it would be unrealistic to utilise this as an element for the 
individual’s recognition. It is clear, affordance exerted by the environment or even user action, 
can restrict and alter the potential elements available for identification purposes. 
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3.1.4 Summary 
This section has provided an understanding of what is truly meant by the term identity. 
Although some of the philosophical views maybe considered by some to be beyond the scope 
of this work, they provide a viewpoint that is supportive and contributory to the project as a 
whole. They suggest that persistence over time is the greatest factor when establishing 
identity, the unbroken chain of affirmation gives the confidence necessary to make informed 
and accurate decisions. 
It has also been discussed how factors are available which can be used to individuate a 
population. By combining these, practical methods can be established and utilised effectively 
within the technical environment. 
3.2 Individuation 
With any method of authentication it is imperative to fully understand what separates one 
individual’s identity from another and therefore how people can be individuated and 
consequently identified. Identification and authentication are two subtly different concepts 
and for clarity it is important to emphasise the distinction. 
Identification is the process of using claimed or observed attributes to deduce who the entity 
is (EU, 2005). That is, a set of discovered attributes are used to select one particular individual 
from a population of known individuals without any initial idea of whom the person is. To 
achieve this, a comparison using the attributes must be undertaken with each member of the 
population until a match is found and identity established. On average this process must 
perform n/2 test comparisons for a population containing n known individuals. Although this is 
an exhaustive process, dependent upon the observed attributes it would be possible to sub-
divide the entire population into sets of matching individuals. For instance, if eye colour was 
employed and the population indexed accordingly, only 8% of the world’s population have 
blue eyes, immediately reducing the size of the identification matching process (Ask, nd). 
However, continuing the analogy, it should also be noted that there are large variations across 
the world with blue eyes being extremely rare throughout Asia and Africa, whilst in countries 
such as Estonia the percentage is as high as 99% (CompuServe, nd). 
Authentication however, is the corroboration of a claimed identity by the comparison of the 
known attributes of the individual, whose identity has been claimed, with the observed 
attributes of the claimant. In this instance a single evaluation has to be undertaken, the direct 
comparison of the observed identity with the claimed identity (OWASP, 2014). 
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Although different, identification and authentication both rely upon the collection of a set of 
traits or knowledge from a subject interacting with a device at any given moment, and the 
subsequent matching of this detail against a known identity. 
3.3 Identification and Authentication 
As discussed at the start of this chapter the process of user authentication (human to system) 
establishes confidence in the identity of the person using the machine. To augment this 
understanding further authentication can be regarded as “how computers can confidently 
associate an identity with a person” or “the process of verifying the validity of a claimed user” 
(O’Gorman, 2003). With reference to person centric traits as outlined in Table 3-1, it is clear 
that there is common ground between identification and authentication from a philosophical 
perspective and that of a technological standpoint7 (Smith, 2001). 
It is well established that authentication is based upon one of three key approaches, 
something the subject knows, has or is; for instance and respectively a password, a swipe card 
or a fingerprint (Wood, 1977). Each of these methods will now be explored in turn, examining 
their own distinct strengths and weaknesses and how they are employed within modern 
technology. 
3.3.1 Knowledge Based Authentication 
Knowledge based authentication has traditionally relied upon a user identity code and 
associated password that is supposedly only known to or more strictly “memorized by” the 
owner (O’Gorman, 2003). To this end the password system would appear to be secure with 
just a single person knowing what has been set and to all extent a seemingly infinite 
population to choose from. For instance, if an eight letter case sensitive password with 72 
available characters (A..Z, a..z, 0..1 plus ten others such as !#+ etc) is utilised, this generates a 
sample space of 722,204,136,308,736 possibilities8. Even if the passphrase is not case sensitive 
this still yields 20,047,612,231,936 potential passwords9 and so superficially it is a surprise that 
password systems are deemed inherently weak (Birget et al., 2005; Brostoff and Sasse, 2000; 
Sobrado and Birget, 2002).  
In 2011 Burnett released a list of the 10,000 most commonly used passwords (Burnett, 2011). 
In his analysis he examined 6,000,000 user identity-password combinations and found that his 
                                                          
7
 In this instance the technological identification refers to the establishment and verification of a user's 
system identity; not the technical security meaning of identification 
8




 Removing case sensitivity limits the number of characters to 46; therefore there are 46
8
 combinations 
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list of 10,000 accounted for 99.8% of all passwords that he encountered, with “password” 
topping the list having been used 32,027 times. Table 3-3 lists the ten most popular choices of 
password that Burnett identified alongside the corresponding least common choices. 
Rank Password Occurrence  Rank Password Occurrence 
1 password 32,027  9,991 chateau 51 
2 123456 25,969  9,992 chas 51 
3 12345678 8,667  9,993 charlie2 51 
4 1234 5,786  9,994 dogggg 51 
5 qwerty 5,455  9,995 doll 51 
6 12345 4,523  9,996 19729172 50 
7 dragon 4,321  9,997 pzaiu8 50 
8 pussy 3,945  9,998 quaint 50 
9 baseball 3,739  9,999 viking1 50 
10 football 3,682  10,000 voltron 50 
Source: Burnett (2011) 
Table 3-3. List of ten most and least popular passwords 
In the analysis Burnett excluded case sensitivity from his analysis and so “PassWoRD” is 
counted as being identical to both “PASSWORD” and “password”, increasing the number of 
coincident choices to some extent. It is clear from this study that human imagination and 
ingenuity is the greatest flaw in the use of a password system, and it also underlines the 
disregard that many give to what should otherwise be a secure and protective process. 
However, it is somewhat more surprising that given humans’ nature to select words that are 
easy to type and remember (Bonneau and Preibusch, 2010; Florencio and Herley, 2007) that 
short words such as “chas” and “doll” appear at the  bottom of the list of favourites, an area 
where imagination would be expected to flourish. 
Inherently human beings are forgetful creatures and have an inclination to trust others. 
Passwords are often written down, placed in desk drawers or even left attached to the 
underside of keyboards on post-it-notes (Albrechsten, 2007; Grama, 2010, p.400; Smith, 2001). 
Although the writing down of passwords is often regarded as extremely bad security practice, 
there are some that argue that it is better to write them down and have many different 
passwords than memorise a few and re-use them (Hayes, 2014). 
Re-use of a password across multiple sites exposes the user to multiple compromise should a 
single set of log-on credentials be lost, intercepted or hacked. However, this practice is 
extremely common. In 2012 CSID undertook a customer survey of the US market in which they 
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quizzed subjects about their password management and habits; 61% admitted they used the 
same password across multiple websites, 54% only have five unique passwords or less and 
despite this 89% felt secure in their password management and security (CSID, 2012). 
Interestingly, the worst age group for password reuse were 18-24 year olds the so called 
“digital natives”, where 76% said that although they were security conscious they wanted to 
choose memorable and secure passwords and then reused them multiple times (Kurkovsky 
and Syta, 2010). 
Historically, if asked by a work colleague to divulge their password for some spurious reason, 
most people would freely do so. In a survey carried out in 2004 it was revealed that “more 
than 70% of people would reveal their computer password in exchange for a bar of chocolate” 
and “34% of respondents volunteered their password when asked without even needing to be 
bribed” (BBC Online, 2004). However with extensive press coverage of password insecurity 
following this revelation the situation improved. When the chocolate survey was repeated in 
2007 the figure had dropped slightly to 68% and then in 2008 there was a significant 




Source: APWG (2014) 
Figure 3-2. Detection of Unique Phishing Sites 
Phishing and social engineering also pose a serious threat to knowledge based personal 
security as attacks try to discover personal information that can be used to compromise the 
security of the target. Although these attacks are generally aimed at gaining banking and other 
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the naivety of users is regarded by predators and how they hope to gain such information. In 
the twelve months between the beginning of 2005 and 2006 the Symantec Network Probe 
detected an 81% increase in phishing e-mails indicating the real start of the threat (Symantec, 
2006). From this point there was a rapid growth in the detection of dedicated phishing 
websites reflected in the global industry, law enforcement, and government coalition APWG’s 
reported findings shown graphically above in Figure 3-2 (APWG, 2014). 
After the initial surge in detected phishing websites, an early peak in August 2009 was noted. 
Subsequent stabilisation and a decrease in numbers was then experienced but from the 
second half of 2011 an increase was once again witnessed, aligned with the uptake of internet 
availability and usage within China. More recently figures suggest that once again the trend 
has stabilised and fallen from a height in April 2011. 
However, an individual who is trying to compromise security without specific knowledge has 
little probability of success. The only way in which a password can be identified (without direct 
communication) is down to pure guesswork. Of course when choosing a password people 
often use dictionary words, names of relatives or places, birthdays, car registrations or pet 
names as an aide memoir. These methods can be easily broken by readily available software 
from the Internet, for example “ophcrack” which can be downloaded from the Sourceforge 
website (Ophcrack, 2014); but if dictionary words and obvious choices are avoided it becomes 
a far greater challenge for even the most determined hacker. In this instance software tools 
have to revert to brute force approaches, where increasing length combinations of every letter 
and available digit are tried in turn or by the use of rainbow tables which utilise a pre-compiled 
series of randomly generated character chains (Orbit, 2012). Clearly these can take a 
significantly long time if the password is long enough; a combination of length and 
randomness is the most astute choice. Negatively though a password such as Q2{g!L£37yKl is 
of course not easy to remember, humans as ever are the weak link in the process. 
As discussed in the previous chapter mobile phones generally use knowledge based 
authentication in the form of a four digit PIN, although some are more recently extending this 
via the implementation of pattern entry. As was highlighted, all methods come with associated 
weaknesses such as predictable choices of codes (Bonneau and Preibusch, 2010; Florencio and 
Herley, 2007) and smudging (Meitiv, 2010). Despite this, implementation of knowledge based 
authentication remains popular because it is extremely straightforward and has an inherited 
acceptance by the established user base (Crawford and Renaud, 2014). Being entirely a test of 
what the user knows the system firstly needs to enrol the user and allow them to create the 
secret piece of information. This is then stored in permanent memory in either an encrypted or 
plain form, for instance encrypted upon the SIM card of a mobile phone. When accessing the 
Chapter 3: Identification and Authentication 
- 33 - 
system, the individual attempting to authenticate enters what they believe to be the correct 
knowledge which is then compared directly with the stored sample. The resultant decision is 
Boolean and without ambiguity, it is either correct and the user is granted access or incorrect 
and the user is declined access. 
3.3.2 Possession Based Authentication 
Possession or token based security is founded upon an item that an individual carries about 
their person. Items suitable for this form of security range from keys, to magnetic swipe cards, 
to devices with inbuilt near field Radio Frequency Identity (RFID) chips. Identification and 
authentication are confirmed by the presence of these tokens during the access process; for 
instance, swiping an identity card with a magnetic stripe through a corresponding card reader 
to gain entry into a laboratory. Indeed, even the everyday process of returning home after 
work and using a key to open the front door, is in fact a form of token-based security. 
Once again, the human owner is the greatest vulnerability. In the same way that passwords are 
shared amongst colleagues, tokens are often treated in the same way (Matyas and Riha, 2002). 
However, not all vulnerabilities stem from the carelessness of the owner. Over recent years a 
number of large-scale applications have been introduced that utilise RFID based contactless 
smartcards; public transport systems being a prime example. In July 2003, the Oyster Card was 
introduced in London to enable cashless travel on the London Underground, buses, the 
Docklands Light Railway, over-ground trains and trams; it is a contactless smartcard that is 
based around the MIFARE technology. Although these cards were favourably received and 
deemed secure, in 2008 Garcia et al. published a technical paper on how to remotely read and 
clone an Oyster Card (Garcia et al., 2008). However, rather than rework the now more than 10 
year old technology, Transport for London decided to wait and introduce contactless payment 
points so commuters can pay as they go (Judge, 2014). 
Another form of possession based security that is superficially less obvious is employed in the 
protection against fraudulent action on some banking apps. For instance, when setting up a 
new payee on Lloyds Bank’s app or website the system generates an automatic phone call to 
either a pre-registered land line or mobile number and the user is required to confirm a code 
displayed on screen before they can continue as shown below in Figure 3-3. By being in 
possession of the phone and able to provide the code the bank has confirmed the presence of 
the token (the phone) and permitted the user to proceed (Lloyds Bank, nd). 
Implementation of this form of authenticated security is subtly different to a knowledge based 
approach. Enrolment is performed in one of two ways, either the user is issued directly with 
the token (e.g. a swipe card) and the action performed to inform the system of the user’s 
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token credentials; or in the case of a phone or other piece of equipment being used, the 
details of the secondary device are entered and a test transmission is performed, allowing the 
user to submit the supplied code and confirming the eligibility of the token. When 
authentication is required, the process is repeated by swiping the appropriate card, receiving 
and entering the pass code, or even double tapping a paired mobile phone, and access is then 
either granted or declined (Kastrenakes, 2013). 
 
Figure 3-3. Lloyds bank token based authentication screen 
The search for unobtrusive methods unable to be compromised by unconscious or subversive 
human action has gathered importance with bodies such as the US Government’s Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) calling for new and innovative approaches to 
security, and so the spotlight has turned upon personal characteristics that cannot easily be 
replicated by others, biometrics (DARPA, 2012; Welch, 2014). 
3.3.3 Physical Trait Authentication 
Physical trait authentication (something that a person is) within the security field has become 
known as Biometrics, a portmanteau word being formed by the blend of two Greek words; 
bios meaning ‘life’ and metrikos meaning ‘metric’ or ‘measure’ – ‘life measurement’. For as 
long as man has inhabited the Earth, humans have used an individual's characteristics such as 
their face or voice to individuate one person from another. In the middle of the 19th century 
the Paris police department under the guidance of Alphonse Bertillon evolved the idea of using 
various body measurements (for example length of arms, feet and fingers) in criminal 
identification. Fingerprints were a natural progression from this initial concept and with 
Galton’s discovery of distinctiveness the idea of recording criminals' fingerprints and storing 
them for future reference was adopted by many major law-enforcement agencies. In time, 
police were able to extract matches from typically fragmented crime scene fingerprints 
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(latents) and the birth of the use of biometrics as a form of identification had unwittingly 
occurred (Crime Scene Forensics, nd). 
Any human behavioural or physiological trait can be utilised as a biometric as long as the 
following seven criteria are met (Prabhakar et al., 2003): 
 Universality. All people should possess the same characteristic, or in a composite 
system be able to exhibit at least some of the required characteristics. 
 Permanence. Over time the element of the trait that is being measured should remain 
sufficiently constant. 
 Distinctiveness. The characteristic of any two people must be identifiably different. 
 Collectability. The trait must be quantifiable, measurable and able to be gathered. 
 Acceptability. Harmless and readily accepted by users. 
 Performance. Agile and accurate enough to function within the available resources. 
 Circumvention. Sufficiently robust to repel attack and fraudulent use. 
Implementation of a biometric system is far more complicated than the previously discussed 
approaches to authentication. Figure 3-4 below illustrates the processes involved in a 














Adapted from CESG (2002) 
Figure 3-4. A simplified biometric system  
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To enable a biometric authentication system to function a user must first enrol and provide 
specimens of the measurements or traits that will be utilised in the identification process. 
These are processed and stored as a reference template. During the verification procedure, a 
user has similar measurements taken which are then compared to the specimen template to 
establish a degree of certainty of likeness (generally a normalized value between zero and 
one). A threshold is then applied to this value to dictate whether or not the sample is accepted 
or rejected. 
For instance a human face contains about eighty significant features that can be used for 
biometric recognition such as the distance between the eyes, width of the nose, depth of eye 
sockets and the length of the jaw line. Figure 3-5 illustrates some of the recognisable nodal 
points and how they are utilised to form a unique identification matrix for an individual which 
can then be stored as a template (Heyce Technologies, 2014). 
 
Source: Heyce Technologies (2014) 
Figure 3-5. Typical measurements taken during facial recognition 
Any authentication system that utilise biometrics as a means of individuation is foremostly 
judged by two significant results which are used to test the acceptability of the process and 
whether or not it could be adopted. The first is the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and is defined 
as the percentage rate at which an impostor can pass as a valid subject; the second, the False 
Rejection Rate (FRR) is the proportion of times when a valid user is identified incorrectly as 
being an impostor. The Equal Error Rate (EER) is the point at which the FAR and FRR are 
coincident. Figure 3-6 shows in graphical form the relationship between FAR, FRR and 
therefore EER. The diagram indicates the influence of the tolerance/threshold10 setting on the 
system performance; slack tolerance will clearly lead to FRR tending towards 0% and FAR 
                                                          
10
 The threshold controls how easily a user can pass the identification process. A reduced threshold 
dictates that a low matching score will be accepted as a match whilst an increased threshold implies 
that a higher score must be achieved to attain the same result. 
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nearing 100%, whilst tight tolerance will result in a FAR approaching 0% and FRR 100%. The 
most desirable design of system will result in a minimal EER with the ultimate biometric 
authentications returning an EER of 0%. 
 
Figure 3-6. Biometric system performance rates 
Although the FAR and FRR are the primary benchmarks by which biometric authentication 
systems are judged, there are two further error rates that should be highlighted. The Failure to 
Enrol Rate (FER) is the proportion of individuals who are unable to enrol on the biometric 
system because of either a technical failure, or absence of the required trait or feature. Clearly 
a high FER will significantly impinge upon the usefulness of a biometric system because a large 
percentage of the population would be excluded from using it; without being able to enrol 
they cannot be identified or authenticated.  
The second error rate is the Failure to Acquire Rate (FAqR); the proportion of times that the 
attempted capture of a biometric sample fails. Failure to acquire can typically be caused by an 
equipment fault or external environmental conditions that are distorting the process in some 
way. For example, an external door entry system might use a video camera and facial 
recognition to control access. Poor lighting or extreme weather conditions might affect the 
image quality and therefore incur a high FAqR; or equally something as simple as vandalism 
might be the cause (Heyce Technologies, 2014). Whatever the reason, this could lead to a high 
degree of frustration being experienced by the subject attempting to use the system, affecting 
the confidence and general acceptance of the access control (Golfarelli et al., 2007). 
In a biometric authentication system the assessment of an individual’s likeness to a known 
sample or template will deliver a matching score as illustrated below in Figure 3-7. Applying an 
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acceptance threshold will then dictate the proportion of attempts that occur in either the false 
acceptance or rejection regions. A tighter threshold with a higher matching score will shift 
towards the upper extremity of the impostor distribution and therefore reduce false 
acceptance. Conversely reducing the decision threshold increases the likelihood that a genuine 
user will be accepted (by reducing rejection) but equally the number of impostors passing will 
grow (Golfarelli et al., 2007). Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 are adapted from Prabhakar et al. 
(2003). 
 
Figure 3-7. How the threshold affects the Impostor and Genuine error distributions 
The level at which the threshold is set is greatly influenced by the arena in which the biometric 
authentication is to be used. Prabhakar et al. (2003) illustrate this influence and the accepted 
degree of associated error in Figure 3-8 shown below. 
 
Figure 3-8. Illustration of error tolerated within different application scenarios 
In Figure 3-8 it is illustrated that “civilian applications” occupy the middle area of the graph 
where the EER is located and the balanced minimisation of FAR and FRR leads to applications 
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that provide the best security with low hindrance to the subjects; that is, people are falsely 
accused of, or rejected as, being someone who they are not at an acceptable rate. In 
comparison, high security applications accept a high FRR because as far as possible these 
require minimal false acceptance, only allowing authorised individuals access into the 
protected system or environment. It leads to high rejections, forcing subjects to re-
authenticate or seek authorisation elsewhere. Prabhakar et al. (2003) refer to “forensic 
applications” as ones that might be employed to undertake criminal identification, and suggest 
that they require minimisation of FRR. In these scenarios, false rejection is not identifying a 
known criminal or wanted person when their image is analysed. Authorities are willing to 
accept a high FAR in which a large volume of individuals would be wrongly identified, requiring 
manual resolution; they much prefer to check many to ensure none are missed.  
Many physical human traits have been proposed and trialled as biometric indicators from 
overtly visible parts of the body, through the way people walk and speak (Bazin et al., 2005; 
Pennebaker and King, 1999; van Halteren, 2004), to patterns exhibited when undertaking 
familiar tasks but to fully understand the power and shortcomings of biometrics further 
exploration is required (Dowland and Furnell, 2004). 
3.3.3.1 Negative Identification 
Negative identification is the process whereby the “system establishes whether the person is 
who they (implicitly or explicitly) deny being” (Prabhakar et al., 2003), which further defines 
the “forensic applications” outlined in the previous section and Figure 3-8. It is used by 
governments and airport security to check that a subject is not a known terrorist or wanted 
person, it must be executed in identification mode. However if a high performing biometric 
system operates with a FAR of only 0.1%, in a large airport processing 175,000 passengers per 
day statistically 175 false alarms11 would be expected. Although this does not appear at first to 
be a significant number the inconvenience, embarrassment and personal stress caused to the 
wrongly identified individuals could pose a public relation disaster for the airline/airport 
concerned. Bolstering the procedure by adding traditional individual recognition tools such as 
passwords or PINs would clearly be inappropriate for this process of negative identification. 
Only recently have automated biometrics operating at a high rate of throughput become 
accurate enough to support large-scale identification applications, and arguably they provide 
the only solution where negative recognition is required. By operating it (and accepting the 
inevitable FAR) in conjunction with a human to scan all false alarms might arguably produce 
acceptable results whilst saving on a purely manual system (Planet Biometrics, 2014). 
                                                          
11
 This equates to approximately one every 8 minutes 14 seconds. 
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If the system aim is negative identification it is the FRR that is much more politically sensitive. 
In the scenario outlined above the FRR dictates how many sought individuals would be 
statistically expected to pass the security checks without being identified. In the worst case it 
would only require one persona non grata with terroristic intentions to be allowed through to 
result in a potentially catastrophic outcome; a risk that few commissioning entities would 
entertain. 
3.3.3.2 Physiological and Behavioural 
Biometrics can be categorized in one of two ways: physiological and behavioural. Physiological 
techniques draw on geometrical attributes of the human body; typically fingerprints, but even 
hand geometry, retina scanning or vein pattern recognition can all be used. This category of 
biometric is considered more robust and reliable than behavioural metrics because the 
physical attributes offer greater resistance to change over time and are more likely to be 
unique across a large population (Gamboa and Fred, 2004; Monrose and Rubin, 2000). 
Behavioural biometrics utilise aspects of human behaviour to differentiate between individuals 
with measurements and comparison of voice, use of written language and even typing 
techniques being employed (Ahmed and Traore, 2007; Araújo et al., 2005; Cho et al., 2000; 
Dowland and Furnell, 2004;). This category of biometric is more prone to be affected by 
external environmental factors. For instance, background noise can seriously impact upon the 
quality of a captured voice sample, which would severely influence the observed performance 
level (Ngo et al., 2006; Pennebaker and King, 1999; van Halteren, 2004). 
Physiological biometrics is more often preferred for identification purposes because of the 
greater degree of uniqueness, experienced consistency and resilience to external corruption. 
However, they are best suited to point-of-entry scenarios where an individual would be happy 
or certainly less discontent to tolerate the inconvenience necessary to undergo the required 
process of identification (IBG, 2006). For instance, having to place a hand upon a particular 
device, or head at a specific angle, to enable the relevant scan to be taken are both obtrusive 
procedures that should not be mandatory more than once in any session. 
Conversely, behavioural biometrics suit authentication scenarios where the identity of the 
individual is already established and confirmation of a user's continuing presence is sought. In 
this mode of operation repeated unobtrusive/transparent samples could be captured and 
analysed to support the ongoing confidence in the user (Bazin et al., 2005; Clarke and Mekala, 
2007; Pennebaker and King, 1999; van Halteren, 2004). This fundamentally supports the idea 
of a new approach to mobile device security where continuity of assurance is vital and 
presents advantages when compared with point-of-entry authentication. A review of the 
current state-of-the-art is made in Section 3.3.3.6. 
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3.3.3.3 Resistance to Attack 
Intuitively biometrics appears to be resistant to attack because they are generally 
measurements of subconscious or physical traits and therefore not something that can be lost 
or forgotten. They are complicated for attackers to counterfeit - creating a false finger with an 
embedded fingerprint is not a straightforward exercise and for an attacker there are no 
economies of scale in undertaking such an exercise, it is just as difficult to create the fourth or 
fifth facsimile as it is the first. However, making a speech recording to pass voice verification 
authentication is far easier and so fake biometric attacks remain a serious concern. 
The threat posed by hackers can be addressed in two ways. By developing multimodal 
biometric authentication systems a user would be required to pass two or more specimen 
tests simultaneously; for instance, undergoing a retina scan whilst providing a speech sample 
to a voice recognition system (see section 3.3.3.5). 
The second method involves building vitality detection mechanisms into the employed 
systems. Prompting a user to recite a randomly selected phrase or alternatively detecting signs 
of pulse during a hand geometry scan should be sufficient to establish the live presence of the 
subject. 
The measures outlined above will make it very difficult for a hacker to mount a successful 
circumvention of security but there remain two further factors that should be highlighted. If an 
attack is successful and a biometric is compromised because of its permanence it remains 
compromised for eternity. A subject cannot supply or use an alternative, they have what they 
have. Additionally, with a wide adoption of biometrics it is likely that different access security 
systems would employ the same technique; thus once the biometric key has been acquired 
multiple systems become vulnerable (Prabhakar et al., 2003). 
3.3.3.4 Privacy 
Although an in-depth investigation of privacy is beyond the scope of this document it is 
sensible to offer a brief review of this area of concern to ascertain implications that will need 
consideration in the future. As mentioned in section 3.3.3.3 once compromised a biometric 
cannot be changed and therefore when this occurs it remains an issue for the subject for their 
entire life. In many cases individuals do not have the choice to opt out of supplying biometric 
samples because of policy requirements that have been introduced by entities. There is no 
decision to be taken and the ability of the individual to choose is entirely removed (Down and 
Sands, 2004). 
The use of particular biometric techniques in criminal investigation has incurred negative 
connotation and a barrier to general acceptance. Strong identifiers such as DNA or fingerprints 
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facilitate the possibility of unwanted identification. For safety reasons some people may be 
forced to legally maintain an alias which could be easily circumvented by biometric 
identification. This is often cited by objectors as a means by which government or corporate 
organisations could accumulate information and reduce the autonomy of individuals 
(Prabhakar et al., 2003). 
It is near impossible for users to repudiate a biometric identification and with the unlikelihood 
of FAR's ever reaching 0% misidentification of individuals is always a possibility. In the future, 
biometric identification may be used as evidence in legal cases but however sophisticated the 
systems become it is unlikely they will be entirely accurate and so a degree of doubt will 
always exist. 
With the advance of genetic and genome research it is possible that some physiological 
malformations might be associated with genetic disorders. Biometric samples are biological 
measurements which might inadvertently provide evidence of an individual falling into a high 
risk category and therefore afford a basis for discrimination (Fairhurst, 2003). With many 
biometric traits being overtly displayed (e.g. gait or a person's face) the opportunity to covertly 
identify people either in real-time or from recordings is possible. Additionally, in the desire to 
cut costs governments who are a significant driver of the technology are likely to outsource 
data and facilities to service providers, further raising privacy concerns (PR Newswire, 2014). 
Individuals could in fact be denied their right to privacy as biometrics are adopted and 
accepted more universally (Bazin et al., 2005). 
Legislation and enforcement by independent regulatory bodies are the two main ways in 
which privacy issues can be addressed. With the potential for abuse, such entities are likely to 
face fierce objection from opposition parties with doubt being expressed regarding the 
impartiality of the regulators. An underlying agenda will always be assumed.  
3.3.3.5 Multimodal Biometrics 
“Unimodal biometric systems have to contend with a variety of problems such as noisy data, 
intra-class variations, restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof attacks, and 
unacceptable error rates” (Ross and Jain, 2004). With individual biometrics failing to meet 
appropriate levels of acceptance attention has been turned to combining techniques in 
multimodal authentication systems (Arandjelovic et al., 2006). Biometric systems are 
constructed from four main elements (see Figure 3-4); sample capture, extraction, template 
matching and decision, and fusion of information can occur at three levels; data/feature level, 
matching level or decision level. 
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It is believed that the most effective systems integrate information as early as possible with 
the best recognition results being achieved with data fusion at the feature level. However, this 
is extremely difficult to achieve because of data incompatibilities and limits of data access 
provided by commercial biometric applications. Fusion at the matching level is more common 
(Ross and Jain, 2004). 
Number of Biometrics Method of Processing Detail 
Single Multiple sensors Multiple sensors record the same trait 
Single Multiple classifiers 
One sensor, one sample, multiple 
calculations 
Single Multiple units 
E.g. integration of two irises or multiple 
fingers12 
Multiple One unit per biometric 
E.g. voice, hand, fingerprint 
simultaneously or consecutively. 
Independence yields improvement 
 
Table 3-4. Outline of multimodal biometric implementation 
Multimodal systems can operate in three different modes; serial, parallel or hierarchical. In 
serial mode control is passed consecutively from one stage to the next and each modality 
narrows the number of possible identities before passing to the next. In this scenario an initial 
decision can be taken before acquiring the next sample helping to reduce the amount of 
processing. 
In parallel mode, information is gathered and used simultaneously from multiple sources. The 
greater the number of modalities, the larger the amount of processing that needs to be 
undertaken. Hierarchical multimodal systems combine individual classifiers in a treelike 
structure. Typically, pairs of classifier combined at each tier before control is passed on to the 
next level. This is suitable when a large number of modalities are employed. 
Factors to be considered when implementing a multimodal biometrics system are the choice 
and number of traits, the level at which fusion is to occur, methodology of integration, cost 
versus matching performance trade-off, and location and mode of data capture (Ross and Jain, 
2004). A review of the current state-of-the-art is made in the following section. 
3.3.3.6 Current Implementation 
With technologists purporting that mobile biometric authentication will only ever become 
more significant and universal, and being driven by the need to undertake mobile financial 
transactions (Beranek, 2014) and protect sensitive information, it is necessary to review state-
                                                          
12
 Using 6 fingers would stop an individual being able to register as two separate people 
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of-the-art approaches. The current lead technologies are voice biometrics, fingerprint, facial, 
iris and vein recognition, although historic proposals such as body odour detection are less 
likely to feature either now or in the future (Research and Markets, 2014; Welch, 2014). 
Voice verification 
The technology that sits most readily with mobile phones has to be voice verification (speaker 
recognition) because it can be captured and undertaken unobtrusively and without 
notification. Rather than recognising the actual words that are spoken voice verification 
captures the sound of the person speaking, converts it to a digital pattern and then compares 
this to either a specific known voice pattern (authentication) or a database of samples 
(identification). Speaker recognition is an unusual biometric because it exhibits both 
physiological and behavioural elements; the voice is created by the physiological parts of the 
body contained within the voice tract as shown below in Figure 3-9, whilst behaviourally 
individuals pick up an accent which is usually dictated by region or parental influence 
(Bayometric, 2013). 
 
Source: Peccei (2006) 
Figure 3-9. The human vocal tract 
With two factors influencing the way in which individuals speak it makes it difficult for 
imposters to precisely impersonate an authenticated user and gain access via a speaker 
recognition system, although the system can be fooled by the playback of a recording if a 
simple passphrase is employed (text dependent mode) (Bayometric, 2013). To counteract this 
weakness of narrative dependence systems often operate in either text prompted or text 
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independent (passive) modes (ICR, nd). In comparison, text prompted mode approaches 
operate by requesting the subject to repeat or utter a number of randomly selected numbers, 
words or phrases which are then compared to a known voice sample to verify identity; whilst 
text independent voice recognition usually works in the background, capturing spoken samples 
as the subject is speaking in general conversation and testing them to establish identity 
without using any specific narrative (ICR, nd). The quality of captured voice samples can be 
affected by the health of the subject, the communication channel over which the conversation 
is occurring and the amount of ambient noise in the background. These factors can intuitively 
lead to an increase in FRR because the system fails to recognise the speaker. 
One big advantage of voice verification systems is that they can generally be implemented for 
minimal additional cost. With modern mobile devices usually being produced with inbuilt 
microphones they inherently have the ability to capture the required voice samples without 
the addition of any extra equipment. The only cost is that involved with the installation and 




Source: Ridden (2011) 
Figure 3-10. A digital fingerprint scanner 
The previous chapter outlined some of the current implementations of fingerprint recognition 
on mobile phones and Section 3.3.3 also introduced how Galton had discovered the 
uniqueness of fingerprints and how they could be categorised and used to identify individuals. 
He identified that patterns on an individual’s fingertip were made up of ridges of skin and 
corresponding valleys that formed minutiae such as arches, loops, whorls, ridge endings, 
bifurcations and spots (Biometric-Solutions.com, 2013a). From a user’s perspective their 
adoption by handset manufacturers has made fingerprint security become one of the most 
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readily accepted biometric technologies. The barriers of historic mistrust have been broken 
down by familiarity of use either directly or within social circles. Electronic scans of an 
individual’s finger originally utilised a dedicated external reader as shown in Figure 3-10, 
however more recently the technology has been incorporated into mice, laptops and phones 
directly increasing its availability (Apple, 2014; Drummond, 2014; Harris, nd). 
There are four methods of digitally capturing the detail of a fingerprint, optical scanning, 
capacitance scanning, ultrasound scanning and thermal scanning (Biometric-Solutions.com, 
2013a). They all produce an image depicting the ridges and valleys of the observed finger but 
perform the operation in entirely different ways. During optical scanning light is shone at the 
finger and reflected back into the scanner; ridges are closer to the scanner’s surface and 
reflect more light, appearing as bright lines, whilst valleys are conversely dark. Capacitance 
scanning uses a variation in the skin’s ability to store electrical charge (capacitance) to build 
the respective image. The capacitance of skin varies correspondingly to its distance from a 
surface imparting an electrical charge; the further skin is away, the lower the capacitance. The 
height variation of ridges and valleys is sufficient for the detector to differentiate between the 
two and so compile a corresponding image. Ultrasound scanners transmit sound waves 
through the epidermal  (surface) layer of skin, that are reflected by the underlying dermal layer 
at different rates depending on whether it is a ridge or valley that is encountered. These 
variations in timings enable the formation of an image map that corresponds to the subject’s 
fingerprint. Finally, thermal scanning uses the perceived temperature difference exhibited by 
ridges and valleys to construct the fingerprint image (Biometric-Solutions.com, 2013a; Harris, 
nd). 
 
Source: Easy Clocking (nd) 
Figure 3-11. Steps taken to encode a fingerprint scan 
When the user places their finger onto or drags it across the scanner, the image is captured 
and the minutiae identified. These significant points form a pattern which can then be overlaid 
onto a grid and subsequently encoded into a digital sequence; these steps are illustrated in 
Figure 3-11. 
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The various types of scanner all come with associated issues. All but the ultrasound approach 
require the subject to have clean dry hands in order to be successfully scanned, although this 
ability and associated accuracy come with a high price tag. Thermal scanning is affected by 
both ambient temperature and the temperature of the subject, plus the method has a high 
power consumption rendering it less convenient especially for mobile devices. 
Fingerprints do however have the great advantage of persistence over time, once the pattern 
of ridges and valleys are laid down in the womb they remain with an individual virtually 
unaltered throughout their life. Even if the surface layer of the skin is removed, during re-
growth the same identifiable pattern returns; only if a relatively deep cut is made might the 
pattern be permanently disrupted although this in itself is a unique identifiable feature 
(Ramsland, nd). 
Facial recognition 
Facial recognition is also one of the more common biometrics that have been endorsed and 
implemented by some of the more popular mobile handset manufacturers (Apple, 2014; Kerr, 
2014). With smartphones incorporating both forward and user facing high resolution cameras 
it became a matter of software implementation to harness this physiological biometric 
technique. As shown earlier in Section 3.3.3 Figure 3-5 on page 36 facial recognition works by 
analysing a captured image to detect the face and then ascertain specific points of reference 
(Biometric-Solutions.com, 2013b); there are up to eighty features that can be used (Heyce 
Technologies, 2014). From these points spatial geometry calculations are then made and a 
digital template formed. The identification or verification process then compares the captured 
sample with known and stored reference templates to locate a match if one exists. 
Unlike fingerprints facial images are not persistent. With ageing occurring and individuals 
growing or removing facial hair although the underlying bone structure remains unaltered, the 
geometrical template might change or fail to be established. An additional weakness is that the 
capture process can be easily influenced by external factors such as poor lighting, the subject 
not looking directly into the camera or even in centralised systems, the resolution of the 
camera distorting the image leading to template inconsistencies (Biometric-Solutions.com, 
2013b). 
It has also been demonstrated that some facial recognition systems can be fooled into 
accepting photographs as valid identification even when vitality tests are incorporated (Colon, 
2013; Kelion, 2013). Folding a photograph in a particular way can be used to simulate a blink 
and be enough to trick the system. To further counteract these flaws some manufactures are 
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proposing that more extreme facial expressions be used that truly require a live person to 
perform (Gorman, 2013). 
Iris recognition 
Iris recognition has for a long time existed in the realm of science fiction and spy films, 
although more recently it has emerged within real life technology. The iris is the coloured 
circular structure in the eye which dilates and contracts in response to light, resulting in the 
appearance that the pupil is correspondingly growing or shrinking (Riverside, 2007). 
 
Source: Riverside (2007) 
Figure 3-12. Illustration of a human eye showing the iris and pupil 
Iris recognition utilises the unique colour patterns that occur within the thin structure, an 
automatic classification algorithm for which was first devised and patented by Dr John 
Daugman in 1994 (FBI, nd). During the process an image of the iris is captured via a high 
resolution camera using near infrared light (NIR) to illuminate the subject’s eye whilst reducing 
reflections and without causing them discomfort or harm. The location of the iris within the 
image is a vital element in the process and requires the accurate identification of the 
concentric outer edges of the pupil and iris. Often part of the iris is obscured by an eyelid or 
lashes, further complicating the process (Biometric-Solutions.com, 2013c). 
Once the precise location of the iris has been established a two dimensional Gabor wavelet 
filters and maps the identified region into eight concentric vectors that contain information 
pertaining to location and spatial frequency. From this information a Daugman’s 256 byte 
IrisCode can be derived and used as the biometric template (FBI, nd); Figure 3-13 illustrates a 
captured iris scan, the eight vector regions and the calculated binary IrisCode. With a template 
size of only 256 bytes it enables samples to be compared at a rate of over half a million per 
second (Biometric-Solutions.com, 2013c) and a misidentification rate of one in 1.2 million 
(Sheth et al., 2014). 
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Source: Ibiblio.org (nd) 
Figure 3-13. An iris scan showing the vector regions and derived IrisCode 
Being internal to the body and consequently relatively well protected iris patterns are 
unfaltering and permanent throughout the life of an individual. Failure to enrol rates, that is 
the proportion of people for which it is not possible to obtain an iris scan, are vey low although 
the process of enrolment itself can be difficult because of lighting issues and intrusive to 
subjects (Biometric-Solutions.com, 2013c; Sheth, 2014). 
Retina recognition 
Another form of ocular biometric recognition is retina scanning although because of its 
intrusive nature, requiring the user to get extremely close to a scanner and have a light shone 
deep into their eye, it is less commonly employed. The retina is the internal surface of the eye 
which is rich in blood supply and it is the complex network of capillaries that form unique 
patterns that can be detected and used for identification (Trader, 2012). As the retina is 
illuminated with NIR the blood rich capillaries absorb more light that the surrounding surface 
and appear as dark rivers within the eye. The pattern of light and dark can then be scanned 
and synthesised into a template. Unfortunately the retina comes without the assurance of 
guaranteed persistence because conditions such as diabetes, glaucoma and retinal 
degenerative disorders can all affect the capillaries and therefore alter a scanned sample (FBI, 
nd; Trader, 2012). 
Vein recognition 
Another variation of the same approach is vein recognition which leverages the pattern of 
blood supply within a finger or hand for individuation. This physiological biometric process is 
non-contact and poses little inconvenience to the subject with the underlying vein structure 
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being revealed once again by the use of NIR light (Vrankulj, 2014). With the veins being located 
beneath the subject’s skin the pattern is virtually impossible to forge making the approach one 
of the most secure in today’s security conscious world with an associated FRR of 0.01% and 
FAR of 0.0001% (FindBiometrics, 2014). Although vein size can alter with the age of the subject 
the relative pattern remains unaltered yielding a high degree of persistence. 
Vein recognition systems have the added advantage of being able to be incorporated into 
other items of technology such as fingerprint scanners; for example the reader depicted earlier 
in Figure 3-10 has that very function built in (Ridden, 2011). It is also not essential that direct 
contact with the reader is made, enabling the template to be extracted over short distances as 
shown below in Figure 3-14 (FindBiometrics, 2014). 
 
Source: Fujitsu (nd) 
Figure 3-14. An example of a palm vein reader 
Gait recognition 
With the inclusion of accelerometers in smartphones and tablet computers, continuous 
authentication via the use of gait analysis with minimal implementation costs has become a 
real possibility (Nickel et al., 2011). Identification via the way in which individuals walk is based 
upon five detectable motion periods of the stance phase and three within the swing phase as 
demonstrated by Figure 3-15. There are three employed methods for capturing a person’s 
walk, Machine Vision (MV), Floor Sensor (FS) and Wearable Sensor (WS); the modern devices 
with inbuilt accelerometers use WS based gait analysis (Derawi Biometrics, 2011). 
WS data collection records acceleration information in three axes; vertically, backwards-
forwards and side to side and the combination of these readings during the eight periods of a 
stride are drawn together to form a template (Nickel et al., 2011). Intuitively the effectiveness 
of gait analysis can be affected by the surface on which the subject is walking, an injury or even 
the footwear that they are wearing. Having so many external influences it is unsurprising that 
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researchers are observing EERs of 10-20%, which although useful as a supporting 
authentication method would be deemed unsuitable for primary security implementations 
(Nickel et al., 2011). 
 
Source: Derawi Biometrics (2011) 
Figure 3-15. Subdivisions of human gait used for categorisation and identification 
Keystroke dynamics 
If unobtrusive and transparent authentication is the aim one behavioural biometric that is 
ideally suited to the role is keystroke dynamics. Classification of typing characteristics or 
keystroke dynamics is based upon the timings with which keys are pressed and for how long 
they are held down whilst a subject is typing.  The latency between consecutive keystrokes 
(digraph) (Araújo et al., 2005; Bergadano et al., 2003), the length of time it takes to type 
complete words (Dowland and Furnell, 2004) and associated typing rates (Bartolacci et al., 
2005) have all been investigated as a means of classifying an individual.  When a key is pressed 
there are three distinct actions, the key depression, the key release and the holding of the key 
in the down position.  If extended in the consideration of a digraph pair the measurements 
that can be used for analysis on a keyboard are; the timing interval between the two key 
depressions, the gap between the release of the first key and the pressing of the second, the 
total digraph length - the elapsed time between the pressing of the first key and the release of 
the second (or the first if for some reason this is held longer than the second). It should be 
noted, that the inter-key latency can in fact be a negative value as often a keyboard operator 
will have pressed the second key of a digraph before releasing the first. However when 
implementing keystroke dynamic verification on mobile devices it is clear that some of the 
timing measurements outlined above will not be applicable in the absence of a physical 
keyboard that requires the keys to be pressed. It is more likely that this type of 
implementation will use digraph timings and typing rates. 
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With subjects regularly using mobile devices to compose emails, text messages and interact 
with social media, a background keystroke analysis system could easily capture the required 
data unobtrusively and monitor user identity. 
As introduced earlier there are seven criteria that biometric techniques must meet in order to 
meet implementation requirements; universality (1), distinctiveness (2), permanence (3), 
collectability (4), performance (5), acceptability (6) and circumvention (7). Table 3-5 below 
compares the degree to which the criteria are met by each of biometric techniques discussed 
in this section; ‘H’ signifies a rating of high, ‘M’ medium and ‘L’ low. To aid direct comparison 
between criteria column 7 should be read as resistance to circumvention in contrast to Jain et 
al.’s (2006) presentation of the data, and within the table the approaches marked with an 
asterisk have been added by the author for completeness. 
Biometric approach 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Facial recognition H L M H L H L 
Fingerprint recognition M H H M H M M 
Gait recognition * M L L H L H M 
Iris recognition H H H M H L H 
Keystroke analysis L L L M L M M 
Retina scanning * H H M L H L H 
Speaker verification M L L M L H L 
Vein recognition * H H H M H M H 
Adapted from Jain et al. (2006) 
Table 3-5. Criteria comparison of discussed biometric techniques 
When the approaches are compared it is evident that vein recognition meets the criteria in the 
strongest way without any low scores, whilst keystroke analysis is deemed the weakest 
technique. However, if any of these methods were being utilised as part of a multimodal 
approach they can contribute significantly and greatly enhance security. 
3.3.3.7 Summary 
As biometrics are introduced into smartphones and arise in everyday situations user 
acceptance grows correspondingly. Third party manufactures are releasing software 
development kits (SDKs) for Apple’s iOS, Android and Windows phones that utilise 
physiological biometrics, enabling developers to easily incorporate these into app security 
(Mobbeel, 2014). Furthermore, these SDKs provide end users with the ability to layer-up 
biometrics in an individual combination, yielding a multimodal solution that is specifically 
tailored (Top, 2013). 
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Facial recognition security has also been implemented across all the major platforms as a 
means of securing devices although some go further requiring users to perform a gesture such 
as a wink or raising an eyebrow in order to pass (Gorman, 2013). Apple have recently taken out 
a patent in the US to invoke additional control via face recognition, enabling screen savers to 
be blocked or caller id information to only be displayed when the user is detected as being in 
front of the screen (Colon, 2013). 
Recent reports have estimated that the global government biometric marketplace will grow by 
6.8% during the next ten years and be worth US$6.9 billion by 2024 (Atkins, 2014). With 
government spending as the key market driver and the desire to implement tighter security at 
borders, the expectation of the growth in numbers of terrorist groups and the increasing need 
to protect data, this figure is seen as unsurprising (PR Newswire, 2014). 
It has also been suggested that North America will be the dominant marketplace for biometric 
technology in the upcoming years and it is projected that fingerprint recognition will account 
for 43% of all biometric business, facial recognition 26% and iris/retina scanning 13.2% (Atkins, 
2014). Of course, as technology continues to evolve alternative cheaper methods of 
implementation might be identified that will counter these predictions and take the 
marketplace in another direction altogether. 
Whatever the future may bring, it is clear that the biometric revolution has begun and as 
people become more accepting of the technology it will pervade ever further into everyday 
life. Humans are inherently lazy and in an attempt to ease the security burden manufacturers 
and developers alike are implementing novel solutions. However, it is apparent that the 
majority of these are still point-of-entry either upon activation or for unlocking a device. If a 
device has not been set to timeout and invoke a lock screen or without activation security the 
device is and will always be vulnerable. 
3.3.4 Polled and Non-polled 
Authentication can fall into one of two categories, polled and non-polled and it is necessary to 
distinguish between these in order to understand how any new concept can utilise aspects of 
each. Non-polled authentication is user driven in that subjects present themselves to a system 
and demand to be authenticated with the process being “resolute - once the verdict is 
determined, it is inviolate until the next authentication attempt” (Jansen et al., 2004), i.e. upon 
authenticated acceptance or rejection by a system, the respective associated security status 
remains constant and unchanged until another attempt at authentication. The only action that 
can alter the status is the process of re-authentication and the user undergoing the entire 
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procedure again from scratch. Examples of non-polled authentication are passwords, facial 
recognition and hand geometry. 
Conversely, polled authentication is system driven and uses the presence of tokens or RFID 
devices. This approach is irresolute and the detection of such tokens is regarded as being 
sufficient to establish authentication which remains true whilst the object continues to be 
present. Upon the device being transported out of detectable range authentication can be 
repudiated immediately. Continual sensing of the accredited token allows authentication to be 
reassessed at any time leading to a greater confidence in user continuity. However, any such 
token can easily be acquired illicitly and if its mere presence is unilaterally enough to engender 
authentication, the system should not be regarded as secure. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the theory of identification and how sameness and persistence over 
time forms the foundation for both human-human and machine-human recognition. Although 
the philosophical and psychological discussion of identity is removed from the purely technical 
arena, it provides an understanding of what is truly meant by recognition and the process 
undertaken by the human mind to do so. Elements of this can be used in a novel approach to 
mobile device security. 
It then proceeded to examine each of the three forms of technical authentication, something 
that is known, something that is possessed or something that we are; reviewing the strengths 
and weaknesses of each and discussing means of application. 
Section 3.3.1 explored the use of knowledge based PINs and how modern technological 
developments have augmented its implementation. Although superficially these are secure 
means of authentication, examples of human frailty highlights the need for further 
development or indeed replacement.  
Similarly token or possession oriented authentication has its weakness inextricably linked to 
human beings and their propensity to lose or share security sensitive items. Although with 
smart watches becoming more prevalent throughout society the potential to utilise more 
subconsciously held tokens grows, the threat of loss is still ever present. Consequently focus 
has turned towards security with greater imperceptibility, biometrics (Donohue, 2013). 
A detailed investigation of biometrics has been outlined, discussing how systems operate, their 
resistance to attack and the difference between physiological and behavioural categories. 
Contemporary implementations of the technology have also been presented providing an 
understanding of the current state-of-the-art, although it is important to note these are 
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standalone, provide security for a single device and are only used if directly invoked by the 
owner. 
In the majority of the reviewed technology and approaches authentication is Boolean and 
point-of-entry; once access has been gained the user is free to roam through the device, being 
able to view all information contained within and utilise any of the installed applications and 
services. Authentication is simply a gateway to unrestricted freedom. With this justification, 
there is certainly a need for a new and novel approach to security, one that continually reviews 
the user and assesses on an app-by-app or service-by-service basis what is available for use at 
any given time. The succeeding chapter introduces a new approach to authentication and how 
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4. A New Approach to Authentication 
The preceding two chapters have examined the rise in proliferation of mobile devices, their 
increased portability and processing power, and the current approaches to security upon 
which owners rely to protect these valuable and desirable items of equipment. Currently 
manufacturers and developers provide security that is unresponsive or adaptive to threat, 
environment or use, and is primarily focussed on keeping out persona non grata at point-of-
entry. 
As the public at large routinely carry more devices and move towards ubiquitous connectivity 
it is reasonable to suspect that an opportunity exists to harness this potential and in some way 
use it in a novel approach to security. This chapter explores the premise by firstly examining 
the potential that exists within an individual’s locale and how this might be harnessed. It then 
continues to discuss an experiment that has been performed to assess this potential, and 
analyses if data obtained during the experiment provides sufficient evidence to support this 
theory.  
The chapter then concludes by introducing a novel approach to user authentication that is 
both adaptive and responsive, which can grow and develop with technology and provide the 
user with assurance not currently seen.  It enables the device’s owner to adapt the security per 
application or service, setting levels of access reflective of location and familiarity of 
surroundings and because it liaises and cooperates with other items of equipment, it even has 
the potential on occasions to dispense with obtrusive authentication. 
4.1 The Concept of an Authentication Aura 
In everyday life individuals are enjoying almost total connectivity as they go about their 
everyday life with pressure of work and addiction to social networking encouraging 
uninterrupted access to the internet, email and the mobile phone network. Coupled to this, 
people are concurrently carrying numerous pieces of electronic equipment such as laptop 
computers, tablets, smart phones or MP3 players, and with the internet of things becoming 
reality, a bubble or aura of technology is forming around each and every person. This is not a 
single location or a fixed set of equipment but a fluid and ever changing environment, which 
alters as an individual physically travels throughout the day, going about their business, 
interacting with technology and the environment. 
Within this bubble devices are utilised both in isolation and unison depending upon the 
process being performed. For instance sending a text message requires the use of just a mobile 
phone, whereas printing a document from a laptop utilises both the computer and printer 
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concurrently. During each interaction or device initiation a level of security and user identity 
confidence is established and exists between the user and the device(s); this in turn ‘radiates’ 
within the user’s personal localised environment. Couple this confidence and bolster it with 
other readily available information within the locale such as details of communication 
infrastructure, and the concept of an Authentication Aura is born. 
To summarise this and for the purposes of the research an Authentication Aura is defined as 
an area of close proximity to an individual in which an increase in user identity confidence can 
be gained from other trusted and present devices, their current state of authentication 
confidence, the surrounding location and the behaviour of the individual. 
 
Figure 4-1. The concept of an Authentication Aura demonstrating contributing elements 
If the concept of Aura as illustrated in Figure 4-1 is extrapolated across a population it is clear 
that several individuals will coexist in a single location at any given moment in time, being 
concurrently close to items of known infrastructure and even sharing equipment. Although 
elements of the Aura are not mutually exclusive, with the incorporation of personal electronic 
items and even superficially inert (dumb) belongings, it becomes unique. For instance, car keys 
and contactless payment cards are items that are covertly carried, with a capacity for 
detection and the potential to individuate one person from another but in themselves are 
unable to perform computation or interact autonomously. Furthermore, with the internet of 
things materialising, home appliances such as refrigerators and televisions are becoming 
internet enabled and will also have the inherent ability to contribute (Fritz, nd). 
With its capacity to be unique it is proposed that an individual’s Aura can be leveraged to 
provide a novel approach to device security. As discussed earlier, current approaches to 
security all function unilaterally, treating each particular device as an island without knowledge 
of surroundings and other possessions. As users authenticate on one device, trust is 
     
Chapter 4: A New Approach to Authentication 
- 59 - 
established and the respective device has a high degree of confidence in its user’s identity. This 
knowledge is currently kept private but if shared amongst the user’s other equipment a 
personal network of assurance could be established benefitting all items within the Aura. 
Conversely if an Aura is established and a device has knowledge of its counterparts and 
surroundings, if for some reason it is then removed and it detects a change in location the 
device can react accordingly and immediately reduce service availability. Security becomes 
responsive. 
Attaining this cooperative and reactive approach to security will definitely improve upon the 
unilateral methods in existence today but intuitively this premise requires justification. 
4.2 Justification of the Aura Concept 
Having defined an individual’s Aura and proposed how people exist in proximity to a unique 
set of devices, infrastructure and possessions, it is necessary to investigate this concept to 
establish to what extent this is the case. To enable this, information regarding the presence of 
devices and possessions in close proximity to an individual at any given moment needs to be 
collected and analysed. It is not sufficient to simply take a number of snap shots of a lone 
individual at distinct points in time, rather a continuous and extended survey is required to 
capture the number and types of device that are encountered throughout daily life. Any 
undertaken survey must be able to identify intelligent devices, inert possessions, infrastructure 
and even home appliances and equipment that might become enabled in the future, and then 
record details of the identification (such as the date and time, and for how long they were 
detected). The proposal additionally outlines that each and every person has their own unique 
set of devices (Aura) that coexists with acquaintances and strangers alike, as they move 
throughout their daily life. At any given locale, at any point in time there maybe any number of 
Auras which simultaneously need to be identified and the presence of their constituent 
devices recorded. 
To achieve this, a data capturing experiment is required which will assess the quantity and 
type of equipment that surrounds individuals within close proximity throughout the day, and 
provide information which can be analysed to further this research. Importantly the 
experiment will need to concurrently survey a number of people who live or work together so 
an assessment of how Auras simultaneously exist within the same space can be made. Not 
only will each experiment subject’s device details need to be identified and recorded, but 
those of their friends and colleagues will also require the same. This dual data will provide 
sufficient detail to ascertain the importance of the role of devices considered alien to an 
individual’s Aura. 
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For the concept of Aura to function a user must regularly encounter two or more devices 
simultaneously and so it is thus proposed that the hypothesis for this experiment should be: an 
individual regularly encounters two or more devices from which user identity confidence can 
be gleaned and combined to form an Authentication Aura.  
In the succeeding sections the experiment is proposed and explained, outlining the rationale 
behind the selected approach, examining the gathered data and the analysis of that data. 
Finally a discussion of the results is performed, concluding the experiment’s efficacy, potential 
support for the Aura concept, and whether or not to accept the hypothesis. 
4.2.1 Experiment Design 
As outlined above the experiment needs to record time-stamped information that can be used 
to identify each specific device, in addition to the quantity and types of device surrounding a 
number of individuals at any moment, and for how long each item remains in close proximity. 
This will allow meaningful analysis to be performed on the data in a variety of ways. It would 
be relatively straightforward to execute such a task on entirely intelligent devices because 
software could be designed, written and installed that would record the subject’s daily activity 
and other detectable equipment that was encountered. However the premise dictates that 
both dumb objects and equipment that might become intelligent in the future are also 
included.  
To summarize the three key requirements of the experiment are: 
1. The ability to sense infrastructure such as Wi-Fi access points. 
2. The capacity to detect a wide range of device types some of which may not 
currently possess the ability to communicate (but will conceivably be able to in 
the future) e.g. mobile telephone, laptop, personal computer (pc), printer, mp3 
player, television, telephone, car keys, wallet, refrigerator, handbag or briefcase, 
watch. 
3. To capture and record sufficient time-stamped information to enable a 
statistically significant investigation to be undertaken and a decision to be made 
to either accept or reject the hypothesis. 
An obvious solution would be to provide experimental subjects with pen and paper to record 
devices and items that surround them at any given moment, over a period of days. Intuitively 
this is far from practical. Forgetfulness and sheer imposition renders this an inappropriate 
approach; an alternative means of surveying an individual’s surrounding locale had to be 
found.  
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Consideration was also given to a mixed solution; develop software to run on a mobile phone 
that would automatically record details of surrounding devices and infrastructure via Wi-Fi and 
Bluetooth, whilst providing an interface for the user to manually record inert items. Again this 
was thought to be too intrusive, impractical and unreliable. 
To enable analysis that identifies the user and those that were encountered it is necessary to 
record the user identity, the detected device identity, the time and date that the device was 
observed and (if possible) an indicator to reflect the proximity of the entity to the user. If this 
process is repeated at short intervals it will illustrate the arrival and disappearance of users 
and their equipment, whilst providing a near continuous picture of the local environment. 
Thus, the experiment needed to be able to detect and record data autonomously, without 
intervention from the subject, continuously throughout the day, with the requirement to 
include dumb and currently incapable devices. Additionally it required the ability to 
differentiate between users’ Auras, so the approach had to identify owned and unowned 
devices in such a way as to provide separation at the analysis stage; precisely identifying each 
item and knowing its owner would provide the required detail post-experiment. To achieve 
this radio frequency identity (RFID) was identified as a means of fulfilling the experiment’s 
requirements. This was selected because it provided the ability to attach RFID tags to a diverse 
selection of objects, irrespective of capability and independent of power, that would possess a 
unique identity whilst remaining portable and unobtrusive.  
An RFID tag is a small low power electronic object that will transmit a unique numeric or given 
identity, across a short distance, which can be detected by a collector or reader. RFID tags are 
either active with an inbuilt battery powered transmission capability or passive with no 
obvious power supply (Weinstein, 2005). Passive tags are triggered into emitting their identity 
by a reader, extracting induced power from the requesting transmission. Passive tags can be 
obtained for relatively low cost and typically have a small physical footprint, their one major 
drawback is that they are limited to operating over very short distances (less than 0.5m). The 
readers required to utilise a passive RFID system are bulky hand held devices that would need 
to be carried by the experiment volunteers (Weinstein, 2005). 
In comparison, active tags are larger, more costly but with their inbuilt power supply are able 
to transmit their identity constantly and autonomously. Additionally they operate over much 
greater distances (up to 15m) and can be detected through walls and other solid objects. With 
the constant chatter that they generate, active tags can be detected by several readers at 
once, enabling multiple subjects to be in the same location without the threat of disruption to 
the experiment. The associated reader for active tags has a smaller and more practical 
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footprint which can generally be worn attached to a belt or carried in a pocket (Weinstein, 
2005). 
It was clear that an individual furnished with a number of RFID tags could then attach these to 
devices, infrastructure and personal items, enabling a reader to detect and record their 
presence. By extrapolating this across a number of co-workers, data could be simultaneously 
gathered for the group and detection of one another’s possessions obtained, providing the 
required details for analysis. Active tags provide a continuous transmission stream of their 
identity, enabling the users to move freely and immediately identify equipment when in close 
proximity. 
To facilitate the experiment equipment was sought and purchased to enable the recording of 
data simultaneously for five subjects. Although in an ideal world as many candidates as 
possible would undertake the experiment at any one time, the prohibitive cost of equipment 
restricted the sample groups to five, an affordable number that would yield a meaningful set 
of results. The personal digital assistant (PDA) RFID readers were Dell Axim x51s running a 
Windows mobile operating system and each was equipped with a CompactFlash RFID node, 
capable of reading both passive and active RFID tags. With the need to detect Wi-Fi points and 
other infrastructure, it was deemed prudent to secure active tags that would communicate 
over a greater distance. The price of the tags with batteries was £23 each and with the need to 
equip each participant with as many as possible the cost immediately became an issue. 
However, it was necessary to acquire a sufficient quantity to allow items to be tagged both at 
work and home so monitoring across a full day was possible, whilst enabling a cross section of 
devices and belongings to be selected. Funding to underwrite the purchase of seventy five tags 
was secured enabling each individual volunteer to be supplied with fifteen, permitting them to 
identify and record a sufficient number of devices both at home and in their workspace. 
To record the observed data software was written in VB.net using Visual Studio 2008 and 
released to the PDAs; the program is listed in Appendix A. It was designed to operate on a 24 
hour basis, sleeping for 50 seconds, awaking and then listening for 10 seconds, recording all 
the tags it identified in the near vicinity during the process. The system was designed to 
maintain two flat text data files during operation; the first was a summary file that recorded 
the subject’s number, the number of detected tags, date, time and a sequential number that 
would increment upon each listen. The second file recorded the details of each tag that was 
detected during each listen and held the unique tag reference, the subject’s number, date, 
time, the listen sequence number and the signal strength of the tag’s transmission. 
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Figure 4-2. A PDA with installed RFID node and five RFID tags 
Figure 4-2 above shows one of the purchased PDAs with an installed CompactFlash RFID node 
and five of the active RFID tags with their visible batteries in situ. 
Intuitively the tag data files had the propensity to become extremely large, for instance if on 
average only five tags were detected at every listen a single day would generate 300 data 
items every hour or 7200 items every day. If the experiment was to run for a week, that figure 
would extrapolate to 50,400 separate tag detects. On a laptop or tablet with sufficient 
processing capability these figures are manageable, however on a PDA with much less 
computational power and storage capacity the text file data capture becomes restrictive. To 
counteract this, the system was designed to record the data on a day by day basis and at 
midnight close the current files and create a new ones ready to receive the upcoming 
information. 
During trialling and development it was discovered that the PDAs upon first detection of a tag 
set a lock which blocked it from communicating with any other reader. Thus if two participants 
were simultaneously in the same locale, the first to arrive would lock the surrounding tags and 
prevent the later arrival from sensing any of the beacons. In order to prevent this shortcoming 
a release command had to be issued at the conclusion of each listening window, to remove the 
lock and allow other readers access to the tag. In addition, to prevent two readers having their 
activity at the same time, the internal clocks of the five PDAs had to be precisely synchronized 
and each staggered with a different start time during a minute. For instance, PDA number one 
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was programmed to start its listening period at precisely the start of each minute, PDA number 
two at twelve seconds after the start of each minute, PDA number three at 24 seconds, four at 
36 seconds and finally the fifth at 48 seconds or twelve seconds before the start of the next 
listen by PDA number one. By separating the listening periods in this way it prevented any of 
the PDAs from blocking any of the others. 
Instructions were then compiled (Appendix D), ethical approval sought and granted (Appendix 
E), and the experiment was prepared; all that remained was to recruit the experiment’s 
subjects.  
It was decided to run each experiment for a period of 14 continuous days to provide a 
sufficient quantity of readings that incorporated both weekdays and weekends. Groups of 
volunteers were sought who worked in a single location to provide some crossover of Auras, 
with each individual receiving fifteen tags and instructed to place these on or by devices or 
personal belongings both in the workplace and at home. Some tags were to be placed on 
communal equipment that would be shared and used by many during a normal working day. 
For instance, it was suggested that a photocopier or printer be chosen, or even a refrigerator 
within a communal kitchen.  The precise list of suggestions that was made to the volunteers 
was mobile phone, work PC, home PC/laptop, work Wi-Fi point, home Wi-Fi point, TV(s), car 
interior, car keys, wallet/purse, MP3 player, work bag/briefcase, home telephone, bedside 
clock, fridge, Hi-Fi and coat pocket. 
Companies outside of the academic arena were specifically targeted because it provided an 
opportunity to explain the research to lay people, gauge their reaction and whether they 
believed there was merit in the novel approach to authentication. Each of the companies 
approached had to be of a sufficient size to ensure five co-workers would be willing to 
volunteer and in fact several companies immediately refused to participate on the 
misunderstanding that the experiment would contravene in situ privacy policies and Data 
Protection. Eventually four companies agreed to cooperate: a school, a firm of local 
accountants, a scientific research establishment, and a highways department within a local 
authority. Each company was visited in turn, the volunteers briefed and the experiment 
performed. 
Anecdotally the majority of volunteers at first meeting expressed a reticence at participating 
and were keen to understand more fully any potential impact upon their privacy. However, 
once the data collection was verbally explained in detail and how the information would be 
used any signs of mistrust disappeared. Universally they were extremely interested in the 
concept and understood how it could benefit them as users, agreeing that they found the onus 
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of repeated authentication burdensome. Two of the accountancy staff felt that they used 
technology so infrequently that it would not impact them significantly, although if it were 
extended to PC desktops (which it could easily be) they would acknowledge increased 
convenience. 
4.2.2 Gathered Data 
 
Figure 4-3. User 3's completed tag location form 
Upon completion of each 14 day tranche of the experiment the created data files were 
downloaded and the PDAs reset in preparation for the next set of volunteers. Each of the 
seventy five tags possesses a unique 12 digit hexadecimal reference that it would transmit (e.g. 
8A11F411574C) but for user convenience had been labelled with a sequential number 1-75. As 
part of the experimental process each volunteer was requested to identify each of their tags 
with an item of equipment, stating its location and whether it was situated at home or work. In 
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turn, each subject’s tag data was imported into a single Excel spread sheet and then cross 
referenced to ascertain the respective item of equipment.  
Figure 4-3 above shows the user form completed by subject 3 illustrating how they described 
their RFID tag placement, and Figure 4-4 illustrates a two minute extract from the same 
volunteers detected tag comma separated variable (CSV) data file showing the unique tag 
reference, the subject’s number, date, time, the listen sequence number and the signal 
















Figure 4-4. Subject 3's tag data file sample showing tag id, user, date, time, sequence & strength 
From the tag data it is evident that during the two listens that have been shown (one at 
12:48:28 and the second at 12:49:28) the same seven tags were detected on both occasions.  
Tag Identity Label Owner Location Equipment Type Dumb/Intel 
8A112711574C 50 2 W Printer D D 
8A112B11574C 62 2 W PC other's D I 
8A112311574C 54 2 W PC D I 
8A11DC11574C 41 3 M Mobile D I 
8A11FA11574C 15 3 M Coat O D 
8A11D311574C 38 3 M Bag O D 
8A11FF11574C 10 3 M Laptop D I 
 
Table 4-1. The corresponding cross referenced detail 
Introducing the transcribed information from the user forms as shown above in Table 4-1 it is 
possible to decipher what is occurring. The location indicates that the equipment is situated at 
work (W) or is mobile (M) and not fixed in a single position, type specifies if the equipment is a 
device (D) or something else, other (O), and under the ‘Dumb/Intel’ column the equipment is 
categorised as being either intelligent (I) or dumb (D). In addition in a full dataset an item can 
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also be located at home (H) and have a type of ‘I’ indicating that it is regarded as 
infrastructure. 
If the cross reference detail is applied to the data and noting that the tag data is recorded by 
subject 3 (as shown in Figure 4-4), it can be deducted that subject 3 had entered subject 2’s 
office; user 2’s PC, printer and ‘PC other’s’ were detected, revealing the location of the 
meeting. User 3 was also close to their mobile phone, coat, bag and laptop. It could be 
conjectured that subject 3 was perhaps leaving for lunch or returning after it as the readings 
were taken at 12:48 and 12:49, carrying their personal belongings with them, and on the way 
they entered subject 2’s office to speak to them. During this innocuous everyday occurrence it 
revealingly becomes apparent just how much information is available and currently going to 
waste. 
Operating the PDA RFID readers constantly was battery intensive and so recharging was 
necessary to be undertaken twice a day; an extended overnight charge, and ad hoc periods 
during the day when subjects were at their desk and it was convenient to return the device to 
its charging cradle. However, upon return of the experiment equipment it rapidly became 
apparent that users had experienced problems in maintaining charge because within the 
captured data blocks of time were absent and corresponding data missing. Despite this 
1,576,340 separate tag readings were captured at an average of 78,817 per subject, with a 
standard deviation of 33,430.64. As such 100% of the reading sizes are within three standard 
deviations of the mean, indicating that the data is indicative of a normal distribution, and more 
that one and half million samples are easily sufficient to have significance and provide 
meaningful analysis. Table 4-2 below lists the number of observed tags identified during the 
experiment for each of the twenty participants. 
Subject Readings  Subject Readings 
1 43,540  11 95,970 
2 117,054  12 31,097 
3 105,087  13 104,029 
4 12,805  14 90,109 
5 45,453  15 95,203 
6 121,256  16 49,587 
7 37,970  17 82,147 
8 122,484  18 91,665 
9 119,057  19 88,554 
10 66,773  20 56,500 
 
Table 4-2. Quantities of recorded readings for each of the twenty experiment participants 
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It is evident from the data tabulated above that there is a large variation in the quantity of 
recordings made with user 4 (only 12,805 observations) performing particularly poorly and 
subjects 1, 5, 7 and 12 also recording comparatively few. Anecdotally user 4 reported 
afterwards that during the fortnight’s experiment they had suffered illness and been confined 
to bed for a number of days which impacted upon their participation in the experiment. The 
following section undertakes analysis of the data for individuals and the subject group as a 
whole. 
4.2.3 Data Analysis  
It is firstly important to note that upon initial investigation the recorded data between 
midnight and 6am remained consistent and unwavering. During this time, it was evident that 
users had understandably replaced their PDA on its respective cradle to be charged and so it 
remained in a static location repeatedly observing the same tags located in the near vicinity. 
This data was deemed to be insignificant in terms of investigating the Aura concept and was 
consequently ignored during analysis. This resulted in a 22.527% reduction in the observed 
dataset size, lowering it to 1,221,243 readings.  
Additionally because of the persistently large volume of data involved and the need to plot and 
review the findings graphically, the granularity of the images that follow have been reduced to 
either fifteen minute periods rather than each individual minute. For each hour four datum 
points will be drawn instead of the full sixty, increasing clarity and enabling inferences to be 
made. Also, removing the data that occurred between 6am and midnight resulted in the 
horizontal axis only representing 18 hours rather than a full 24, further aiding clarity and 
interpretation. 
 
Figure 4-5. A typical subject's weekday observations 
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Figure 4-5 illustrates the number of unique devices observed by an individual during a working 
week (Monday-Friday). Each day is plotted as a separate set of readings with individual data 
points representing the average number of detected devices within a fifteen minute period 
plotted against the time of day that the observation was made. In comparison Figure 4-6 
illustrates the weekend tag data for the same user. 
Examining the plots in unison it is evident that the weekday diagram exhibits a maximum 
average of ten devices being detected in any given observational period whilst at the weekend 
this figure peaks at twelve, suggesting that more static tags were located at home rather than 
at work. However, with such a high number of observations being recorded at both home and 
work it is apparent that the majority of tags were placed on portable possessions that the 
subject carried with them throughout the day. During the workdays there appears a high 
degree of variation in the number of observed devices implying that this subject is active 
during their employment and even spends time out of the office. Time away from their usual 
location can be perceived from the data on Tuesday and Thursday between 10am and 4pm 
where the average falls to a single unit. 
 
Figure 4-6. The same typical user's weekend observations 
It is also possible to observe from the weekend data that a greater number of devices are 
detected through the morning and up until 4pm. After 4pm the quantity drops suggesting that 
the subject was away from home or at least changing their location, without porting some of 
their personal devices with them. Whatever the movement of the user or the day that is 
observed, it is clearly apparent that a significant quantity of devices are consistently detected 
throughout; the subject is consistently within close proximity of contributable possessions. 
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If subject 14 is examined in isolation because they had a near median number of total 
detections, and the data is grouped into 30 minute sections, the average number of devices 
found during each listening window throughout their experiment participation is shown below 
in Table 4-3. 
Viewing the data in this way immediately highlights the completeness of the data for this 
average user, with the empty data cells illustrating periods of down time or time out of reach 
of any personal devices. The highest average number of devices found was 15.67 and was 
recorded on the second Tuesday of the experiment for the half hour from 13:30 until 14:00. 
The data also indicates that when devices are found they are seldom in isolation, the lowest 
average number is 1.2 and was recorded in the period running up to midnight on the second 
Monday but only a total of 14 of the observations shown have an average less than 2.0. 
Examination of the summary data indicates that during this period the PDA performed 12,470 
listens with only 269 of these failing to identify any devices, a success rate of 97.84%. 
Extending this one stage further reveals that only 167 attempts detected a lone device, just 
1.34% of the total observations. 
Time W Th F Sa Su M Tu W Th F Sa Su M Tu W 
06:00   5.20 4.00   3.93 3.57 3.23 2.73  4.47 2.77 1.97 1.37 
06:30   7.23 4.00   3.77 3.70 3.47 2.87  4.67 2.80 2.10 1.40 
07:00   7.00 4.00   3.83 3.93 3.70 4.60  4.27 2.90 2.93 1.43 
07:30   7.13 4.00   3.87 4.33 4.17 4.83 3.21 4.23 2.33 3.13 1.87 
08:00   5.55 4.17  13.00 6.64 4.58 6.13 8.67 3.77 4.33 4.64 3.36 2.67 
08:30   2.00 4.07  10.47 13.30 10.90 6.53 4.03 3.87  3.33 11.33 5.26 
09:00 7.50   4.37  14.03 13.90 8.60 3.00 2.00 3.63  10.57 13.53 9.53 
09:30 9.00   5.20  12.10 13.97 8.13 2.56 1.80 3.50  13.17 13.33 11.77 
10:00 12.70   5.40  12.90 14.23 7.47 1.97 2.00 3.43  12.83 11.83 12.77 
10:30 11.62   5.37  13.23 13.17 8.40 1.87 2.00 3.83  12.93 11.70 13.00 
11:00 10.88   5.47  6.36 13.43 6.47 1.87 2.00 4.57  12.73 12.03 13.07 
11:30 12.30   5.57  14.37 15.60 8.43 1.93 2.00 4.03 3.20 12.53 13.47 13.13 
12:00 10.03   5.23  12.13 15.10 9.73 2.00 2.00 4.17 3.45 13.17 13.77 13.17 
12:30 8.60   5.27  12.00 13.37 10.57 2.00 2.00 4.20 3.17 12.33 14.07 13.43 
13:00 5.00   5.50  13.00 4.50 8.30 2.00 2.00 4.17 3.23 13.87 14.70 12.77 
13:30 9.58   5.47 6.62 12.93 3.00 7.97 2.00 1.97 4.13 3.43 13.57 15.67 12.73 
14:00 12.90   5.30 3.93 13.67 8.55 11.70 2.00 2.00  2.93 12.80 14.07 12.97 
14:30 10.77   5.50 4.33 13.13 11.30 9.43 2.00 1.93  3.20 11.83 14.37 12.50 
15:00 11.52   5.37 4.63 13.53 12.13 13.10 2.00 2.00  4.23 12.33 14.83 13.00 
15:30 13.10   5.40 4.47 14.17 11.70 13.63 2.00 2.07  3.90 12.10 14.60  
16:00 13.07   5.17 4.53 12.93 11.37 11.67 1.93 3.00  4.40 13.60 14.83  
16:30 11.40   5.37 4.17 13.13 12.10 13.03 2.00 3.00  3.83 14.03 13.53  
17:00 8.53   5.43 4.03 10.80 3.77 12.08 4.21 4.76  3.43 10.80 10.03  
17:30 2.87  5.00 5.27 4.17 6.37 2.00 5.07 4.23 5.40  3.90 2.44   
18:00 7.67  3.80 5.30 3.80 5.00 4.83 4.17 3.03 5.37  4.00 3.87 3.03  
18:30 6.53  3.37 5.30 3.87 5.00 5.07 4.00 3.13 5.50  3.57 3.67 3.47  
19:00 6.03  3.43 6.90 3.47 4.97 5.97 3.93 3.13 5.57  3.13 3.93 3.07  
19:30 5.67  3.50 6.70 3.50 4.83 6.13 3.40 3.07 5.43  2.90 4.03 2.97  
20:00 4.07  3.83 6.37 3.43 4.97 5.50 3.70 3.00 5.00  2.80 4.03 2.90  
20:30 3.45  4.27 6.13 3.93 5.17 5.33 3.90 3.03 5.23  2.87 3.90 2.40  
21:00 3.13 6.75 3.80 6.33 4.07 5.07 5.30 3.97 3.13 4.23  2.93 3.93 2.27  
21:30 3.63 5.40 3.87 6.00 5.43 4.87 5.57 4.00 3.87 3.70  2.77 3.23 2.43  
22:00 3.77 5.07 3.97 5.67 4.13 4.97 5.57 3.60 3.97 3.73  2.60 3.87 2.60  
22:30 2.13 5.13 4.03 5.73 2.31 5.00 5.67 3.47 3.87 3.57  2.83 2.17 2.97  
23:00 2.30 4.97 4.00 6.20 2.40 5.00 5.63 3.27 3.87 3.67  3.77 2.33 3.33  
23:30 2.13 4.93 4.00 4.17 2.13 4.07 4.13 3.37 3.90 3.83  4.10 1.20 2.83  
 
Table 4-3. Subject 14's average number of detections in each half hour period 
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If the data from all the experimental groups is combined, these two figures can be compared 
against the experimental average as a whole; Table 4-4 shows the number of detected devices 
for each listen when the experiment data (post 6am) is combined for each group of subjects. 
Furthermore Figure 4-7 illustrates this in graphical form and from this it can be seen that no 
devices were detected on 2.36% of occasions and a single device on 9.96%. These figures are 
higher than those experienced by user 14 although it still supports the hypothesis and 
indicates that elements of an individual’s Aura were detected on the majority of attempts. 
Number of Experiment group Total 
devices detected 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 detections 
0 1,171 2,591 1,686 558 6,006 
1 7,018 3,663 4,243 10,413 25,337 
2 7,167 6,832 6,957 12,381 33,337 
3 6,808 3,744 9,812 15,878 36,242 
4 5,783 4,189 8,046 10,844 28,862 
5 4,703 4,354 7,470 9,535 26,062 
6 7,756 7,337 6,946 5,977 28,016 
7 6,616 9,852 4,514 2,339 23,321 
8 3,416 10,251 2,930 4,590 21,187 
9 1,766 7,155 1,138 220 10,279 
10 1,061 1,490 1,177 3,525 7,253 
11 834 7 1,367 36 2,244 
12 149  1,658 8 1,815 
13 34  1,897 2 1,933 
14   1,313 12 1,325 
15 1  784 2 787 
16   312  312 
17   81  81 
18   24  24 
     254,423 
Table 4-4. Number of detected devices on each listen, combined into experiment groups 
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It is vital to also understand the types of device that are being detected in addition to just the 
quantities. Examining a single user in isolation the breakdown of their device detections 
reveals the distribution shown in Figure 4-8 below. This indicates the percentage of 
observations that recorded each of their fifteen RFID tags, cross-referenced to identify the 
specific devices or items of equipment. Clearly from this histogram, there is one personal item 
that was detected far more often than any other. The subject’s wallet was observed during 
approximately 45% of all recordings executed during the two week experiment in comparison 
to their burglar alarm, PC, upstairs phone and hall phone, all of which were detected far less 
than 1% of the time. 
 
Figure 4-8. A single user's specific device observations during the experiment 
It is therefore imperative to compare the rate at which inert devices or personal items are 
detected as opposed to intelligent ones. For the same user, by plotting days’ observations in 
isolation (Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10) it is possible to visually examine more clearly how the 
user’s routine affects the number and type of devices that are detected. These diagrams 
illustrate the continuity of presence for each possession or item of equipment across the day in 
ten minute periods, when contact is established and when it is lost. Additionally, other users’ 
devices (Other devices) and infrastructure are also shown indicating when they are also 
detected. Intuitively, these foreign device contacts only appear on the weekday plot (Figure 
4-9) because the other members of the experimental group were all work colleagues. 
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Figure 4-9. A user’s isolated single weekday activity 
 
 
Figure 4-10. The same user’s isolated single weekend day activity 
Illustrating the earlier discussion, in both examples nearly the entire observation window from 
6am to 12pm has at least one device within detection range at any given moment. Indeed, 
closer examination appears to suggest that the inert devices are present most consistently 
throughout the day, supporting the potential for leverage. Indeed within the entire dataset 
coats, work bags and hand bags all topped the frequency chart for particular participants.  
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Figure 4-11. Daily activity for a poor performing experiment subject 
The diagrams presented above have been selected to indicate a good spread of devices 
throughout the day where the user did not run into any experimental difficulties. Compare 
these figures above with a user who did not manage to fulfil the criteria and ran into problems 
as shown above in Figure 4-11. It is immediately evident that the lack of captured data is 
meaningless in terms of the experiment analysis, although it does serve to remind that these 
anomalies should be expected. A full set of these charts are available on the data disc included 
with this thesis as indexed in Appendix F. 
 
Figure 4-12. Percentage share of each category of detected items 
One of the most important elements of the experimental observations to be considered is Wi-
Fi infrastructure such as public hot spots, work and home access points. As people move 
throughout their daily routine it is one of the main factors that could be utilised to establish 
location, being unseen and static there is a real potential to leverage the information it 
provides. If the number of infrastructure detections is examined it superficially appears that 
only 8.69% of detections fell into this category as shown in Figure 4-12. However on further 
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1 47.70%  11 23.61% 
2 42.98%  12 62.19% 
3 70.40%  13 26.71% 
4 12.06%  14 28.16% 
5 0.55%  15 58.04% 
6 60.93%  16 31.20% 
7 3.19%  17 59.91% 
8 8.61%  18 9.32% 
9 70.94%  19 3.99% 
10 4.28%  20 30.75% 
 
Table 4-5. Percentage of infrastructure detections by subject 
The volunteers who partook in the experiment all decided to place the majority of their tags 
on dumb and intelligent devices rather than infrastructure, the most items of infrastructure 
that anyone chose was two. Consequently it is expected that infrastructure will constitute a 
minimal share of the total number of readings. A far more indicative statistic is to examine 
what percentage of readings encountered at least one item of infrastructure; analysis 
discovered that 35.24% of all captured data met this criteria. However, viewing the subject-by-
subject results as shown in  
Table 4-5 it is clear there are significant fluctuations in the observations with the highest 
detection rate experienced by subject 3 when during their participation they detected 
infrastructure on 70.40% of their reads but in contrast user 5 only achieved 0.55%. This further 
analysis certainly suggests that infrastructure detection can contribute significantly to an 
individual’s Aura. 
Figure 4-12 also indicates the observed relationship between intelligent and dumb devices, 
with the computationally incapable items being detected three times as often as their 
sophisticated counterparts. This bias is fundamentally reflective of everyday life; people have a 
tendency to carry more inert items than intelligent ones. Although several intelligent devices 
are carried and used, items such as wallets and handbags are kept close by their owners and 
ported throughout the day. All experiment subjects tagged more of these than the high value 
items leading to the 69%:23% disparity. 
If the type of detected device is examined further and the occasions when only one category is 
identified as shown in  
Table 4-6, it is apparent that only dumb devices were detected on 25.07% of occasions, only 
intelligent on 1.51% and only infrastructure 0.09% of the time. Once again though, these 
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figures are slightly misleading with three subjects observing only dumb devices more than 70% 
of the time. All volunteers detected just a single type at least once with user eighteen the 
lowest overall figures recording 1.12%, 2.45% and 0.0% for the three device types respectively. 
Fourteen subjects experienced no infrastructure only listens but only one, user ten, no dumb 
only reads. 
Subject Dumb Int. Inf.  Subject Dumb Int. Inf. 
1 30.16% 0.75% 0.00%  11 74.63% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 1.74% 2.24% 0.00%  12 36.27% 0.00% 0.00% 
3 3.06% 2.02% 0.14%  13 7.47% 0.35% 0.00% 
4 61.81% 0.00% 0.00%  14 70.47% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 3.96% 2.46% 0.00%  15 13.42% 1.91% 0.00% 
6 8.10% 0.07% 0.20%  16 66.28% 0.00% 0.00% 
7 71.90% 0.00% 0.64%  17 40.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
8 10.61% 0.00% 0.30%  18 1.12% 2.45% 0.00% 
9 10.75% 0.07% 0.40%  19 32.15% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 0.00% 4.51% 0.35%  20 0.38% 11.45% 0.00% 
 
Table 4-6. Percentage of dumb, intelligent and infrastructure items when only a single one identified 
Extending this analysis to the next stage, when the data is examined to ascertain on what 
percentage of reads a mixed sample of device was encountered (that is at least two of the 
three types during any single listening period) the results shown in  







1 69.09%  11 25.37% 
2 96.02%  12 63.73% 
3 94.78%  13 92.18% 
4 38.19%  14 29.53% 
5 93.58%  15 84.67% 
6 91.63%  16 33.72% 
7 27.46%  17 59.91% 
8 91.84%  18 96.43% 
9 88.78%  19 67.85% 
10 95.14%  20 88.17% 
 
Table 4-7. Percentage of mixed types of detections by subject 
These results indicate that overall mixed types of device are encountered on 73.48% of all 
reads with subject eighteen experiencing the highest result of 96.43%, whilst user eleven 
contrasted this with only 25.37% of occasions. 
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The following section reflects upon these results and then establishes the basis for the next 
tranche of work. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
The preceding section examined the gathered data to establish the quantity and frequency 
that owned and known items were within detectable range during everyday life. Although 
some of the data was lacking in volume because of difficulties experienced by some 
volunteers, the outcome from the experiment has to be regarded as a success. The devices 
appear to have operated successfully and although anecdotally some users reported the 
experiment as a little restricting, none found it burdensome to the point where they 
abandoned participation. All have provided data that is contributory to the research and 
supportive of the project as a whole. 
When analysed the quantities of recordings lay within the parameters indicative of a normal 
distribution with 100% of the data falling within three standard deviations of the mean. The 
saturation of observations certainly indicates that one or more objects were identified for the 
majority of individuals’ waking hours, being detected on 97.84% of all attempts with 
infrastructure being found on 35.24% of occasions. 73.48% of all attempts detected a mixed 
range of items identifying at least two of the three categories; dumb, intelligent and 
infrastructure.  
With two or more devices being detected on 87.68% of occasions the results certainly lead to 
the acceptance of the experimental hypothesis that significant numbers of devices are 
encountered to enable the Aura concept to function. Furthermore, it is certainly clear that an 
individual’s Aura of devices could be built from a consistently diverse range of items. 
The experiment was designed to additionally establish the relationship between dumb and 
intelligent items. It became apparent that inert items and possessions were observed more 
than three times as often as intelligent ones, with dumb devices being detected on 68.63% of 
all occasions.  This significant figure suggests that these superficially lesser objects can 
contribute hugely if a means to incorporate them into an individual’s Aura is found. If several 
items are consistently within detectable range at any given moment, it should be possible to 
use these to identify an individual. Couple this with the ability to recognise familiar locations 
and already it appears as if the basis for an adaptive response may be possible.  
The plotted activity charts for weekdays and weekends further supported this theory, 
illustrating how the movement of an individual throughout the day results in a changing profile 
of detected items. Time spent at home and work could easily be distinguished in addition to 
visibly underlining the saturation of device detection. From these charts it was also possible to 
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identify how one user could also leverage the presence of someone else’s devices. When time 
was spent in communal areas other subject’s equipment was identified on a regular basis, 
suggesting that if harnessed this might further support locational information or strengthen 
the user’s Aura. 
In summary the experiment and analysis of the gathered data suggests that the concept of 
Aura is valid and provides reassurance of identity. The following section will build on this 
premise and outline how an individual’s Aura can be used to build and adaptive and 
cooperative approach to authentication. 
4.3 Conclusion 
So far this chapter has defined an individual’s Aura and how the undertaken experiment has 
confirmed its existence and quantified the diversity of the devices contained within. It has also 
demonstrated how people exist within their Aura during everyday life and how its profile 
adapts to change of location and contact with work colleagues or family members. This section 
will outline how this detail can be leveraged in the search for a novel approach to user 
authentication. 
The concept of an Authentication Aura is two-phase. The first phase is designed to counteract 
the accepted fragility of Boolean point-of-entry security that once passed gives the user 
unfettered and consistent access to all applications, data and services that lie within the device 
being secured. Currently when a user successfully authenticates on a device the confidence 
that is established in the user’s identity is 100% and remains so for the duration of their usage 
session. The concept aims to improve upon this by utilising a continuous authentication 
scheme that sets confidence in the user’s identity based upon authentication method used, 
elapsed time and location. 
The second phase of the Authentication Aura leverages the confidence gained from the 
surrounding Aura and associated devices. As established earlier, the user’s Aura contains 
intelligent devices that are capable of calculating and maintaining their own Aura confidence 
level. Enabling them to communicate their current status will permit the host device to 
incorporate this confidence value into its own confidence assessment. Additionally, the regular 
presence of inert items and possessions is evident from the analysis that has been undertaken. 
These items can therefore also contribute towards the confidence calculation by incorporating 
them as tokens; the more there are, the more confident the host device should be that 
authenticated identity has not changed. 
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In summary an Authentication Aura is a cooperative and adaptive approach to mobile security 
that utilises surrounding possessions, devices and infrastructure to enhance user identity 
confidence against which apps and services with preset thresholds can either have activation 
and use permitted or denied. 
There is one further requirement for the Authentication Aura to fulfil. It was observed earlier 
in this document how users carrying multiple electronic devices currently have the repeated 
arduous requirement to authenticate on each device during activation. If upon activation the 
Authentication Aura immediately polls the surrounding Aura and the confidence gained is 
sufficiently high it will be possible to remove the need for the user to authenticate. Immediate 
access to the device can be gained without the usual associated inconvenience. 
Having now established the overarching concept of an Authentication Aura and the interesting 
potential it harbours the next chapter expands  upon the ideology outlined above and 
examines in detail the elements that will be required to implement this novel approach to 
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5. Elements of an Authentication Aura 
In current systems, each authentication measurement is treated as discrete and independent, 
and users may have to remember a variety of information and/or carry a variety of physical 
tokens with them in order to achieve authentication in different contexts (Tanvi et al., 2011). 
When considered from a holistic perspective, this can clearly be seen to be inconvenient, and 
potentially over-complex. The Authentication Aura introduced in the previous chapter 
proposes a distributed approach that can improve the situation by bringing together a range of 
authentication methods (e.g. based upon secret knowledge, physical tokens, and biometrics) 
that can operate across multiple devices and services within a user’s personal area, their Aura. 
The intention is not to simply achieve a single sign-on, whereby authentication to one device 
automatically authenticates the user to all others for an unlimited period. Instead, by 
intelligently combining authentication measures from the different devices and techniques 
used within this network, the concept of an Authentication Aura can be established. When 
access to a new device or service is requested, the strength of the user’s Aura will determine 
whether they will be granted access automatically, or be required to perform an explicit 
authentication. This strength will vary depending upon when the user last performed an 
authentication, and with which technique it was achieved (e.g. a measure obtained from a 
physiological biometric could well be weighted higher than that from a password) 
(AuthenticationWorld.com, 2006; Clarke and Furnell, 2007). This distributed and collaborative 
environment seeks to improve the level of authentication security and improve the 
convenience for users. 
 
Figure 5-1. Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent contribution to the Aura 
From the strength of the experiment results outlined in the previous chapter it indicates that 
the Authentication Aura should use intelligent, dumb devices and even innocuous possessions 
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that have computational capabilities and able to interact with the user and one another, whilst 
dumb or inert possessions are those that do not currently possess this ability. For some 
intelligent devices it might be possible to undertake continuous authentication (such as voice 
recognition during telephone calls) to provide frequently reconfirmed identity details and a 
valuable confidence contribution, whilst others might simply act as tokens, their physical 
presence at a location being the only information of use. Figure 5-2 illustrates how the 
information might then be relayed amongst a group of commonly owned devices and where 
relevant, some of the authentication techniques that could be employed. Note that the three 
intelligent devices receive and provide information, whereas the possessions and 
infrastructure only act as providers. 
 
Figure 5-2. The potential inter-device relationship and authentication techniques 
This chapter builds upon this proposed concept of an Authentication Aura by examining in 
detail the elements required to implement this novel form of mobile device security, 
discussing the strengths and weaknesses of each and how practical the respective element of 
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5.1 Inter-Device Trust 
One of the fundamental principles of an Authentication Aura is its ability to draw information 
from surrounding devices and infrastructure. To achieve this, a communication channel will 
have to be established and opened during operation, allowing information to be received and 
transmitted. With data being communicated between devices consideration needs to be given 
to trust and whether or not it has to be established prior to invoking the Authentication Aura 
or if trust can be learned by the participating items with suitable intelligence. 
Superficially the latter option appears more desirable because no initial enrolment or human 
intervention would need to be undertaken, each device would autonomously learn. In this 
scenario however, to initially relay confidence between devices without trust would be 
meaningless. For instance, if device A authenticates person X and transmits this to device B 
which it has detected as being in near proximity, device B is now aware that device A is 
confident in the identity of its own user but does not possess intrinsic trust and knowledge of 
device A. Without prior trust and knowledge there are no means by which the devices can be 
assured that the identity of their own users is the same - they may simply be communicating 
with an item owned by an entirely different person who just happens to be nearby. It could be 
suggested that upon receipt of such knowledge from a nearby device, the user could be 
obtrusively informed of the receipt and polled to ascertain if the communicating equipment 
should be trusted. The counter argument is that this approach opens up the Authentication 
Aura to spoof communication and the potential for users to unwittingly accept communication 
from illicit devices by mistake. It is therefore clear that trust must be established between 
devices within the Aura as part of the initiation requirement.  
An enrolment process similar to Bluetooth pairing will be necessary to distribute inter-device 
awareness and the relevant information to enable common identity of individuals to be 
undertaken. Once a new device has been introduced to an established piece of equipment, the 
knowledge of the established entity could be automatically shared and transposed onto the 
new arrival which in effect would limit the entire introduction process to a single action, 
reducing the burden for the user. 
5.2 Functional Requirements 
There are a number of criteria that a functioning Authentication Aura will have to meet should 
any implementation be deemed a success. These requirements provide an understanding of 
the Authentication Aura’s aims, what it will achieve and some of the expectations that a user 
will have. This section introduces these benchmarks and describes the rationale behind each 
one. 
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5.2.1 Non-intrusive 
One of the key motivations for this research was the repeated intrusive nature of current 
authentication implementations which is exacerbated by individual’s possessing multiple 
devices. Thus during the process of authentication and operation it is imperative that minimal 
intrusion is made upon the individual because safeguarding the user experience and quality of 
service is of primary importance (Ngoc, 2007). It is important to avoid asking direct questions 
of the user and prompting for responses which will impinge upon the flow of work being 
undertaken on the device at the time. As far as possible the techniques employed must 
operate imperceptibly in the background during normal situations and will only become visible 
if an authentication by the user is absolutely necessary and cannot be undertaken in any other 
way. 
An obvious candidate to meet these criteria is non-intrusive biometric authentication which 
can be performed invisibly and continuously in the background whilst the user continues to 
interact with the device. With service access being restricted as confidence in the user’s 
identity is eroded it can be implemented as required to re-establish maximum confidence. 
Intuitively the ability to invoke such an approach is dependent upon the target device and its 
capability to perform the necessary processing and data capture. Smart phones, tablets and 
laptops would clearly be able to meet this requirement utilising methods such as voice and 
facial recognition or even keystroke dynamics. 
Standard Description 
ISO/IEC 24713-1:2008 Information technology -- Biometric profiles for 
interoperability and data interchange -- Part 1: 
Overview of biometric systems and biometric 
profiles 
ISO/IEC 29164:2011 Information technology -- Biometrics -- Embedded 
BioAPI 
ISO/IEC 29109-5:2014 Information technology -- Conformance testing 
methodology for biometric data interchange formats 
defined in ISO/IEC 19794 -- Part 5: Face image data 
Source: ISO (nd) 
Table 5-1. The key ISO Biometric standards defined by ISO committee SC37 
To future proof the system and leverage the most advantage from new and emerging 
technology a universal and adaptive interface will be required that complies with the key ISO 
standards (ISO, nd) as shown above in Table 5-1 but will also be able to use less sophisticated 
traditional methods. This will provide a fully inclusive Authentication Aura that can utilise the 
greatest diversity of devices, ensuring the most benefit is gained from their presence. 
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5.2.2 Flexible metrics 
The premise of the Authentication Aura is to protect the host device and the services it 
contains, whilst leveraging maximum advantage from familiar surroundings, devices and 
possessions alike. The experiment findings supported the inclusion of a wide and varied range 
of devices. To achieve this, parameterisation will facilitate an adaptive approach that 
incorporates this diversity at the lowest level but where appropriate has the scale to 
concurrently underpin sophisticated items.  
The Authentication Aura will incorporate parameterisation at its core providing the ability to 
adjust settings and influence the way in which it operates. However, it is important that as 
default the system is set with restrictive parameters to implement strict initial security, 
protecting the device to a high degree without the need for user intervention. Any user should 
only consider making adjustments when they become comfortable with the concept and 
confident in their understanding of the influence of the parameters. 
To maintain adaptability it is necessary to impart the Authentication Aura with the facility to 
restrict service access and application use on an item-by-item basis. At any given moment the 
Authentication Aura will possess a user identity confidence rating and restricting service and 
application access based on this rating will yield the desired control. Parameterising these 
access thresholds will enable bespoke control to be maintained and provide the required level 
of flexibility. 
With devices in the Aura having varying perceived degrees of significance the flexibility to 
reflect this is also required. Introducing a ranking system that will enable a weighting to be 
assigned to a device will once again allow a common approach to cope with the diversity of 
equipment. Assigning a parameterised level to a device will then allow the system to adapt and 
deal with items on an individual basis. 
Location of the user at any given time is also a key influence upon the Aura’s performance. As 
discussed earlier the risk associated with locations is correlated with the familiarity of those 
surroundings and the perceived threat associated with being there. Flexibility can be 
introduced by assigning weightings to categories of location and then linking these to known 
static devices or infrastructure. This will equip the Authentication Aura with the ability to 
recognise where it is and under what level of response it should function. 
With all the metrics listed above those that are deemed to be of a lesser threat or influence 
will be given a lower weighting, and those that are considered more of a threat and sensitive 
will conversely receive a higher factoring. Potentially these can be adjusted by the user 
although any user burden must be minimised which is achievable via the use of a strong set of 
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default values. If these rankings are then incorporated into the calculation of user identity 
confidence (see section 5.5) it will provide the owner with the ability to influence operation 
and adapt functionality. 
5.2.3 Rigorous authentication 
The employed solution should operate with strict rigour when authenticating an individual and 
immediately reject detected impersonation whilst minimising false acceptance and rejection 
rates. As outlined in section 5.2.1 this will vary from device to device and the corresponding 
available methods of authentication. If a choice exists, the Authentication Aura should always 
invoke the strongest form of authentication available, not only to secure the host device but 
also as a contribution to the Aura as a whole. It must be the responsibility of any partaking 
device to add as much as possible to the collective, ensuring that all devices concurrently 
maintain the highest level of user identity confidence.  
Different techniques will be allocated varying starting percentages of confidence meaning that 
when a user authenticates the Authentication Aura will not automatically set the identity 
confidence to 100% but to the parameterised level instead. Techniques such as iris or retina 
scanning will intuitively be allocated a very high percentage (if not 100%) because of their 
proven strength, whilst PIN authentication might only be given a 70% initial value. This will 
provide a mechanism through which the user can adjust the contribution to the Aura that a 
method makes and how it will effect ensuing confidence calculations. 
Utilising parameterisation of authentication percentages and rank of authentication methods 
will yield the necessary information to meet these requirements further supporting the need 
for flexibility.  
5.2.4 Supports multiple identities 
Multiple identities will need to be supported by the employed framework across a number of 
different platforms (Ngoc, 2007). With devices being shared amongst family, friends and work 
colleagues the ability to manage these with minimal intrusion is paramount. As an individual 
picks up and uses a device it is imperative that the Authentication Aura does not assume 
identity and immediately open itself up for use if suitable confidence can be gained from the 
local environment. Auras are not mutually exclusive with common devices likely to appear in 
more than one, especially in the home environment, and so without safeguards unwarranted 
access could be permitted by incorrect identification. 
However, the Authentication Aura must allow a new user to create a profile and introduce 
devices personal to them once access to the device has been gained via standard 
authentication, and beyond this manage the multiple identities. Upon activation it will be 
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necessary to simultaneously assess multiple Auras to gauge if numerous matches exist and 
further more rigorous checks need to be made to ensure accurate identification is maintained. 
5.3 Influence of Location 
Location has a major influence and indeed is one of the cornerstones of the Authentication 
Aura as introduced earlier in the discussion of Flexible metrics in section 5.2.2. Recognising 
location via known infrastructure or static equipment will influence degradation of confidence 
and even parameterised thresholds for service activation and application use. Security invoked 
at home is intuitively less than that required when a device identifies itself as being in an 
entirely alien environment. Identity confidence should be eroded more slowly and levels at 
which authentication is required, lowered. 
Additionally, people interact differently with technology in different environments (e.g. the 
usage of a laptop during working hours may be starkly different to its usage at home in the 
evening) and so the Authentication Aura will need to adapt and use appropriate 
authentication. Although the strict identity of an individual remains unaltered the perceived 
identity can be quite different for some biometric authentication methods such as keystroke 
analysis. 
An advantage of knowing a person’s location would be sufficient for applications to carry out 
predetermined actions in a given situation, such as muting a mobile phone whilst at the 
cinema or in a library. In these cases, the person's relationship or interaction with a place is 
more important than the physical location (Hazas et al., 2004). Although the determination of 
such actions could be considered burdensome, the Authentication Aura has the capability to 
meet this need if so desired. 
The influence of location is coupled closely with the degradation of confidence. Section 5.5 
expands upon this concept and explains in detail how the two Aura elements work in unison. 
5.4 Taxonomy of Device Interaction 
Exploring the taxonomy of device interaction will give an understanding of the relationships 
that need to be established in order to facilitate the implementation of an Authentication 
Aura. Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 already illustrated some of the types of interaction that will be 
experienced and indicates how both one way and two way communications will need to be 
accommodated. 
Below are outlined each category of relationship and a discussion of scenarios where this 
interaction may occur. Each relationship is initiated by a user's device on which they have been 
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authenticated (either directly or by Aura assessment) and the target device with which the 
liaison is to be established. 
5.4.1 Own New or Un-trusted Device 
This inter-device relationship triggers the procedure of enrolment, discovery and introduction 
necessary for the new equipment to operate as part of the Aura. For instance, when a new 
mobile telephone is purchased by an individual, upon initiation, it will have no knowledge of its 
surroundings or kindred devices and equally the other pieces of equipment owned by the user 
will have no prior knowledge of the new item. Initially security will have to be set to the 
highest level by all devices in the security cooperative, even though some of them are familiar 
to each other. This is because in the worst-case scenario, following initial authentication the 
owner may have had all items stolen and the presence of a new device might indicate their 
removal. 
Enrolling new devices into the Authentication Aura framework will require a phase of tentative 
introduction in addition to self user verification as soon as feasibly possible. During this pairing 
like process the individual devices must be satisfied with the authentication process on both 
items before the new entity can be confirmed as being a new member and extension to the 
Aura. Following this, ongoing operation would adopt the methodology outlined in the 
following subsection. 
5.4.2 Own Trusted and Established Device 
Within this relationship all devices are owned by an individual, with trust and knowledge of 
each other having already been ascertained. Typically this might be the relationship 
established between an individual's smart phone, personal computer and tablet. Each device is 
known to every other, and upon initiation there is a level of anticipation regarding the 
presence of the other devices that can contribute towards the Aura. With the inclusion of 
location recognition and the contribution from these devices the requirement to authenticate 
on a newly activated device might be negated. For instance, having logged onto a PC via 
fingerprint authentication and with the presence of a PIN enabled smart phone, activating the 
user’s own tablet whilst at home might draw sufficient confidence from the two sensed and 
recognised pieces of equipment to facilitate access without need for further security 
assurances. 
This taxonomy encompasses both intelligent and dumb devices although the relationship 
between an intelligent and a known dumb device is only one way as illustrated earlier in Figure 
5-1. Enough detail will be held to recognise the inert equipment when encountered but 
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because of its incapability to converse it can only be used as a token, merely its presence 
contributing to the Aura assessment. 
5.4.3 Alien New or Un-trusted Device 
A precursor to the taxonomy discussed below in subsection 5.4.4 and interaction with an 
alien13 device is the enrolment process that must be undergone to introduce the assurance 
necessary for cooperative working. It is unlikely that this will be an entirely unobtrusive 
process; it will require some human intervention. Alien devices are generally used for less 
onerous tasks such as printers and refrigerators. This category of equipment, from the 
perspective of the user, can usually be regarded with complete confidence and act as tokens in 
contribution to the confidence calculation. Communicated information, in the majority, flows 
from the device within the Authentication Aura to the alien device; for example a printer only 
transmits job status information in the reverse direction. The printer is more intent on 
establishing whether or not it should accept the print request.  
In general, alien devices will always remain external to the Aura and therefore recognition 
must be established by listening to the near vicinity, identifying networked devices and 
transmitting polled requests for identification. Once a list of present and currently unknown 
devices has been compiled it will then be a manual task for the user to review each and specify 
the appropriate interaction. 
5.4.4 Alien Trusted and Established Device 
Some devices, even though they are deemed trustworthy, will always remain alien to the 
Authentication Aura and never accepted as part of it. However, in the future it may be possible 
for the alien device to utilise the confidence of identity established within the Aura for its own 
purposes, provided it is known to the Aura. An example of this might be the approach of an 
individual to a cash-point machine (ATM). Upon entry of the customer’s cash card and 
associated PIN the electronic items held about the person could be polled by the ATM to 
identify themselves but in consequence the Aura would not expect the ATM to become a part 
of it. The ATM system would need to have prior knowledge of the items owned by the 
customer and be able to cross reference these against the user's cash card; it is not secure to 
unilaterally act upon the device identification because of the possibility of theft. 
The Authentication Aura must be able to deal with such a scenario and respond accordingly. 
Devices will need to be allocated controls that govern their social promiscuity and identify the 
mode in which they will be expected to cooperate with encountered entities. It is essential 
                                                          
13
 In this context an alien device is one not exclusively owned by the user 
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that the method of secure identification that is synthesised will allow recognition of alien 
devices whilst protecting against spoofing attacks. Only with assurance that the nearby alien 
device is in fact what it purports to be will the Authentication Aura be confident enough to 
enter into appropriate negotiation. 
5.4.5 Shared Computational Capability 
A further subset of a user’s own trusted and established devices (section 5.4.2) are those that 
are able to share computational capability. In some established relationships one device might 
be capable of capturing information that can potentially be used for authentication but 
because of computational restrictions be unable to process the information autonomously. If 
however the capturing device is able to transmit this information to another Aura member 
which has the capacity to process the data, the receiving device can undertake authentication 
on behalf of its colleague and either convey the outcome or use the result for the benefit of 
the Aura. 
For example some MP3 music players have inbuilt cameras and Wi-Fi capability that will 
enable them to capture a facial image of the user but they are incapable of independently 
acting upon it. If it can transmit the image to another device within the Aura that can process 
this information, resultant successful analysis will provide authentication with a good 
confidence contribution. 
To establish these symbiotic relationships additional parameters will be required to identify 
devices on either side of the affiliation, signifying those that can capture information and those 
that can process it. This identification process would have to be undertaken after any mutual 
trust or recognition has been established. 
5.5 Degradation of Confidence 
On the majority of personal devices, as an individual authenticates, the piece of equipment 
establishes a confidence in the user’s identity. In most scenarios this is Boolean, in that the 
user is either believed to be whom they claim to be (they pass the authentication process) or 
they are not (they fail). As a consequence, the confidence in the user’s identity is either set at 
total (100%) and universal application access granted, or it is none and the user is barred. One 
of the fundamental concepts of the Authentication Aura is the degradation of a user’s identity 
confidence over time, with the associated restriction on service access as the tariff reduces. 
High confidence will permit the use of expensive applications and access to sensitive data, 
whilst reduced confidence can be used as a cue to block the use of these functions (Clarke, 
2011 p. 180). Then when confidence erodes to a suitably low level, or a high level action is 
attempted with insufficient confidence, re-authentication of the user will be necessary to 
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ensure continuing availability of use. This proposal is similar in concept to an approach 
outlined by Clarke and Furnell (2007) and Furnell et al. (2008). The original IAMS and updated 
NICA frameworks discussed how eroding confidence could be used to shutdown the 
availability of applications until an intrusive specific authentication was required to enable the 
user to continue device use. Although the current work does not specifically develop its 
proposals based upon these publications, it does acknowledge the detail contained within and 
the similarity in approach. This section examines the degradation of confidence and how it will 
impact upon functionality of an Aura’s devices. 
Initial assessment of confidence in the user’s identity will be established by the Aura in one of 
two ways. Upon activation of a piece of intelligent equipment, the surrounding locale is polled 
for trusted and recognised devices to establish a confidence level. If recent and high level 
authentication has been performed on one or more nearby devices, the inherited confidence 
can be established and may well be sufficient to postpone intrusive authentication. If the 
contribution from the Aura devices is insufficient to achieve this state, the traditional second 
method is invoked and explicit authentication is required from the user to directly establish 
the confidence in their identity. Upon completion of either of these processes and with the 
confidence level set, the device will proceed to operate within the Aura framework. 
The first fundamental influence upon confidence erosion is time, as time passes suspicion 
regarding the user’s identity should increase. It is an inversely proportional relationship as 
captured below in Equation 5-1 which illustrates that as time (t) increases (t approaches 
infinity) the core confidence (C) of device x will tend to zero.  
   
   
       
Equation 5-1. Relationship between time and identity confidence 
Intuitively the erosion of confidence can take many forms from linear erosion, through curved, 
to stepped reductions as illustrated below in Figure 5-3; even a combination of more than one 
form of degradation as shown in Figure 5-4 might be appropriate in some situations.  
 
Figure 5-3. Graphs of varying approaches to confidence degradation over time 
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Different approaches might be suited to different devices within the same Aura. For instance a 
high value device that holds sensitive information might require an initially rapid decrease in 
confidence which slows as time passes (graph B), whilst a lesser item of equipment could be 
suited to a slow linear reduction in identity confidence (graph A). It can also be argued that 
following strict authentication it is unlikely that within a short period of time the device would 
be lost or stolen; it is probable that it is being used and consequently in the user’s control. To 
reflect this a degradation path should be chosen that erodes slowly to begin with but then 
gathers pace as more time passes as illustrated in graph C. 
C
t  
Figure 5-4. A combination of confidence degradation approaches over time 
A further influence on the process which has already been referred to earlier in this chapter is 
location. There are two main types of location that any user will experience, those that are 
familiar and known, and those that are alien and unrecognised by the device. However a finer 
granularity can be introduced by dividing familiar locations into home and work;  
Table 5-2 summarises the categories of location and how they influence security. 
Location Threat Description 
Home Low 
Location most familiar to user and devices where security can 
be most relaxed. Multiple static inert devices present. Several 
users sharing the same device. Accessible infrastructure. 
Work Medium 
Regular weekday time spent at this familiar location. Security 
can be slightly relaxed although device removal a possibility. 
Some shared device usage. Multiple familiar but un-owned 
devices present. Accessible infrastructure. 
Alien High 
Unknown location, unlikely that any other familiar devices are 
present. Unknown inaccessible infrastructure. 
 
Table 5-2. Summary of locations 
Consequently home is where confidence should erode at its slowest, work at a medium rate 
but when in an alien location and the user is away from both work and home confidence must 
decrease at its most rapid as shown in Figure 5-5. It is evident that the influence of location 
must be incorporated into the degradation calculation in a way that will influence confidence 
accordingly. 
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Figure 5-5. Confidence graphs illustrating the influence of location 
It is important to highlight that when strict authentication is successfully performed by the 
user the level of confidence in identity, immediately afterwards, will not necessarily be set to 
100% as a default. Previously in section 5.2.3 it was discussed how authentication techniques 
vary in rigour and strength, and how parameters will dictate the initial core confidence 
allocated following authentication. For instance Figure 5-6 shows how authentication methods 
with varying rigour will reduce the starting percentage of confidence and subsequently affect 
the rate of degradation even when the location of the user remains unaltered. An iris scan has 
the highest starting confidence value with slowest degradation because of its rigour and 
imparted security, voice recognition is awarded a lower initial confidence and a medium rate 




Iris scan Voice PIN
 
Figure 5-6. Confidence graphs illustrating the effect of different authentication methods 
With consideration being given to all of these requirements it is possible to now summarise 
the core confidence calculation in the following equation. 
              
Equation 5-2. The core confidence calculation equation 
In Equation 5-2 it is noted that the core confidence of device x is a function dependent upon 
time since authentication on the device (tx), the method of authentication (mx) and the 
location (l). Additionally because this confidence is a percentage the function will be bounded 
above at 100 and below at zero. A vital caveat to this function is that confidence erosion must 
be treated as an iterative process and not as a direct time calculation. This implies that when 
location is changed via the user physically moving the effect will be to alter the rate of 
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degradation from that point onwards to ensure that the Aura is still influenced by the time 
spent at the previous location. For instance when a user leaves home if a complete 
recalculation (non-iterative) took place it is likely that a huge dip in confidence would 
immediately be experienced, triggering service barring or a polled request for authentication 
artificially early. 
Figure 5-7 below illustrates the comparison between the iterative and non-iterative approach 
described in the previous paragraph. The point at which the user leaves home is evidently clear 
but the iterative graph indicates how the influence of the time spent at home remains when 








Figure 5-7. Comparison of iterative and non-iterative confidence calculation 
Within the Authentication Aura confidence erosion will be offset and potentially reversed by 
confidence gained from the user’s personal Aura and so it is important to remember that 
although degradation is a fundamental process it is only one element of the entire approach. 
In the remainder of this chapter these other influences will be discussed and the overall form 
of the confidence equation introduced. 
5.6 Information Policy 
It is imperative to establish a policy regarding the information that flows amongst the 
elements within an Authentication Aura which will control its effect and duration of validity. 
Information will be received by a device in response to a request for status updates, as un-
polled detail from other Aura members or as identification of dumb devices and infrastructure. 
This section will examine these scenarios and discuss the length of time for which it can be 
regarded as significant. 
When an intelligent device is activated and its Authentication Aura system launched the first 
process it will have to undertake is to ascertain what other devices are near, operational and 
prepared to cooperate. This will be achieved via transmission of a general request for status 
information to the local vicinity to engender replies from other Aura members. Those that are 
present and active will respond and their contribution to confidence assessed; the conveyed 
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detail will specify the last time of strict authentication and an indicator signifying the strength 
of the method used. 
The same data should also be transmitted whenever strict authentication is performed upon 
any device capable of relaying the information. Although the authentication has occurred in 
isolation transmitting the detail will benefit the Aura as a whole, enabling interested receiving 
devices to gain the greatest advantage from the knowledge to maximise their own confidence 
assessment. 
Intuitively it is unreasonable to treat the received information with the same significance as 
time passes. If a communication is received indicating that authentication has just been 
successfully passed on a device, at that moment it is extremely significant and should port an 
equally significant proportion of confidence to the receiver. However as time passes, without 
further status updates being received and although the contribution should still be counted, it 
will carry less significance. The Authentication Aura should address this situation in two ways; 
firstly any received contribution assessment will be degraded over time, and secondly at 
parameterised intervals all contributing devices must be polled to ascertain their continuing 
presence and their current status, ensuring that all information is as up to date as possible. 
In a similar manner, inert devices and infrastructure that are acting as tokens and indicators of 
location will also be polled on a parameterised time interval to ensure they are still within the 
Aura’s active vicinity. Implementing another user controlled parameter to dictate this time 
period not only complies with the requirement for flexible metrics (refer to section 5.2.2) but 
also gives the user control over the performance of the Authentication Aura. However, the 
presence of the token inert equipment is Boolean in contribution, it is either detected and 
adds to confidence, or it is undetected and considered absent. For this category of device the 
policy will be to include its existence when relevant without degradation over time, with the 
only influence being the user controlled significance rank. For instance detection of a 
contactless payment card might be deemed more significant than the presence of 
computationally incapable MP3 player. 
            
Equation 5-3. The contribution to confidence made 
by an intelligent device 
          
Equation 5-4. The contribution to confidence made 
by an inert device 
 
Utilising this information policy enables the realisation that the confidence contributions made 
to the Authentication Aura by any individual intelligent device (i) (shown above in Equation 
5-3) is a function of the time since successful authentication and the method used, and those 
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of inert/dumb devices (d) (Equation 5-4) is a function of the user controlled device security 
rank (r). 
The equations shown above encapsulate the parameters to be used when formulating the 
confidence contributions of both inert and intelligent devices but only when simulation has 
been performed and analysis of performance observed will it be possible to establish the 
precise detail of each function. 
5.7 Data communication 
As illustrated earlier in Figure 5-2 the Authentication Aura relies upon the communication of 
information between intelligent devices, and the sensing of infrastructure and inert devices. 
The concept of Aura is focussed upon the local vicinity that surrounds the user at any given 
moment and so it is across this area that communication must be enabled. With security being 
the primary focus, to minimise data leakage to eavesdropping equipment inter-device 
communication should only operate over a relatively short distance such as 3-4m. This will also 
ensure that should some equipment be surreptitiously removed it will quickly drop out of 
communicable range and its contribution to the Authentication Aura lost, reducing the 
confidence of the host device. With the development of technology a number of methods are 
now in-built and available for use; for instance NFC, RFID (NFC being a form of RFID), Bluetooth 
and Wi-Fi are all commonly resident in the modern smartphone and able to impart 
information (Baker, 2011; Bluetooth, 2014; RFID Journal, 2013). Dumb equipment and 
infrastructure however, are used as location identifiers and tokens but do not as a rule have a 
variety of options available; they are either detectable or not, and generally via a single 
communication channel. For example Internet access points are Wi-Fi enabled, contactless 
payment cards utilise NFC and car keys RFID. Although NFC is specifically designed to operate 
over a very short maximum distance of 4-5cm the underlying RFID technology has the ability to 
be detected over greater distances which qualifies it as a usable candidate (NFC Forum, 2014; 
Rapid NFC, 2013). 
To get full advantage from the local vicinity it is vital that the Authentication Aura will have to 
adapt and possess the potential to use all of these methods as required. It will simultaneously 
be required to monitor all channels and transmit responses or requests appropriately. 
The vast majority of inter-device communication will consist of short individual text strings 
that contain details of performed authentications or Authentication Aura generated messages. 
However, as previously outlined there will be a requirement to pass captured biometric 
samples for analysis from one device to another. These are much larger blocks of data and 
because of their sensitive nature must be appropriately secured. Utilising a long-term 
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symmetric key which could be exchanged between devices when their initial trust is 
established, from which short-term symmetric session keys are generated to encrypt the 
biometric sample that has been captured prior to transmission (Xiao et al., 2013). Pre-encoding 
the data sample in this way will secure it and ensure that if captured by an alien device it will 
remain protected. 
To achieve the required data communication Bluetooth has the greatest suitability because of 
its minimal footprint, wide availability, resistance to interference, low power usage and overall 
flexibility (Ang, 2008). Taking devices through the pairing process during setup will inherently 
introduce a level of inter-device trust and knowledge, providing confident communication and 
an immediate degree of security. The element of the Authentication Aura that manages 
communication however will require inbuilt flexibility to utilise a variety of the methods 
outlined above and adapt as required.  
5.8 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the core functional requirements and elements of an 
Authentication Aura upon which a detailed framework can be built. It has highlighted the need 
for the transfer of information relating to location, time since authentication and the method 
used between trusted devices, and how this combined with the presence of other detected 
possessions can be used to calculate a positive confidence contribution. In contrast it has also 
examined the erosion of identity confidence and general functions for its calculation have 
been proposed. Although without simulation it is not possible to precisely define the specific 
functions that will be employed in any of the listed elements it is imperative to understand 
how they relate to one another. As such, the distinct constituents can now be combined and 
the formula for the calculation of identity confidence visualised. 
                           
 
   
           
 
   
  
    
    
    
      
    
 
Equation 5-5. Combined identity confidence equation 
In Equation 5-5:   
x signifies the user device on which the confidence C is being calculated and C is bounded 
within the range 0.0 to 100.0 inclusively. 
Function F1 calculates the amount of core confidence held by the host device x, using the time 
(t) since authentication was carried out on the given device (x), m the method of 
authentication that was used and the location (l) of the user. 
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n represents the number of intelligent devices and p the number of dumb that constitute the 
current active Aura. 
Function F2 yields the contribution to confidence that each intelligent Aura member (i = 1..n) 
makes to the receiving device x. This function utilises the time (t) since authentication was 
undertaken on the contributing device (i) and the method used (m). 
The confidence contribution assessment of dumb and inert items to the receiving device x is 
calculated by function F3. Each of these Aura members’ (d = 1..p) addition is simply based upon 
their rank (r), a numeric indicator used to represent their significance. The total inert device 
contribution is bounded at a parameterised upper limit a to block excessive influence being 
gained from this element of the Aura. 
The following chapter will now build upon these concepts and detail a framework which will 
administer and control an Authentication Aura, providing a route to simulation and further 
analysis. All of the core elements introduced will form the fundamental premise for the 
framework and enable it to be developed in a focussed and controlled manner, whilst precisely 
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6. Authentication Aura Framework 
Now that the supporting principals have been ratified by the experimental results and the core 
elements introduced in the previous chapter it is necessary to establish a framework within 
which a functioning Authentication Aura can be constructed. The framework must enable a 
member device to identify its current locale, recognise and communicate with the 
infrastructure and other devices contained in it, and interpret this information to formulate a 
confidence coefficient of user identity. This figure can then be used as a user adjustable 
security control to either permit or deny service and application usage upon the host device, 
enhancing the security of the device and benefitting the user with an increased assuredness of 
its integrity should it be lost or stolen, or when operating in an unfamiliar environment. 
A fundamental principle of the Authentication Aura is its capability to function for a user with a 
single device without contribution from external influences, or grow into a collaborative 
network of trusted devices, further supported by possessions and infrastructure. The member 
devices can be intelligent with the ability to perform independent computation and 
communication such as tablet computers or smartphones, or dumb with merely the ability to 
be detected, for instance car keys or contactless credit cards. Hence the framework and 
resultant product must be able to adapt to changing environments, a variety of devices, and 
the arrival and disappearance of member items at random intervals during operation. It is a 
fundamental principle that the Aura will be gregarious and include as many devices as 
possible. This requirement will maximise the influence that can be obtained from the Aura 
members and provide the greatest security assurance for the owner when using multiple 
devices. Further to this, to provide an additional benefit, some intelligent devices will be able 
to provide an authentication service to other less capable pieces of equipment. That is, a 
laptop could undertake voice recognition on behalf of a basic mobile phone that is capable of 
capturing a voice sample but lacks the processing power necessary to perform the analysis and 
authentication. By capturing the sample and transferring it to the laptop for analysis, it would 
be able to undertake a higher level of authentication than would otherwise be possible. To 
ensure data integrity it is vital that this process be performed in compliance with the ISO 
standards for biometric information interchange highlighted earlier in Source: ISO (nd) 
Table 5-1; that is standard ISO/IEC 24713-1:2008 (ISO, nd) which specifies details of how the 
data should be exchanged between devices and the precautions that should be taken to 
ensure data integrity and protect its security. 
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Finally, it is paramount that the framework design produces agents with small footprints, 
enabling them to be deployed upon the greatest range of devices, whilst providing a level of 
sophistication that will administer the Authentication Aura effectively. To achieve this it is 
imperative that any resultant design be focussed and efficient, with size being kept to a 
minimum. 
This chapter will explore in detail the components of the framework, how each functions and 
the interoperability that is necessary to achieve the requirements above. Initially a diagram is 
presented to provide an overarching understanding of the framework with an associated 
outline of the components and their role in its operation, which is then supplemented by a 
more detailed investigation and explanation of the specific function of each. 
6.1 Anatomy 
A diagrammatic view of the framework is shown below in Figure 6-1 which outlines the 
elements and interconnectivity that has to be incorporated into the design. The diagram 
divides the internal structure of the agent into two discrete groups, the data and the 
processes. The data is intuitively a key element in the design of a functioning Aura agent with 
the data tables and the information stored within dictating the flexibility of the Authentication 
Aura to adapt and its ultimate capability. The processes collectively form the agent and are the 
logical blocks that undertake data processing, initiate internal and external communication, 
and provide the agent with the sophistication required to establish and manage the user’s 
Aura.  
 
Figure 6-1. Authentication Aura implementation framework 
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The framework diagram illustrates the presence of three distinct databases, Temporary 
Storage, Aura Detail and Application Security. Although in implementation it is probable that 
the agent will contain a single database with multiple tables, to facilitate clarity and for the 
purposes of this thesis the tables have been grouped into these three disparate types. Table 
6-1 below outlines the data tables contained in each of the three groups to provide an 
understanding of the information that will be held. 
Database group Data table Description 
Temporary storage 
Message cache 
Stores received messages from other Aura members in 
preparation for processing. 
Authentication sample 
Holds data samples supplied by other Aura member 
devices that require authentication e.g. a voice sample. 
Aura detail 
System parameters 
Controls the parameters and variables required by the 
system to function. These are both default and user 
amended values. 
Location 
This table will hold the locations at which devices can 
be found. Initially it will default to Home, Work and 
Away but will be user extensible. 
Device 
Stores the records of trusted devices that can become 
members of the Aura. 
Aura 
This key table holds the details of the current Aura and 
the status of the member devices. 
Application security System security 
A table of thresholds used to control the confidence 
level at which application invocation and service 
activation is denied. 
 
Table 6-1. Database structure 
For further clarity Figure 6-1 presents a separation between the databases and the processes. 
However, in reality each is inextricably linked with the other and thus precise details of the 
data tables will be explained in conjunction with their controlling processes. Firstly though, it is 
appropriate to introduce the required processes and provide an insight into the function of 
each. 
The information necessary to operate the Authentication Aura is drawn from the surrounding 
environment, be this sensed infrastructure, tokens or communication from other active Aura 
members within communicable distance. Figure 6-1 illustrates a representative mixed sample 
of data sources, showing items such as keys, Wi-Fi access points and electronic devices passing 
information into the agent via the Sensor. It is important to reiterate that some of these items 
(e.g. keys) may not be intelligent and possess the ability to communicate; rather their mere 
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presence is sensed and used as a contribution14. The information obtained from each can vary 
greatly, from indication of presence to complex biometric data samples for analysis. The 
Sensor will react appropriately to the type of data, collate the received detail and place it into 
a Temporary Storage database for later processing.  
The Aura Security Manager (ASM) is the core processing unit of the framework. It utilises the 
information held within the Temporary Storage invoking appropriate processing procedures as 
required. Upon installation the ASM directs the user to define system parameters and tailor 
the system to their specific requirements; this process is administered by the Policy Manager. 
When the system is activated the Policy Manager is also called to initiate operational 
parameters and thresholds in preparation for ongoing functioning. 
When captured data samples are passed to a sophisticated device for analysis and 
authentication by a less capable device, the ASM uses the Authentication Manager to 
undertake this process. Dependent upon the category of data sample the Authentication 
Manager will utilise external Authenticators to perform the relevant processing. For instance, if 
a fingerprint image scan was captured and supplied the Authentication Manager would pass 
the data to a fingerprint authenticator for analysis, whilst if it were a voice sample an alternate 
but appropriate authenticator would be called. The Authentication Manager will then obtain 
the verification result and inform the ASM accordingly. 
The Device Manager administers data pertaining to known devices that are trusted by the host 
device. Upon initial recognition of a new device the ASM invokes the Device Manager to create 
a relevant record in the Aura database. Once the record exists and the device recognised at a 
future date, the Device Manager will be used to supply the ASM with its relevant details to be 
used as required. 
Administration of the Aura, the devices currently active within it and necessary information 
requests are all undertaken and generated by the Aura Manager sub-process. This process will 
operate under the direction of the ASM, updating the database with the latest details as 
devices arrive and depart, location changes and communications are received. Then as status 
updates from other Aura members are needed, the Aura Manager will communicate the 
request back to the ASM for processing. 
When an information request is received by the ASM it uses the Message Transmitter to 
perform the practicalities of compiling and sending the message to the relevant device. This 
                                                          
14
 The research experiment detailed in Chapter 4 produced results that overwhelmingly supported the 
inclusion of these inert devices into the Authentication Aura’s design. 
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removes the ASM from the burden of having to interface directly with the appropriate 
communication channel and provides a degree of flexibility that will allow the Authentication 
Aura framework to be deployed on as many types of device as possible. 
The Confidence Monitor will continually assess the information held within the Aura database 
and based upon the time since last authentication of the host and other member devices, the 
current location, and the status of member devices, will calculate the security confidence 
coefficient. This value will then be passed from the ASM to the System Security Interface which 
will communicate directly with the device’s operating system, intercepting requests for 
application and service usage, blocking those which have been defined as requiring a higher 
confidence level than that which is currently experienced. If a request is blocked the user will 
be given the option to authenticate themselves in order to raise their identity confidence and 
if passed the request be will be reassessed and invoked if appropriate. 
Now that an overview of the framework has been established the remainder of this chapter 
will undertake a thorough and detailed investigation into the functions and roles of each of the 
elements, providing a complete understanding of the logic to be employed and the intricacies 
of an operational Aura.  
6.2 Sensor 
The Sensor provides the communication gateway into the Aura from the local surroundings, 
receiving all messages that are of concern to the device, sensing token (dumb) equipment, and 
monitoring the environment for networks and infrastructure that can be used to recognise the 
current location. To ensure that all messages are received and equipment sensed, the Sensor 
will have to continually monitor all channels through which communications can be received, 
dependent upon the device and its associated sophistication. A number of communication 
channels are available such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi networks and local area networks as discussed 
in section 5.7 but because of security provided by its limited operational range and the 
inherent security from the pairing process, the primary channel for communication will be 
Bluetooth. However, as Near Field Communication (NFC) and even RFID become more 
prevalent on laptops, smartphones and other mobile equipment, the potential to sense 
possessions such as contactless credit cards and keys will evolve. These tokens will respond to 
a polled request from a master device, a role which can be fulfilled by a suitably enabled piece 
of equipment on a regular basis providing a key element to the Authentication Aura as the 
research experiment proved. Interfaces to each of theses communication channels will need to 
be incorporated into the Aura agent providing the means for the Sensor to monitor the local 
environment effectively. 
Chapter 6: Authentication Aura Framework 
- 105 - 
 As a module the Sensor is standalone, continuous and does not have any direct 
communication with any other processes. It analyses the information it receives or gathers, 
parses it and then depending upon the type of information places it into one of two temporary 
storage data tables, Message Cache or Authentication Sample. Two data tables are required 
because of the very different nature of the two categories of communication; messages are 
short and carry a small amount of detail, whilst authentication sample requests will potentially 
contain large amounts of data for processing. Separating the two tables will enable the data to 
be handled more efficiently and result in faster processing. 
As temporary storage the function of these data tables is to temporarily store information in 
preparation of processing by the Aura agent for a brief period of time. As transmitted data is 
received, identified and verified by the Sensor it is inserted into one of the two tables. Each 
table is distinct, unrelated to the other and acts as a short-term holding repository. Upon 
opening or closing the device any remaining data will be cleared and the appropriate table left 
empty. 
It should be noted, when data tables are introduced, alongside the title the suggested name is 
shown in brackets, i.e. when the agent software is developed it is suggested that the ‘System 
parameters’ table be created as ‘param’ and this is then carried through the design by 
prefixing each of the columns with the corresponding table name. For instance, ‘param_key’ is 
the key field for the table ‘param’ ensuring consistency and clarity throughout. 
6.2.1 Message Cache data table (cache) 
The Message cache data table is used to hold all received inter-device communications that 
have either been generated by an intelligent Aura member or detection of an item of 
equipment that is acting as a token. It is a repository that aides processing speed whilst 
ensuring that all messages are recorded without any being lost. As each appropriate message 
is received by the Sensor a new row is appended to the table and remains until it is parsed and 
used by the ASM. 
Each data row will hold up to nine distinct columns as illustrated in Table 6-2 below. The key 
field cache_key is the primary index field that dictates the order in which the messages are 
received. It is an incremental integer automatically allocated during row insertion by the 
database engine and can be reset upon initial activation of the device. Although cache_key 
indicates the order of receipt, cache_received maintains the precise internal date and time at 
which the message was detected. When a communication is processed and the row created, 
the receiving device’s internal clock value is allocated to this column on table update. 
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During any information receipt or sensing of infrastructure and tokens, the identity code of the 
technology or broadcasting device will be detected. This unique identifier is held in the 
cache_device field of the message cache data table to aid subsequent processing. For known 
and familiar devices this can be used to rapidly identify them accurately, dictating how the 
received message will be handled; for alien or unknown devices it can be used to start building 
familiarity. 
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Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
cache_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 1 
cache_received Date and time received Date 20 
Date and time in internal format at which 
the message was received by the device 
15824937301 
cache_device Source device identity code Text 50 
Character string used to identify device. i.e. 
machine identity code or similar 
00037A964637 
cache_message_type Character Text 1 
Single character that indicates the type of 
message that was received and cached e.g. 
A (Aura message), I (infrastructure sensed), 
T (Token/dumb device), U (unknown – 
although this should not be used) 
A 
cache_message_command Message command Text 3 The message command MSI 
cache_message_identity Device identity Text 50 
Character string used to identify the target 
device. i.e. machine identity code or similar 
A785H6575G46 
cache_message_detail_1 Message detail #1 Text 50 
First detail field. Is dependent upon 
command 
19:32:48 
cache_message_detail_2 Message detail #2 Text 50 
Second detail field. Is dependent upon 
command 
5 
cache_message_detail_3 Message detail #3 Text 50 




Table 6-2. Message cache data table definition 
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Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
auth_sample_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 7 
auth_device Source of authentication sample Text 50 
Character string used to identify device. i.e. 
machine identity code or similar 
00037A964637 
auth_sample_type Type of sample Text 5 
Indicator used to identify the sample type 
that has been transmitted for authentication 
e.g. FR (facial recognition), V (voice), FP 
(fingerprint) etc. 
V 
auth_sample_received Date and time received Date 20 
Date and time in internal format at which 




Authentication sample encryption 
key 
Text 50 
Public encryption key allowing the 
authentication data to be deciphered 
1456383683 
auth_sample_data Authentication sample data Blob n/a Encrypted  QE+yg)05sbQ/@... 
 
Table 6-3. Authentication sample data table definition 
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As the Sensor receives communication the command string will indicate the type of message 
detail received. Rather than wasting this knowledge a single character is allocated to the 
cache_message_ type column that can be utilised by the ASM to immediately categorise the 
type of message, aiding the processing speed. For example, ‘A’ will indicate an Aura message 
from another device whilst ‘I’ the sensing of infrastructure and ‘T’ a token. With the Sensor 
hearing all but with limited processing capability, it is imperative that a catch-all be utilised in 
scenarios where the source and message type cannot be readily identified, the character ‘U’ 
(unknown) is reserved for this purpose. 
When a message is received from another Aura member, it will contain a short text string that 
identifies its function enabling the appropriate action to be taken. The format of the command 
string is detailed in section 6.2.3 and will be held within the cache_message_command field. 
cache_message_identity is used to hold the identity string contained within the message. 
Finally three columns have been allocated to store the remaining detail associated with the 
received message. These may or may not be filled with data dependent upon the type of 
communication that has been received. 
6.2.2 Authentication Sample data table (auth) 
In some instances, devices that are active members of the Authentication Aura will be able to 
capture user details that can be used to authenticate identity but will be unable to perform the 
process independently. For example, a low-end tablet computer is capable of capturing a 
user’s facial image or voice sample but may not have sufficient storage available to host the 
application and processing capability necessary to undertake authentication via facial 
recognition. With an active Authentication Aura enabled laptop within communicable range it 
is possible to securely transmit the encrypted image or sound file to the laptop for remote 
validation. In this scenario the Authentication sample data table as illustrated by Table 6-3 will 
be utilised by the receiving laptop to store the transmitted data prior to processing. In short, it 
is a holding table for identity data samples sent by other devices that require validation. 
This temporary data table is smaller in design but will potentially store much larger items of 
data. Each row of the table will consist of six columns auth_sample_key, auth_device, 
auth_sample_type, auth_sample_received, auth_sample_encryption_key and auth_sample 
_data. 
The primary key field (auth_sample_key) will be used to control the order of population within 
the table, enabling the ASM and the Authentication Manager to process received requests for 
authentication process in the correct order. Although the auth_sample_received column 
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dictates the exact date and time of receipt, being the internal clock value of the authenticating 
device. 
Each item of equipment that communicates an authentication request will supply its identity, 
sample type and sample data (encrypted where appropriate, for instance in the use of 
biometric feature capture). The auth_device column will be used to track the device from 
which the detail was transmitted, storing the unique device identity number. This field will 
then be used to direct the outcome communication appropriately upon completion of the 
validation procedure. 
auth_sample_type is used to annotate the type of detail that has been received. It is intuitively 
important that the authentication process clearly understands what variety of data sample is 
waiting to be processed, enabling it to perform the appropriate analysis. It has been designed 
as an uppercase character string that will be easily recognisable. For example, ‘FR’ will indicate 
a facial recognition, ‘FP’ a fingerprint, whilst ‘V’ will specify a data sample for voice recognition. 
As intimated above, transmitted data that requires authentication is likely to be biometric in 
nature. As such and because of non-repudiation issues it is imperative that any undertaken 
transmission be as highly secured as possible and encrypted. The Sensor process will receive 
the transmitted data sample and place it in this table in raw form, it will not attempt to 
decipher the sample in any way. By inserting any relevant supplied encryption key into 
auth_sample_encryption_key it will enable processes later in the authentication route to 
manipulate the data and utilise appropriate external modules to ascertain the validity of the 
sample. 
The auth_sample_data is an unbounded blob of storage that holds the encrypted biometric 
sample ready for validation to be performed. 
6.2.3 Message identification and format 
A message will be received during the operation of the Authentication Aura in reply to a 
request for information, as a targeted call for information, to pass a data sample for 
authentication or a general announcement from another Aura member. The first three of 
these are precisely aimed at the receiving host whilst the fourth is not but must be dealt with 
accordingly; these transmissions will be received via the configured communication channels. 
Each received message will be securely transmitted, and structured in such a way as to allow 
easy parsing and quick identification of the message type. All messages will consist of a 
command block separated by an underscore from a device identity, followed by none, one or 
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more items of detail, each of which is preceded by an underscore. The message format is 
shown below in Figure 6-2. 
 
Figure 6-2. Generic message structure 
Each command string will be comprised of exactly three alphabetic uppercase characters and 
which can be parsed easily using the underscore to identify the message type. Using the same 
technique the process will then extract the device identity, a string of characters of undefined 
length. As introduced above, some messages will be specifically targeted at the receiving 
device whilst others are purely generic. Although precise message logic and interaction is 
discussed in section 6.7, it is imperative to briefly introduce the entire message vocabulary to 
gain an understanding of how each type can be recognised. Table 6-4 illustrates an exhaustive 
list of Aura messages, a brief description, the category of each indicating the data table into 
which it will be placed, and the type.  
Message code Description Category Type 
ARR Authentication Request Reply Message Targeted Reply 
ARQ Authentication ReQuest Authentication Targeted Request 
AUT AUThenticated Message Announcement 
AYT Are You There Message Targeted Request 
IAH I Am Here Message Announcement 
ISH I am Still Here Message Targeted Reply 
MSI My Status Is Message Announcement 
PEN PENding authentication Message Targeted Reply 
WIT Who Is There Message General Request 
WYS What is Your Status Message Targeted Request 
 
Table 6-4. Message acronyms 
The Sensor module is only interested in processing significant messages, and then to 
distinguish between the ones containing captured detail being passed for authentication and 
those that are not. The first category is identified by the command string ‘ARQ’ (Authentication 
ReQuest) and is specifically targeted to the receiving device; this will be placed into the 
Authentication Sample data table if it qualifies on both command and device identity. The 
second category which will be placed into Message Cache is marginally more complicated to 
parse. If the message type is an announcement or a general request then it is accepted, 
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otherwise it has to be specifically targeted and the identities matched. With knowledge of the 
full vocabulary available, the Sensor will easily be able to filter out irrelevant communication. 
6.2.4 Intelligent device monitoring 
All available communication channels will be simultaneously monitored for messages from 
other intelligent devices that are active within the Aura. The Sensor will parse these 
communications in accordance with the semantics described in section 6.2.3 above and store 
them in the appropriate temporary data table. Implementing this rapid processing and storage 
will enable the Sensor to focus its operation on surveilling the communication channels, 
ensuring that all messages are received and none are missed. 
6.2.5 Token device monitoring 
Token or dumb devices and equipment (those that are unable to authenticate) can still 
positively contribute to the Aura as previously established. The Sensor process is responsible 
for the detection of these items and the recording of their presence. With NFC becoming more 
common, personal items such as contactless credit cards, car ignition keys and even cars 
themselves will all become detectable by portable devices.  
With this capability a device operating the Authentication Aura will be able to regularly poll 
these items and store their corresponding presence in the Message Cache, in preparation for 
processing by the ASM. Recording the observed time, identity and token indicator (setting 
cache_message_type to ‘T’) will provide the ASM with the information it requires. 
6.2.6 Infrastructure monitoring 
The final role of the Sensor process is to monitor the infrastructure within the local 
environment and then for each item identified, to write a pseudo message record into the 
Message Cache to register the information. This will be achieved by monitoring the device’s 
network interface, gauging the present equipment to ascertain Wi-Fi points, networked 
servers and other significant equipment (e.g. a networked printer or even a networked CCTV 
camera). These messages will be used by the ASM to identify familiar locations which will in 
turn affect the user identity confidence calculation. 
6.2.7 Sensor logic 
Figure 6-3 below illustrates the logic of the Sensor process in diagrammatic form, showing the 
control flow within the module, the decisions that are taken and the points at which data is 
written to the database. It encompasses all of the three monitoring roles discussed previously 
and indicates how messages, detected tokens and infrastructure will be allocated to the 
appropriate cache database. 
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The logic takes two main routes; the first when a message has been received, and the second 
when none was detected. When no message has been received the Sensor loops through all 
infrastructure and token device channels, detecting which are visible and for each entering a 
pseudo message into the Message Cache data table. 
When a message is received the Sensor checks if it is of concern to the receiving device. A 
message is of concern when it is either a generic request for information or an announcement, 
or targeted at the specific device; both these scenarios are detailed within the message 
acronyms shown in Table 6-4. If the message is not of concern it is dropped, no further action 
is taken and the Sensor continues with its processing. If these checks are passed and the 
message is deemed significant, one further decision is taken to ascertain if the receipt is a 
request to undertake authentication of a captured biometric data sample (message command 
ARQ) or another command. If the message is biometric data the detail is written into the 
Authentication Sample table to await processing, otherwise an entry is added to the Message 





































Figure 6-3. Sensor process flowchart 
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It should be noted that the process operates continuously and in isolation. During the entire 
operation of the Aura the Sensor will gather the appropriate information and persist in the 
population of the data tables, only the ASM will remove records as it processes each in turn or 
when the device is shutdown. 
6.3 Authentication Manager 
The Authentication Manager is utilised in two ways within the Authentication Aura framework. 
Firstly, it undertakes the authentication of the current user as required within the regular 
working of the framework and secondly as an agent performing authentication on behalf of 
another less capable device.  
When the current user attempts to access an application or system process and their current 
identity confidence is below the parameterised level required to activate the function, the 
ASM intervenes and requests the user to undergo authentication. In this instance the ASM will 
call the Authentication Manager to trigger an authentication and the Authentication Manager 
in turn will interface to an authenticator which is external to the framework. This could be a 
process as simple as a password or equally a request to provide a fingerprint scan. The 
available methods are entirely dependent upon the device being used and its inherent 
sophistication, with any necessary parameterisation being requested and captured during 
system installation and initiation. Each method will be assigned a tariff of robustness in the 
range one to five indicating its perceived security by the user. For instance a fingerprint scan 
would be considered very robust and given a high tariff of four or five, whilst a password is 
deemed less secure and would potentially only be allocated a tariff of one or two. When 
authentication is performed successfully upon a user the utilised method’s associated tariff 
will be returned to the ASM for use in the identity confidence calculation as described in 
Equation 5-5 on page 97. This will provide the user with a degree of control, adjustability and 
influence over the confidence degradation process. 
In an intelligent and sophisticated device there is a secondary role which can be performed by 
the Authentication Manager; the processing of identity data samples which are passed to the 
host device for authentication. The data is received from the ASM as it processes the samples 
held in the Authentication Sample data table as described earlier in section 6.2.2. As already 
established data passed to intelligent devices capable of undertaking the necessary 
authentication processes will be biometric in nature and require correspondingly capable 
external authenticators. The Authentication Manager will interface with the appropriate 
authenticators, establish the validity of the data sample and report back to the ASM. 
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Interfaces to the external biometric authenticators will be compliant with the internationally 
accepted standards of the ISO Committee SC37 which are available on their website, providing 
a degree of future resilience and allow expansion of the available authentication methods (ISO, 
nd). 
6.4 Message Transmitter 
Intuitively the Message Transmitter process is the gateway from the ASM to the outside local 
environment. Through this process messages are issued as requests for information from other 
specific Aura members or those that are present but not currently active, and as replies to 
requests for information. The ASM will supply the Message Transmitter with a variable 
representing the category of message to be sent and any other required detail, which will then 
be processed and transmitted accordingly. 
At this juncture it is important to further expand upon the messages that are used within a 
functioning Aura agent and the information that they provide. The vocabulary of the Aura has 
already been introduced in Table 6-4 on page 111, alongside a brief description of generic 
message syntax. However, a fuller exploration of this must now be made in order to gain an 
understanding of how the Message Transmitter will operate; each element of the vocabulary is 
described in Table 6-5.  
Message code Description Syntax 
ARR Authentication Request Reply ARR_X_Y_success 
ARQ Authentication ReQuest ARQ_X_Y_data type_blob 
AUT AUThenticated AUT_X_X_last authentication_level 
AYT Are You There AYT_X_Y 
IAH I Am Here IAH_X_X 
ISH I am Still Here ISH_X_Y 
MSI My Status Is MSI_X_Y_last authentication_level 
PEN PENding authentication PEN_X_Y 
WIT Who Is There WIT_X_X 
WYS What is Your Status WYS_X_Y 
 
Table 6-5. Vocabulary syntax and transmitted detail 
In the table above; X represents the device identity of the transmitting device and Y the target 
device, last_authentication holds the time at which the last authentication was successfully 
performed, level conveys the authentication robustness, success is a Boolean indicator used to 
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pass the success of an authentication, data type specifies the type of data being supplied for 
authentication (e.g. voice sample) and blob is the data sample to be authenticated. 
When invoked by the ASM between one and four arguments will be passed to the Message 
Transmitter which will then construct the message in the correct format and then transmit it 
via an appropriate communication channel. The source device identity will not be passed as a 
parameter by the ASM; it will be readily available to the Message Transmitter and as such can 
be inserted as required. For ease of processing a consistent three field message header has 
been designed containing the message code and two device identities. This will make it easy 
during the parsing process but in order to fulfil this, in some cases (for instance WIT, an 
untargeted request) it has been necessary to repeat the transmitting device identity. For 








Figure 6-4. Example of a My Status Is (MSI) message 
The logic associated with the transmit-receive cycle and how this interacts with the Aura is 
detailed in sections 6.7.3 and 6.7.4. 
6.5 Policy Manager 
The Policy Manager process controls the creation, maintenance and allocation of the system 
parameters and locations required to operate the Authentication Aura. When the system is 
initially activated the ASM will launch the Policy Manager to prompt the user through the 
allocation of values to the core parameters which are then stored in the Parameters data 
table. During regular operation of the Aura the Policy Manager process will be required to 
establish parameter values, reading them from the database and assigning their values to the 
corresponding variables. These will be held in working memory and used by the ASM and other 
processes. 
6.5.1 System parameters 
Upon activation of the system for the first time the user will be presented with a data entry 
screen displaying the various parameters and their default values, enabling them to make 
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changes as required. Detailed explanations and associated annotations will be provided for 
those users who may not fully understand the terms and operational effect that each of the 
parameters has. Additionally, by presenting the user with this interface it will reinforce its 
existence to them, allowing them to return at a later date to make appropriate adjustments as 
and when their comprehension has improved. Upon saving the information, each value will be 
written in turn to the Parameters data table overwriting any previously stored entry. 
There are a number of core system parameters that have been identified at this time which 
need to be set to enable Authentication Aura operation. In the following paragraphs each of 
the parameters will be described in turn and a default value for each suggested. These 
empirical values have been drawn from the undertaken experiment, experience gained during 
the data analysis and the application of them being a sensible starting position. These values 
will require thorough evaluation and variations tested to ascertain the full impact of alteration. 
They are liable to change. 
The first system parameter is authThreshold and will be used to hold the confidence value at 
which re-authentication of a user is triggered, should the Authentication Aura’s user identity 
confidence fall below this threshold value. Setting the default value to 20.0 will initially provide 
the system with a broad window of operation without being too punitive upon the user. The 
time it will take the system to reduce to this cut off will directly correspond to location, time 
since authentication and the contribution of confidence gained from other Aura devices. 
At specified periods the Authentication Aura will poll the local vicinity for devices and to check 
if existing Aura members are still within communicable range and active. The variable 
auraCheckSecs will be used to store a value that dictates how often (in seconds) this process is 
undertaken. At this point-in-time setting the default value to two minutes (120) will provide a 
reasonable starting point for further investigation. The lower this threshold is set, the quicker 
the Authentication Aura will respond to changes in location and make up of the active devices 
in the Aura, leading to a rapid shift in confidence should movement be detected. However, it is 
worth noting that the more frequent the locale is polled, the greater the power consumption 
within the device, and so it is imperative that a balance between these two aspects is 
identified. 
Confidence erosion as previously discussed is another key element of an Authentication Aura’s 
operation. Rather than always degrading the confidence in the user’s identity second by 
second or even in conjunction with auraCheckSecs it is proposed that this time frame be 
separately parameterised to provide another granularity of control. To this end the cycle rate 
will be dictated by auraDegradeSecs and will specify in seconds how often the host device’s 
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confidence is reappraised; an initial value for this parameter prior to simulated evaluation is 60 
seconds. Once again this value will control the quantity of messages generated by the agent 
and the amount of continuous processing, helping to prolong battery life in a mobile device. 
Operating in conjunction with the above parameter, periodDegradation is used to control the 
amount by which the core confidence in the user’s identity is reduced during each iteration of 
the Authentication Aura. The previous chapter extensively investigated degradation of 
confidence and illustrated how it could take many forms. As a starting point it is sensible to 
utilise a straight line degradation prior to further analysis and thus setting this to a value of t*2 
will achieve this. This implies that each cycle (default every minute) will erode the core 
confidence by a value of two, meaning that it will take the Authentication Aura 40 minutes to 
erode confidence from the maximum value of 100 as shown in Equation 5-5  to the default re-
authentication value of 20 held in authThreshold. The periodDegradation parameter will 
specify the degradation equation to be applied and will require restriction to a number of 
options unless a full evaluation and parsing routine is written and applied during validation 
testing and operation. 
During initial operation the Authentication Aura agent will have to go through a period of 
learning in which it builds its relationship with other devices. learningMode is a Boolean 
variable  that will flag this state as either ‘true’ or ‘false’ and although initially set to the 
former, it can be disabled by the user at any time when they are satisfied with the system’s 
operation. When this parameter is set to ‘true’, as communication is received from an 
unknown device or the agent finds itself in an unrecognised locale, the system will prompt the 
user to establish the relevant relationship. This is achieved by entering and saving the 
appropriate information in the Device data table as outlined in section 6.6.1. 
The Authentication Aura agent will continually monitor the communication channels for both 
targeted and general messages from other active devices. However, if a message is generated 
by the agent it is necessary to employ a threshold to dictate for how long the system waits for 
a reply until it presumes the target device is currently dormant. The user amendable 
messageTimeout parameter will hold this value in seconds and control the patience that is 
exhibited by the agent. Specifying a low value will have the potential effect of blocking 
contributing devices prematurely whilst too high a value will falsely preserve their contribution 
to confidence and so it is imperative that a balance is struck. Initially a default value of 30 
seconds is proposed although simulation and further analysis is likely to alter this viewpoint. 
Coupled with the above parameter is inactiveTimeout. This value is used to specify how long a 
device can remain out of active contact until a message re-establishing its status and details is 
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required. The stored value will be in seconds although it is suggested that several minutes 
should be the default, for instance 300 or five minutes. As the agent cycles through it will 
evaluate each of its known and active devices to assess the last time of communication. If this 
time exceeds the threshold a message enquiring about the status of the device will be sent and 
if no reply received, it will be assumed that the device has been removed or deactivated and 
subsequently deleted from the active Aura. For more detail about this process refer to section 
6.7.3. 
In the summary of the previous chapter the generalised confidence equation was introduced; 
Equation 5-5. In this equation the total contribution that can be made by all the token and 
dumb devices was bounded at a maximum level by variable a. This value will be specified by 
the parameter maxTokenContribution and with an initial default value of 20 will prevent 
excessive influence being exerted. The undertaken experiment indicated that these inert 
pieces of equipment were regularly detected in large numbers and so the potential for bias is 
clearly evident without the implementation of this threshold. 
Extending the concept of confidence contribution and to ensure that the amount of influence 
is user controllable, the base contributory amounts for each intelligent and dumb device 
requires parameterisation. Consequentially intelligentContribution and tokenContribution are 
proposed to carry these values throughout the system and will be utilised where appropriate. 
At this time it is suggested that initial values prior to simulation and testing should be 20 and 1 
respectively. 
The final parameter which has been identified is the default security threshold for application 
or service activation within the host device, appSecurityDefault. During early operation of the 
agent apps and services will be invoked which will require the user to specify the confidence 
level at which they are prepared to allow the activation to proceed. This process detailed in 
section 6.10 will be initially onerous but nonetheless key to the concept of an Authentication 
Aura. To aid this task appSecurityDefault will be used as a default security setting for each 
newly discovered device and will be a slider controlled numeric value between zero (no 
confidence) and 100 (total confidence). It is proposed to initially set this value arbitrarily at 80. 
6.5.2 System parameters data table (param) 
Having introduced the system parameters in the previous section it is necessary to discuss how 
the information will be stored. Although it would be possible to use a data table with a single 
row that would contain the parameter values within a set number of columns, constructing 
generic storage which has a separate row for each of the values ensures future proofing and 
easy system expansion or alteration. To this end, the System Parameters data table shown 
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below (Table 6-6) has been designed with only three columns. The key field (param_ key) will 
not serve any significant role in the table but has been included for completeness, 
param_field_name will be used to store the variable name of the parameter held within each 
of the particular table rows, and param_field_value the corresponding value.  
param_key param_field_name param_field_value 
3 authThreshold 20 
6 inactiveTimeout 300 
 
Table 6-6. Extract from the System parameter data table 
During system start up the Policy Manager will be invoked by the ASM to initiate the 
respective parameters. To achieve this, the process will proceed to loop through each row 
within the table and by evaluating the param_field_name allocate the respective value. 
6.5.3 Location data table (location) 
An additional function of the Policy Manager is to provide an interface through which the user 
can administer the Location data table. It has already been established how vital the current 
location of the device is when administering the user’s Authentication Aura and their 
associated identity confidence. During the discussion in the previous chapter that investigated 
the importance of location (see section 5.3) it was proposed that the system defaulted to using 
three locations ‘Home, ‘Work’ and ‘Away’; this table is employed to hold details of these 
locations with associated security parameters. 
 
Table 6-8 on page 121 illustrates the design of the Location data table and indicates that 
similar to the system parameters table it consists of only three columns location_key, 
location_name and location_multiplier.  Defining the storage in this way provides the 
opportunity to extend the discussed defaults (Home, Work and Away) with the inclusion of 
additional locations with varying security profiles at a later date. For instance, a user might 
create an entry for a friend’s house, a location in which they want their Aura to operate 
differently and this approach allows the easy incorporation of this new locale. 
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Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
param_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 2 
param_field_name Parameter field name Text 30 Name of the parameter authThreshold 
param_field_value Parameter field value Text 20 
Value of the parameter – un-typed to allow 
flexibility. Therefore validated during input. 
15.0 
 
Table 6-7. System parameter data table definition 
 
Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
location_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 1 
location_name Name Text 30 
Allows the user to describe or name the 
location 
Home 
location_multiplier Multiplier Float 3 
Number in range 1..10 which signifies how 
secure the environment is regarded to be 
2.5 
 
Table 6-8. Location data table definition 
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Upon system installation the data table will be populated with three rows and as such will 
appear as shown below in Table 6-9. 
location_key location_name location_multiplier 
1 Home 2.5 
2 Work 5 
3 Away 10 
 
Table 6-9. Example of the Location data table at system installation 
The default values contained in the column location_multiplier have been drawn from the 
investigatory experiments discussed previously and are used in the calculation of the 
confidence coefficient as illustrated in Equation 5-5. It reflects the ease that a user feels when 
operating their device in a particular location; the lower the value, the more at ease the user is 
and the lower the perceived security risk. Manipulation of these values affects the rate of 
decay of the confidence over time, which in turn will alter the length of time that particular 
services and applications remain available to use. 
It could be argued that the data within this table is another set of parameters and as such 
should be held within Parameters. However, in order to support processing performance and 
maintain the degree of flexibility necessary to future proof, it has been deemed prudent to 
separate this table to stand in its own right. 
6.6 Device Manager 
The Device Manager process fulfils two roles within the administration of the Authentication 
Aura: firstly, when the learning mode parameter is set (see section 6.5.1) it will act to populate 
the Device data table with newly discovered items of equipment, and secondly it will provide 
an interface via which the user can manually update, annotate and maintain existing device 
records which are already held. In this instance it is worth introducing the structure of the 
main data table used by this process first, so an understanding can be imparted prior to the 
explanation of the process’ intricacies. 
6.6.1 Device data table (device) 
The known devices data table (device) is a key element in the successful functioning of the 
Authentication Aura agent. It is used to store and hold the details of all pieces of trusted 
electronic equipment that can operate within an active Aura and controls which devices will be 
able to contribute to the confidence calculation. Each row of the table consists of nine columns 
as shown in Table 6-10 on page 124. Although device_key is the table key, device_id will be the 
primary search field. The device_id column will store the unique identification code of each 
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individual piece of equipment, providing a look-up route via which the appropriate record can 
be retrieved as communication is received. This field is read only and cannot be entered or 




Figure 6-5. Relationship between the device and location data tables 
As Figure 6-5 above indicates there is a non-compulsory parent-child relationship that exists 
between entries in the Device table and locations because each Device may or may not be 
statically resident in a single particular Location. 
The implication of this is that each Location may have one, several or no devices located within 
it, and any one can therefore be used to identify that locale. To achieve this 
device_location_key is used to maintain the link when it exists by holding the corresponding 
value of the associated location. In the event that the device is mobile and may therefore 
move between different locations, this field will be left blank. 
The device_name column is a freeform text field that permits the user to annotate the device 
record with a personally meaningful description. This data is used for no other purpose than 
information display and an aide memoir. 
device_block is a Boolean flag that allows the user to withdraw a device from contributing to 
the Aura. For completeness, deletion of records from this table is not permitted and so 
providing a means by which devices can be barred is clearly necessary. The default for this field 
is false and so unless altered each newly recognised device will immediately become part of 
the active Aura once the record has been saved. 
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Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
device_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 1 
device_id Unique identity code Text 50 
Character string used to identify device. i.e. 
machine identity code or similar 
00037A964637 
device_location_key Location key field Integer 5 
Provides the child parent relationship with 
the Location data table 
2 
device_name Name Text 30 
Device name or description that reminds the 
user which device is which 
Work mobile phone 
device_block Block device Boolean 1 
A field that provides the user with the ability 
of blocking a device from being an active 
member of the aura. Default value ‘False’ 
False 
device_type Type Text 1 
Indicates if the item of equipment is a 
device ‘D’, Infrastructure ‘I’ or Other ‘O’ 
D 
device_intelligence Intelligence Text 1 
Differentiates between devices that are 
Intelligent and can authenticate (I) and 
those that are dumb and cannot (D) 
I 
device_rank Rank Integer 1 
Range 1..9. An integer that indicates how 
significant the contribution that any device 
gives to the overall aura confidence. 
5 
device_owned Owned Boolean 1 
Specifies if the item of the equipment is 




Table 6-10. Device data table definition 
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It is necessary to be able to distinguish between items of infrastructure, intelligent devices and 
dumb pieces of equipment. This is achieved by the use of two fields, device_type and 
device_intelligence. The first is set to ‘D’ to indicate a device, ‘I’ which will identify an item of 
infrastructure or ‘O’ for other. Although ‘O’ will not be used often it has been included to 
provide a catchall for items of equipment that the user feels does not fit the description of 
being a device or infrastructure. For devices, the second field (device_intelligence) will hold ‘I’ 
for intelligent devices and ‘D’ for those that cannot authenticate and are therefore regarded as 
being dumb. Items that have been specified as ‘other’ will always be treated as dumb and 
therefore unable to authenticate. 
device_rank is used to control a device’s contribution. This integer value in the range between 
one and nine indicates which devices have high significance and will contribute more to the 
confidence calculation. One will indicate devices that are highly significant and therefore 
contribute most, whilst nine is reserved for equipment that has the least significance. Rather 
than presenting the user with a numeric value which is potentially confusing, it is likely that 
during development a graphical slider is utilised to mask the underlying numeric tariff. 
The final column, device_owned, is a Boolean field that specifies whether or not the detected 
device belongs to the user or if it is the property of a colleague or acquaintance. Only 
intelligent devices that are owned can dynamically contribute to the Aura, those that belong to 
other people can only be utilised as tokens. 
6.6.2 Device discovery and validation 
By monitoring the Message Cache the ASM will identify equipment detected for the first time 
in the current session and pass each of these for validation to the Device Manager process. If 
the Aura is operating in learning mode and an unknown device or piece of infrastructure is 
identified, a prompt alerting the user to the presence of this newly discovered item will be 
issued and the user placed in data entry mode on the device information screen. Upon display 
of this data entry form the appropriately system populated device_id will be shown and the 
user will then be able to fill the remaining information and save the record when complete. 
If however the device is already present within the Device data table the Processor Manager 
will locate the appropriate record, check to confirm that the device_block flag is set to false 
and report its findings back to the ASM. For completeness and clarity a flowchart outlining the 
sequence of these events is shown in Figure 6-6 below.  
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Figure 6-6. Device Manager flowchart 
6.6.3 Device maintenance 
It is important to note that the user will be able to gain direct access to a list of devices and 
then to the device detail screen to amend information held or for instance set the 
device_block indicator. This will be achieved via a system administration function within the 
Device Manager. 
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6.7 Aura Manager 
The Aura Manager is one of the most intricate processes and administers the Aura data table 
in which the details of all devices currently active within the Aura are held. In unison these 
rows will provide the detail necessary to calculate the current device’s status and provide the 
information upon which the Confidence Monitor (detailed in section 6.8) operates. 
Two functions are incorporated in this process: to update and maintain the Aura members’ 
status from messages that the ASM gathers from the Message Cache and passes on to the 
Aura Manager, and to compile a list of messages that need to be generated and transmitted. 
However, before the logic of these two functions is fully detailed the structure of the Aura data 
table will be described.                                                                              
6.7.1 Aura data table (aura) 
Forming the core of the agent’s operating potential, the Aura data table is also temporary 
storage (non-permanent - created and held in memory during runtime) and is used to hold the 
details of all devices that have been detected during the current session. It provides all the 
information required to perform the intricate calculation of the Aura’s confidence 
contribution, as well as maintaining details of messages sent to and received from other Aura 
devices. It represents the active Aura. 
The columns contained within the Aura data table are shown in Table 6-11. aura_key is the key 
field and will be automatically incremented upon creation of a new record. It has been 
included in the data table design for completeness and will not actively used within the 
Authentication Aura Agent’s operation. 
There is a relationship between this table and the Device data table, although it is more 
restricted than the previously discussed relationship between Location and Device; in this 
instance every Aura record must be linked to a specific Device record but not every device will 
be present in the active Aura (illustrated by Figure 6-7). As such, aura_device_key is used to 
store the key field value of the Device table and therefore establishing a one-to-one 
relationship between the two. That is, each and every entry in Aura must be linked to a 
recognised and active (device_blocked is false) device. 
Ongoing communication between devices and information requests need to be tracked which 
is achieved by the use of the aura_status column. This is a five character text field which holds 
a short code signifying the current relationship between the agent and any of the devices 
within the Aura. A full status state diagram is shown later in section 6.7.4 which follows a 
detailed discussion of each valid command and how the status of the target device is affected. 
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Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
aura_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 1 
aura_device_key Device key Integer 5 
Field that provides a join to the Device 
table. 
7 
aura_status Status Text 5 
Status of the device within the aura which is 
used to manage communication and control 
which actions have taken place. Passive 
devices hold status of ‘dumb’. 
ayt 
aura_last_authenticated Last authentication Date 20 
Date and time in internal format of the last 
authentication performed by the device. For 
passive devices this field will remain empty. 
17684936632 
aura_authentication_level Authentication level Integer 1 
Indicator in range 1..5 which signifies how 
secure the method of authentication was. 
3 
aura_rank Rank Integer 1 
Range 1..9. An integer that indicates how 
significant the contribution that the device 
gives to the overall aura confidence. 
8 
aura_last_update Last update Date 20 
Date and time in internal format of the last 
time an aura member had an alteration 
made to its details. 
23467363535 
 
Table 6-11. Temporary Aura data table definition 
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Figure 6-7. Relationship between the location, device and aura data tables 
The next three columns of this data table are used to record the information transferred 
between devices during the communication process. aura_last_authenticated is utilised to 
store the date and time that the member device last carried out an authentication process and 
is held in an internal clock format. 
In addition to the date and time, aura_authentication_level will indicate how secure the 
authentication process was. This is specified by an integer in the range between one and five, 
one being the most secure and five the least; this will be directly supplied from the 
transmitting device during communication. 
aura_rank is the penultimate column in the aura data table and is once again an integer in the 
range one to nine. This data field is used to indicate how significant the communicating agent 
is, the lower the value the more significant the device is deemed to be. There are some 
instances when some entries in this data table will be made for dumb entities incapable of 
data communication. For example, in the case of items such as a contactless credit card which 
can be sensed and indeed whose presence is potentially highly significant, will carry a low 
aura_rank tariff but will be unable to communicate this fact. All devices where 
device_intelligence is set to ‘D’ will operate in this way. 
The final field in the aura table is aura_last_update which is used to store the date and time 
that any Aura member’s details were updated by the system. This information is used to 
ascertain when devices have become inactive or left the Aura and so it plays a vital role in the 
agent’s operation. 
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6.7.2 Received messages 
The message lexicon was detailed earlier in Table 6-4 and all but the ARR (Authentication 
Request Reply) and ARQ (Authentication ReQuest) receipts will be processed by the Aura 
Manager; these two specific messages will be dealt with appropriately by the ASM and 
subsequently the Authentication Manager, in isolation. 
When communication is received from a device, the Aura Manager splits the message into its 
constituent parts and then checks to ascertain if the communicating device is already present 
and active in the Aura. If it is present, the appropriate row within the data table is updated 
with the details received and when appropriate a reply message will be invoked. However if it 
is not present, its trust is established by the Device Manager via its existence in the Device data 
table (as discussed previously in section 6.6) and upon successful location, a record is then 
appended to the Aura record set. If the device is unfound and therefore not trusted, the 
message will simply be ignored. 
6.7.3 Message processing 
This section will describe the precise logical sequence invoked by each of the messages in turn. 
Some are incorporated with others as they are an automated reply response and so will be 
dealt with under a single heading. Each of the following diagrams illustrates a flowchart that 
occurs across two devices and the communication channel. The source device transmits ONE 
message via the syntax shown in the communication channel and the target device then either 
accepts this message type from ANY device or FILTERs only the messages specifically targeted 
at it. Processes on the target device then update the Aura table appropriately and generate 
responses when required. 
6.7.3.1 Authenticated (AUT) 
This message is transmitted from a device immediately following the successful completion of 
an authentication by the user. 
AUT is untargeted and should therefore be collected and processed by any listening device. If 
the source is unknown it should be added to the current aura membership list with a status of 
‘new’. All relevant authentication details should then be applied to the source’s Aura record, 
be it new or an existing Aura member. 
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AUT from X 
received
Start
Add X to Aura
End
 
Figure 6-8. Authenticated message syntax and effect (AUT) 
6.7.3.2 Are You There (AYT) and I am Still Here (ISH) 
When an aura member has not been in communication with a device for a period of time an 
AYT message may be issued to establish whether or not the target is still present and active. 
AYT is targeted specifically at an existing aura member. After it is sent a reply is always 
expected from the target. If one is not received the target should be flagged by the sender as 












ONE AYT_X_Y FILTERED ON Y
AYT from X 
received
I Am Still Here
(ISH)
ISH_Y_XISH from Y 
received
ONEFILTERED ON X





Figure 6-9. Are You There message syntax and effect (AYT) 
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Any listening device should only pay attention to AYT messages directed specifically at them 
i.e. when a device receives an AYT it should filter out and discard those where the target 
identity does not match its own identity. Upon legitimate receipt, the receiver will add the 
source to its Aura with a status of ‘new’ (if appropriate) and then issue an ‘I am Still Here’ 
reply. This will then be appropriately interpreted by the corresponding receiving device. 
6.7.3.3 I Am Here (IAH) 
An IAH message is transmitted when a device is first activated or in response to a WIT request. 
IAH is also untargeted and should be collected by any listening device. Upon receipt, if 
unknown by the receiving device, the sender is added to the current aura membership list with 











IAH from X 
received
End
Add X to Aura
 
Figure 6-10. I Am Here message syntax and effect (IAH) 
6.7.3.4 Who Is There (WIT) 
Upon activation an untargeted WIT message is issued to any devices that may be listening to 
establish which Aura members are active and within communicable range. A WIT message is 
untargeted and should therefore be received and duly processed by any listening devices. 
Upon receiving a WIT request it should firstly add the source device’s identity to its Aura 
membership if it is absent and then reply by issuing an ‘I Am Here’ (IAH) reply.  IAH is an 
untargeted response and will then be handled appropriately as shown previously in Figure 
6-10. 
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IAH from Y 
received
ONEANY
Add X to Aura




Figure 6-11. Who Is There message syntax and effect (WIT) 
6.7.3.5 What is Your Status (WYS), My Status Is (MSI) and PENding (PEN) 
The WYS message is the most complicated that is utilised by the ASM. It is issued when the 
system needs to acquire the current status of an existing active Aura member. Thus, it is a 
targeted message that without a timely response (governed by the messageTimeout 
parameter – see section 6.5.1) will be interpreted as indicating that the corresponding device 
has become inactive or left the aura. 
Upon receiving a WYS an agent will initially update its Aura to reflect the presence of the 
source. Following this process, it will react differently depending if it has authenticated its user 
or not. If the current user is authenticated a MSI reply is issued containing details of the last 
authentication. However, if the user has not currently been authenticated a message 
indicating this pending status (PEN) will be transmitted instead. With confidence being drawn 
from Aura members, it is possible that a device may be operating legitimately without having 
specifically confirmed the user’s identity via authentication. As such, the PEN message relays 
this status allowing the receiving device to utilise it as a token rather than an intelligent 
contributor. 
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Add X to Aura
Start
End
What Is Your 
Status (WYS)
ONE WYS_X_Y FILTERED ON Y






MSI from Y 
received
ONEFILTERED ON X














Figure 6-12. What Is Your Status message syntax and effect (WYS) 
6.7.4 Member status 
As intelligent members of the Aura communicate with each other the status of each will be 
amended within the Aura table to reflect received messages or requests that have been made. 
In Figure 6-13 below, the state chart graphically illustrates how the status of the Aura 
members change during the agent’s operation, summarising the effect of the messages 
discussed above. 
In this diagram the associated message that triggers each change in status is encapsulated in 
square parentheses ‘[ ]’ below the action description, i.e. the status of an Aura member is 
altered from ‘new’ to ‘wys’ when a WYS message is transmitted to that particular member. 
With the Aura table being temporary, when the host device is activated the system 
commences with an empty Aura and polls the listening community to establish which known 
and trusted devices are near and active. When a reply is received and a device is detected it 
becomes part of the Aura and constantly remains so until the host is switched off. This is 
illustrated by the diagram being closed, without any exit points.  
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Figure 6-13. Aura member status state chart 
When communication fails between devices the status is set to ‘gone’ indicating the target is 
no longer active, however during operation the Aura agent will periodically re-poll these 
devices, enabling them to become active again if they return within range. 
6.7.5 Generated messages 
During regular processing checks will be performed to maintain the Aura’s membership and 
ensure the continuing presence and activity of devices. This repetitive housekeeping will be 
undertaken by the Aura Manager and where appropriate a list of required messages to 
ascertain the current situation will be generated. Additionally as demonstrated above, some 
messages require an immediate reply and so these will also be appended to the list in 
readiness. 
At the end of processing the Aura Manager will return the list to the ASM where the requests 
will each be processed and passed to the Message Transmitter for dispatch. 
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6.7.6 Aura Manager logic 
The previous sections have introduced the syntax of the messages utilised to relay information 
between Aura members, how one message can trigger a response and the members’ status 
categories that are held within the Aura table.  
To gain a more complete understanding of the logic used within the Aura Manager 
comprehensive flowcharts have been formulated to diagrammatically show how each message 
is processed, the generation of response messages and how the details within the Aura table 










Figure 6-14. Aura Manager operational overview 
As messages are received by the Sensor they are parsed, filtered and placed into the Message 
Cache data table for processing. When the Aura Manager is invoked by the ASM it deals with 
each message in turn, passing it through a Process Message sub-process which updates 
relevant information and generates any required responses. Upon the finalisation of message 
processing the Monitor Aura function is called perform any required housekeeping. The by-
product of this function is the production of a compiled list of transmission requests which are 
then returned to the ASM for action. 
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6.7.6.1 Process Message sub-process 















































Figure 6-15. Process Message sub-process flowchart 
The first step the sub-system takes is to validate that the transmitting device is known to the 
host by being present in the Device database and active by having the associated device_block 
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flag set to false. The next step is to validate the code of the message received and where 
appropriate check that it has been targeted at the host device. If the message fails this 
validation it is deemed to be spurious and simply discarded. Once these tests have been 
passed a further sub-process (Add Aura device) is called which updates the status of the device 
within the maintained Aura table, explained in detail in the next section. 
For messages AYT, WIT and WYS a transmission message is generated and added to the list to 
be returned to the ASM; for AUT and MSI the sending device’s authentication detail and status 
in the Aura data table are updated, otherwise no action is taken. 
Finally, as the messages are processed the current location of the device is monitored and 
updated. Upon activation of the sub-process the location is set to a default of the Location 
record with the highest location_multiplier value, that is, the least secure and un-trusted 
location. As each message is processed and a device recognised, the procedure identifies the 
device with the lowest associated location_multiplier value and sets the associated memory 
held variable accordingly. This variable will then be used in the calculation of the host device's 
confidence. 
6.7.6.2 Add Aura Device sub-process 
The Add Aura Device sub-process is invoked frequently throughout the system to ensure the 
aura membership is accurately maintained. The flowchart for this process is illustrated in 
Figure 6-16. 
When activated the unique identity of the communicating device is passed as a single 
parameter to the routine. This value is then checked to ascertain if it is already present in the 
Aura data table. If it not present and therefore a new device, the routine appends a row to the 
data table, sets aura_status to ‘new’ and allocates the current date and time to 
aura_last_update. Conversely, if the identity is found to exist, the procedure checks various 
statuses or if the device is dumb, and depending upon current values, it makes the appropriate 
amendments. If a change is made at any point aura_last_update is appropriately updated. 
6.7.6.3 Issue Message sub-process 
This sub-process as shown in Figure 6-17 is reasonably short when compared with some of the 
other discussed processes. 
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Figure 6-16. Add Device sub-process flowchart 
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Start process
End process


















Figure 6-17. Issue Message sub-process flowchart 
When it is called the appropriate message request is added to the maintained list in 
preparation for transmission. If the message is either ‘AYT’ or ‘WYS’ the aura_status column is 
set to reflect the appropriate message and aura_last_update is updated with the current date 
and time value. If however the message is not one of these two, the sub-process simply passes 
control back to the calling routine without taking any further action. 
6.7.6.4 Monitor Aura sub-process and Check Intelligent Device sub-process 
In these two interlinked sub-processes, parameterised values are used to assess when an Aura 
device’s details have remained unchanged for a significant period of time, and when a request 
for information has been sent and the reply is overdue. Within the Monitor Aura sub-process 
the system loops through the Aura table and firstly checks if each device is intelligent or not. If 
the device is intelligent a further subroutine (Check Intelligent Device) is called, otherwise for 
dumb devices the length of time since it was last observed (aura_last_update) will be assessed 
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to ascertain if it is still significant. This is achieved by comparing the time between 
aura_last_update and the current time with the parameterised threshold inactiveTimeout. If 
the difference is greater than the threshold the status of the dumb devices is marked as ‘gone’, 
if not it is set to ‘ok’ and the device continues to contribute (summarised as “Is device info too 

























Figure 6-18. Monitor Aura sub-process 
The treatment of intelligent devices in Check Intelligent Device is more complex as shown 
below in Figure 6-19. The procedure initially validates the device's status (aura_status) to 
decide whether or not a request for information has been sent and a reply is due. In this 
scenario the status will either be ‘ayt’ or ‘wys’. If a reply is expected but it is overdue (the 
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difference between aura_last_update and the current time, compared with a parameterised 
threshold) the Aura device is assumed to have left the Aura and thus the status is set 




































Figure 6-19. Check intelligent device sub-process 
If a reply is not expected the system then checks to see if the device is either a new member of 
the Aura or it has recently returned and become active once again (aura_status will either be 
‘new’ or ‘back’). If either of these two criteria is met the process needs to gather the current 
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authentication details from the device, and so a What is Your Status (WYS) message is issued 
to engender a reply with the required information. Accordingly aura_status will then be set to 
‘wys’. 
Conversely, if a reply is not expected, the routine verifies the amount of time since the table 
row was last updated, to determine if the device should be contacted to confirm it is still active 
and within communicable range. If this is the case, an Are You There (AYT) message is issued. 
6.8 Confidence Monitor 
When authentication is completed by the user on the host device, a core confidence level is 
set and remains unaltered until the Confidence Monitor procedure is called by the ASM at 
intervals dictated by auraDegradeSecs. The initial step the routine takes is to reduce the core 
confidence based on the authentication method, location and time since authentication was 
undertaken in accordance with the confidence equations outlined in chapter 5.8.  
It then continues by examining each active device within the Aura and totals the amount of 
confidence that each category (intelligent and dumb) contributes. If a smart device is 
encountered that has a status indicating that it is pending an authentication (‘pen’) or has 
been sent a request for information (‘ayt’ or ‘wys’), then it is treated as being a dumb device. 
That is, merely its presence will be treated as being significant and it will contribute a 
percentage toward the confidence based upon device_rank rather than the full active 
intelligent contribution. As discussed earlier in this chapter, intelligent devices will contribute 
an unlimited amount of confidence, whilst dumb devices will be capped at a threshold value in 
accordance with Equation 5-5. The specifics of this process are illustrated in Figure 6-20. Once 
the user’s identity confidence has been calculated control is passed back to the ASM where it 
is used during service activation to establish if re-authentication should be triggered. 
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Figure 6-20. Confidence Monitor flowchart 
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Figure 6-21. Aura Security Manager flowchart  
The ASM is the module which is at the heart of the Authentication Aura framework, 
administering the system and activating the other processes as required (refer to Figure 6-21 
above). Upon initiation of the system the ASM firstly calls the Policy Manager to set the 
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required variable values or steer the user into the parameter definition screens. It then issues 
a Who Is There (WIT) message which serves two purposes: to poll the local environment to 
ascertain which devices are nearby and active, and to announce that this host device is now 
active and willing to participate in an Authentication Aura. 
The routine then proceeds into a continuous monitoring loop which will remain active until the 
device is shut down. The first step in this loop is to monitor and filter any messages that have 
been received via the Sensor and placed in the message cache. As each message is superficially 
examined, the transmitting device is validated by the Device Manager (see section 6.6). Once 
the message list has been filtered those that are Aura specific are passed to the Aura Manager 
for processing, authentication requests are temporarily withheld. 
When the Aura Manager has completed its process the ASM then passes control to the 
Confidence Manager to calculate the specific user confidence level. The Authentication 
Manager is then invoked to process any authentication request messages (ARQ) that have 
been received from other Aura members, and to undertake authentication of the user if the 
calculated confidence level falls below the re-authenticate threshold. Finally, any messages 
that have been compiled for transmission are passed to the Message Transmitter where they 
are dispatched. At this point the ASM returns to the starting point and recommences its 
monitoring and processing calls to the various subroutines. 
6.10 System Security Interface 
The System Security Interface is the process that gives the Authentication Aura concept its 
power. This routine will eavesdrop on internal system process calls and application initiation 
within the device, and check the current user identity confidence against a table of thresholds 
(System Security data table) to ascertain if a particular action should be allowed to occur. 
Before the intricacies are discussed, an explanation of the associated table structure will be 
given. 
6.10.1 System Security data table (security) 
Centric to the Authentication Aura concept is the ability of the system to intercept application 
initiation and system processes, and validate these against set confidence thresholds prior to 
allowing their use. To achieve this, a data table of thresholds needs to be created and stored, 
against which the current user identity confidence can be compared during activation of an 
application or service; the System Security table fulfils this role. 
This is standalone and has no relationship with any other data table and as the structure in 
Table 6-12 on page 148 indicates, a relatively small data table consisting of only four columns 
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of information. The primary key field, security_key, is administered by the system and 
incremented automatically upon creation of a new record. 
When a process is intercepted there will be an associated identifying code (Process Identity or 
PID in abbreviation) that will be used to select the appropriate threshold. When a new 
application is identified this code will be held in the security_application_code data field. 
To enable the system administrator to easily remember which threshold applies to which 
application, security_application_name is used to store a meaningful description of the 
process in question although it will be possible to pre-populate this from internal system 
information. It is free format and will accept whatever text the user types. 
The final but all-important column is security_threshold. This is a numeric field which will 
accept data entry to two decimal places and stores the minimum value at which the 
corresponding application or system process will be allowed to operate. The figure contained 
within, will be bounded between 0 and 100 but these are the only constraints placed upon the 
administrator. To enable a more intuitive user interface the entry of this value will be made via 
a visual on-screen slider ranging from extremely high risk to low risk and to ease the initially 
onerous task the value will be defaulted to the parameter appSecurityDefault. 
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Field name Description Type Length Details Example 
security_key Key field Integer n/a Auto increment 1 
security_application_code Code Text 20 
Contains the code of the application or 
system process 
SMS 
security_application_name Name Text 30 
Application name or description that enables 
the user to provide a meaningful reminder 
of which application this threshold relates to 
Text messaging 
security_threshold Threshold Float 6 
A threshold which the confidence must 
exceed before the associated application or 
system process is allowed to run 
25.00 
 
Table 6-12. System Security data table definition 
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6.10.2 System Security Interface logic 
When an application is activated the System Security Interface is called and passed the code of 
the process that is about to function. A search of this code is then undertaken in the System 
Security table (security_application_code field) but if this fails the operator is then prompted 























Figure 6-22. System Security Interface flowchart 
The procedure then continues to compare the current user identity confidence against the 
threshold (either found or freshly entered) and then blocks the process call if the figure is 
below this value, permitting the activity in all other circumstances. A diagrammatic 
representation of this is shown in Figure 6-22 above. 
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6.11 Summary 
In this chapter a detailed description of the Authentication Aura framework has been 
presented, outlining the processes, data and communication that dovetail together to form a 
functioning agent. Although the anatomical diagram initially presented the databases and 
processes as disparate elements it should now be clear that the two are intrinsically coupled. 
The process logic and messages created by and exchanged between devices has been explored 
in depth providing an understanding of how a functioning Authentication Aura will operate. 
Segmenting the design into elements with limited but focussed responsibility will enable the 
production of an efficient agent, with the ability to be maintained easily and incorporating an 
element of inbuilt expandability. The specifics detailed within the chapter and the approach 
taken will allow an evaluation and subsequent performance assessment to be undertaken in 
the following chapter. Simulating operation of the Authentication Aura will enable the 
confidence calculation equation to be refined and in addition the proposed parameter values 
to be assessed. 
Beyond the simulation this framework offers a route to the production of a fully operational 
prototype which can be installed upon a device and assessed within a real world environment. 
The detail specified within this chapter offers the logic and data structures necessary to 
achieve this, whilst maintaining the route to development of a novel, focussed, efficient and 
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7. Evaluation of an Authentication Aura 
In the previous chapters the conceptual elements of an Authentication Aura have been 
introduced and detailed to provide a thorough understanding of the framework and its 
fundamental principles. The undertaken experiment established that within a user’s local 
environment detected equipment and infrastructure provided information that can be 
leveraged to boost user identity confidence and potentially offer enhanced security. With the 
processes to achieve this having now been detailed it is necessary to evaluate the approach 
and investigate if it does indeed have the capability to fulfil its aims and requirements. 
Using the data gathered during the experiment and feeding parameter variations into the 
confidence equation introduced previously, mathematical simulations have been run and 
analysed to ascertain the effects of adjusting rates of confidence erosion, thresholds and 
timings upon the need to re-authenticate. The results will be compared against proposed 
benchmark situations to test the efficacy of this new approach to user authentication and 
establish if a reduction in user inconvenience is forthcoming, and even if the goal of removing 
the need to authenticate altogether in attainable. 
Before the simulation and evaluation can be performed it is necessary to review the 
confidence equation introduced in section 5.8 and define initial forms of the three functions 
contained within it so the analysis can commence. As such the earlier proposed equation is 
reproduced below in Equation 7-1. 
                           
 
   
           
 
   
  
    
    
    
      
    
 
Equation 7-1. Combined identity confidence equation 
Function F1 calculates the core confidence of the user’s identity based on three arguments, the 
time since authentication was performed, the method of authentication used and the current 
location. This calculation must additionally incorporate the erosion of certainty in the user’s 
identity since the last authentication was made on the host device x, the centre of the Aura.  
Traditionally, when a user successfully authenticates on a mobile device the perceived 
confidence in their identity is 100% and remains so until the device is deactivated or a screen 
lock is invoked. As the Authentication Aura requires rigour tariffs to be assigned to every 
available method of authentication it is proposed to use this value to vary the starting user 
identity confidence, reflecting the method used. Hence, an average method (security rank of 
three e.g. a mixed case alphanumeric password of more than eight characters) might be 
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allocated a starting value of 80% whilst a more secure method will approach 100%, and it is 
from these levels that erosion will commence. As proposed in section 5.5 an iterative approach 
to erosion should be used to maintain the history of location, so that when a user moves 
between environments an excessively large fluctuation in this value will not be instantaneously 
experienced. An initial proposal for the function to calculate this at each time interval is: 
                                                                               
Equation 7-2. Core confidence calculation 
The system parameters auraDegradeSecs and periodDegradation described in section 6.5.1 
will respectively dictate the time periods between recalculation, and the quantity of 
confidence erosion applied for each time segment (degradation). Every auraDegradeSecs the 
Confidence Monitor (see section 6.8) will be invoked by the ASM, with the number of time 
iterations since authentication t being calculated as illustrated below in Equation 7-3. 
   
                                        
               
 
Equation 7-3. Calculation of the current time iteration 
By calculating t in this manner as opposed to using the precise time difference will smooth out 
the effect of altering auraDegradeSecs; for instance, if an erosion of 1 confidence point every 
minute was required and auraDegradeSecs was set to 60 seconds, periodDegradation would 
need to be specified as t/60. If the user subsequently wanted to reduce the amount of 
processing their device was performing and changed auraDegradeSecs to 120 seconds they 
would correspondingly have to alter periodDegradation to t/120. Utilising the approach in 
Equation 7-3 dictates that on both occasions only a single time iteration has passed and thus 
for each situation periodDegradation would be set as t (one point reduction for each iteration 
– a straight line erosion). 
Core confidence is further influenced by the location multiplier (location), an argument that is 
set dependent upon the device’s current operational environment, initially home, work or 
away. Simulation will further explore values for these but it should be noted that home is 
where the device is likely to be safest (a low value), work is next and then away is the 
environment in which the device is at greatest risk (high). To enable simulation to commence 
respective values of 2.5, 5 and 10 are proposed meaning that when at home erosion will be 
half as fast as at work but four times slower than when the user is in an alien environment. 
Selecting these values as opposed to 1, 2 and 4 will allow scope for greater adjustment in 
either direction. 
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Additionally, it should be noted that the calculation of core confidence is unbounded and can 
even become negative, and if authentication has not yet been performed on the device it will 
be set to zero. 
Function F2 encapsulates the contribution made by each intelligent device within the Aura and 
is based upon the method of authentication last performed on that member device and the 
time since the authentication was performed. It is important to highlight that the contribution 
of such devices cannot be based upon their current overall confidence because they are 
members of the Aura, and as such will be calculating their own value inclusive of a contribution 
from the host device. If this were done, a ping-pong effect would be created as values were 
traded back and forth, falsely elevating the confidence of each participating device; thus each 
intelligent device will contribute the same parameterised amount intelligentContribution. As 
such function F2 is proposed as follows: 
                                 
                                               
                         
 
Equation 7-4. Intelligent device contribution 
For the sake of discussion, intelligentContribution might be set to a value of 20% and 
authentication method in the range one to five. An authentication method of value five would 
indicate an extremely secure and robust (resistant to circumvention) method of authentication 
and one the least secure method possible. Time since authentication is not a strict time such as 
the number of seconds or minutes but an iteration multiplier based upon the time and 
auraDegradeSecs as used in the calculation of core confidence. For example if 
auraDegradeSecs was set to 120 seconds this would be the number of two minute intervals 
since authentication. Thus for an authentication method of three (an averagely secure 
method) that was performed 18 minutes ago (9 two minute periods) and providing the device 
has been continuously present in communicable range, the confidence contribution would be 
((20 x 3) / 9) = 6.66%. Adjusting the parameter intelligentContribution will of course 
correspondingly alter the amount of contribution made by each intelligent device. 
Dumb pieces of equipment that are unable to authenticate or communicate with other 
members of the Aura will simply act as tokens and contribute confidence by their presence. 
The amount by which they contribute is simply dependent upon their rank, an allocated value 
between one and ten, the higher the rank the greater the security significance of the item. For 
example in the experiment detailed in chapter 4.2 one subject’s wallet was often detected yet 
hidden and potentially quite secure, so it is conceivable that this item would be allocated a 
rank of eight or nine, whilst the meeting table they encountered was far less personal and 
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would therefore be ranked at a much lower level, perhaps two. As an initial starting point the 
proposed equation for the contribution of the inert devices is: 
                                                     
Equation 7-5. Dumb device contribution 
Within Equation 7-5 the static parameter tokenContribution provides the basis of the 
calculation and so to get a balance between the token devices and the intelligent ones it is 
proposed to allocate a value such as 1.5% to tokenContribution. Thus a significant item (wallet) 
with a rank of 8 when detected would consistently add 12% to the Authentication Aura’s 
confidence total. As outlined earlier, the sum of all of the contributions from dumb devices will 
have an upper bound threshold (the parameter maxTokenContribution) applied to ensure 
confidence is not maintained at an artificially high level by a large number of these devices that 
can easily be purloined by an impostor. If for instance an upper bound of 30% were applied, in 
the above example it would require three such items to be concurrently detected to maintain 
this maximum contribution.  
When intelligent devices are present but have not been through an authentication process it is 
proposed that they will be treated as dumb devices. Without authentication they would be 
incapable of making a contribution and so, by treating them in this way, at least their detected 
presence will be used positively. 
7.1 Authentication Aura Simulation 
Now that initial proposals have been made to assess the effectiveness of the outlined 
Authentication Aura and to model the aforementioned formulae to understand the impact of 
the parameters upon authentication security analysis of the observed experimental data is 
required. This analysis has been undertaken by simulating the Authentication Aura using an 
initial set of proposed parameters and then adjusting them to ascertain the effect both 
statistically and visually. The hypothesis for the simulation is that a significant reduction in the 
number of intrusive authentications will be observed when simulating an Authentication Aura 
in comparison to a PIN based benchmark solution. The details of how the simulation was 
performed will now be outlined in the following sub-sections. 
A script has been written in a mathematical modelling system that utilised the captured data 
and calculated a confidence based upon the detected presence of equipment and 
infrastructure; this is listed in Appendix B. With the script being consecutively run for all users 
and the sheer volume of data involved it was decided to simulate the user’s day between 8am 
and midnight at ten minute intervals. This approach enabled legible graphs to be plotted 
illustrating the confidence level at each time interval. 
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The calculated confidence value is based upon all the observed information and so the host 
device for which the confidence relates, should be regarded as a non-existent virtual item of 
equipment upon which the Authentication Aura is centred; that is, a device additional to the 
observed Aura, the role played by the PDA listening devices in the experiment. To maintain an 
accurate simulation, during the operation of the script the Authentication Aura confidence was 
calculated for each of the observed devices with the parameters being universally applied. 
Thus all intelligent devices had identical thresholds and allocated tokenContribution values 
which would not necessarily be true in the real world. 
With the experiment being run concurrently for groups of five individuals it was vital that any 
simulation script was written to reflect this. During the operation of the script (listed in 
Appendix B), once the individual for whom the simulation was being run was ascertained the 
appropriate tag cross-reference file and then all tag data for the subject was read in and held 
in memory. As the tag observation data was imported it was filtered to exclude readings prior 
to 8am and combined into ten minute slots. Thus for each user an array of 96 ten minute slots 
(16 hours with 6 slots per hour), for every one of the possible 75 tags, across a fourteen day 
period was populated with an indicator when the appropriate tag was detected. Using the list 
of cross-reference values enabled the script to identify which of the possible 75 tags each row 
of detection information related to and provided details of the corresponding device. 
Consequently the array from which the simulation was run was three dimensional for each 
user (day, time, tag) and consisted of 14 x 96 x 75 or 100,800 cells.  
The cross-reference file holds details of the tag reference, label (1..75), owner, location (home, 
work, mobile), description, type (device, infrastructure, other), category (intelligent or dumb),  
rank (1..10), can authenticate (yes or no). Hence the array constructed from this file was two 
dimensional and consisted of 75 rows with nine columns in each row. 
The simulation then processes each timeslot in turn, identifying the devices that were 
detected, and from this builds and maintains an Aura (as detailed in section 6.7.1) for the 
subject; from this data the confidence calculation is then made. Authentication of the user’s 
identity plays a vital role during confidence calculation and so within the simulation it has been 
necessary to make some assumptions regarding this process. When an intelligent device that 
can authenticate is newly detected, authentication upon that device is assumed to have just 
occurred and then confidence eroded from that point onwards. When authentication is 
required on any device it is assumed that the process is successful and performed via an 
averagely secure method, a security tariff of three. From this cyclic calculation of confidence 
and assumed authentications the appropriate statistics are gathered to record the number of 
required intrusive user interventions and draw the corresponding graphical representations. 
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As a baseline comparison, Figure 7-1 illustrates the performance expected from a mobile 
device employing current PIN based protection, with a ten minute screen lock and an 
assumption of access being required every thirty minutes. Thirty minute usage is based upon a 
review of the author’s own interaction with a mobile device during a five day period. Although 
this is not considered heavy usage (with, for example, Woolaston, (2014) indicating that some 
extreme users access their devices over 200 times a day), it was decided to use the 30 minute 
frequency as a starting point. Using this access frequency implies that any screen lock of less 
time makes no difference to the baseline frequency of required re-authentication, and this 
generous value was selected to gauge the initial efficacy of the Authentication Aura. It should 
be noted, at the moment the screen lock is invoked the host device assumes the identity of the 
user to be valid, a well documented weakness of this approach to security (Muncaster and 
Turk, 2006).  
 
Figure 7-1. Control plot of user identity confidence on a device with a 10 minute screen lock 
In this and all succeeding plots the y-axis represents the percentage of identity confidence, 
with the time of day being plotted along the x-axis. Additionally, plus (+) symbols have been 
overlaid to indicate the point at which access to the device was made and squares have been 
used to show the points when the user was required to authenticate. Each authentication is 
represented by two squares, the lower indicates the time and confidence at which 
authentication was invoked whist the upper illustrates the confidence allocated immediately 
after the assumed successful authentication. It should be noted that in several situations and 
especially in Figure 7-1, a plus and a square co-exist at the same point in time (along the top of 
the graph) and have consequently been plotted one on top of the other. 
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From this control plot and with the assumptions detailed earlier it is clear that this simulation 
indicates that the user would be required to undergo an authentication process 32 times 
during the 16 hour period from 8am until midnight. Also, employing a traditional Boolean 
approach to security, when authentication is passed confidence is set to 100% and remains 
unchanged until the screen lock is invoked and confidence drops to 0%. This gives the graph 
the box-wave appearance that is exhibited in the diagram. 
Variable Value Reason for selection 
Authentication method tariff 3 Median tariff value 
Re-authentication threshold 20% Low risk service being accessed 
Device access frequency 30 minutes Based on author’s observed usage 
Time segment for confidence calculation 10 minutes 
Clarity of graph production and dictated 
by large data volume 
Location multipliers: home, work, away 2.5, 5, 10 
Initial weights, will be adjusted during 
simulation 
Intelligent device contribution factor 20% 
Set at this low figure to restrict the 
influence of these devices 
Dumb device contribution factor 1.5% 
Selected a low value to limit the 
influence of insignificant inert items 
Cumulative dumb device upper bound 30% 
Set at this value to permit usage of a low 
tariff app 
Period degradation t x 2 
Selected to ensure erosion to 0 within 20 
minutes when in an alien location. 
 
Table 7-1. List of parameter values used in the simulation 
The simulation parameter values introduced earlier are summarised in Table 7-1 and in-line 
with the benchmark above it was assumed that the user attempted to access a low risk, low 
tariff application (e.g. texting on a mobile phone) once every thirty minutes. This application is 
deemed to be available at a confidence level at or above 20%. If the confidence level was 
below the 20% threshold at point of operation authentication was assumed to be requested 
and successfully completed with an average level three method, establishing the associated 
initial confidence of 80%. It should be noted that in reality this figure would vary upon differing 
authentication techniques being invoked.  
The period degradation multiplier (t x 2) will invoke straight line erosion with the only 
influence on its rate being the location multiplier; without the inclusion of location it would 
take the system 30 time segments (300 minutes) to erode confidence from a starting point of 
80% to the re-authentication threshold of 20%. If this Authentication Aura baseline is 
simulated both at home and away the resultant graphs are shown below in Figure 7-2 and 
Figure 7-3. 
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Figure 7-2. Degrading confidence whilst away from home 
 
Figure 7-3. Degrading confidence whilst at home 
To aid interpretation the graphs also include the re-authentication threshold which is drawn in 
a colour dependent upon the user’s location (home is green, red away and work would be 
amber). When service access is attempted at a confidence level below this value re-
authentication is demanded and assumed successful, and thus without any external Aura 
influence, in Figure 7-2 the confidence degrades at a rate of 20% for every ten minute period 
after authentication. Thus it takes 30 minutes to degrade from the authentication level of 80% 
to 20% and 40 minutes to drop below the access cut-off value. As a result, in this test 
simulation authentication is required every sixty minutes at alternate service activations, 
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leading to the 16 authentications exhibited by this default graph between 8am and the 12pm 
cut-off. In direct comparison when at home for the entirety of the day Figure 7-3 requires only 
seven re-authentications during the same 14 hour period. 
As a further introductory comparison if a single user (subject 3) is examined for a single day 
(day 915 - the second Tuesday), it is first necessary to allocate ranking values for the items they 
specified on their experiment participation device list. The values used are shown below in 
Table 7-2 and have been allocated based upon the anecdotal evidence observed in the 
experiment. 
Equipment Rank  Equipment Rank  Equipment Rank 
Wallet 8  Car (Home) 7  Bag 6 
Fridge 6  Microscope 5  MP3 4 
Locker 4  Coat 6  PC 5 
Bed clock 6  Fax 1  Car (Work) 5 
Laptop (Work) 4  WiFi (Home) 5  Mobile (Work) 5 
 
Table 7-2. Subject 3’s tagged equipment and associated rankings 
Utilising these values and running the simulation for the user the graph illustrated in Figure 7-5 
is produced. For completeness and to aid discussion the corresponding diagram in Figure 7-4 
has been reproduced in-line, highlighting when the various items of equipment were detected 
throughout the identical timeframe. 
Immediately it is noticeable that the detected devices provide the necessary information to 
ascertain the location of the user at any given time. Although close examination also reveals 
that shared resources, items tagged by other experiment subjects, have also been detected; 
that is, colleague’s office, reception and meeting table. For security purposes the default 
location is away but this graph indicates the extended periods that are spent both at home and 
in a work environment. Interestingly, as discussed previously, upon activation of the core 
device initial authentication is delayed for a period of time. Although initially the Aura only 
contributes approximately 24%, a level at which operation of many services should be 
restricted, it is a level at which the first simulated access can function and is a good indicator of 
the influence that can be harnessed. This influence is further illustrated by the confidence 
rising above the parameterised 80% level immediately upon each authentication. 
 
                                                          
15
 All users’ data was labelled with a day number based on 1=first Monday of experiment, ... ,6=first 
Saturday, 7=first Sunday, … , 12=second Friday etc. 
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Figure 7-4. Subject 3’s devices detected during the day selected for simulation (day 9) 
 
Figure 7-5. Simulated Authentication Aura results for subject 3 on the same day 
Location of the user and the core device clearly affects the rate of decline in confidence; with 
the user returning home just before 5pm during the evening beyond this point the gradient of 
the plot significantly reduces, reflecting the relaxation of degradation expressed within the 
confidence equation. At approximately 5.40pm the user moves within detectable proximity of 
their PC, MP3 and fridge and the added assurance these token devices reverses the confidence 
erosion, reflected by a spike in the graph at this point. This further supports the applicability of 
the Authentication Aura’s approach and with the future expected to provide us with greater 
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numbers of detectable devices, the potential for security leverage is only likely to increase. 
Overall the number of authentications across the 14 hours of utilised experimental data for 
this user on the simulated day is reduced to 8, 25.0% of the baseline 32. 
 
Figure 7-6. A comparative user's weekend Authentication Aura profile (user 9, day 14) 
For comparison purposes, Figure 7-6 illustrates a different user’s simulated weekend day 
activity based upon their own specific devices and personal items but using identical 
parameters and thresholds. From this it is clear to see that apart from an hour in the early 
afternoon the user spent their entire day at home. In this location the Aura is most relaxed 
with degradation at its slowest. During the plotted 14 hours only 5 authentications are 
required, only 16% of the baseline 32. The home reference graph Figure 7-3 suggests that 
without the Aura’s influence re-authentication will be expected every 2.5 hours. In the 
weekend graph however, this period extends to as much as four hours between 9.30am and 
1.30pm as the detected devices maintain the confidence at an operable level. There are seven 
points during the day at which the confidence is capped and then sustained at its maximum 
level of 100%. Additional contributions from the Aura push the confidence from the simulated 
authentication threshold of 80% to above the 100% for over 60 minutes before the erosion 
finally reduces the level back below the cap. 
Alteration of the simulated parameters of course influences the performance of the core 
confidence calculation. If subject three is re-examined for the same day as illustrated earlier 
but the value of the intelligent device contribution is varied, Figure 7-7-Figure 7-11 indicate the 
affect of the parameter adjustment. It should be noted that Figure 7-8 is identical to Figure 7-5 
but has been replicated here for clarity. 
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Figure 7-7. Intelligent device contribution 10 
 
Figure 7-8. Intelligent device contribution 20 
 
Figure 7-9. Intelligent device contribution 30 
 
Figure 7-10. Intelligent device contribution 40 
 
Figure 7-11. Intelligent device contribution 50 
In the examples above it is clear that the main effect of varying the intelligent device 
contribution parameter is to reduce the number of authentications during the day from nine in 
Figure 7-7 to six in Figure 7-11. However, perhaps more significant is the number of 
authentications required when the user is not at home. It is in the higher risk environments 
where the user would be required to undergo fewer authentications; at home the 
inconvenience remains unaltered. Whilst at work or in an alien environment, setting the 
intelligent contribution parameter to 10 (Figure 7-7) forces six authentications, whilst 
increasing the parameter to 50 (Figure 7-11) requires only three. This indicates that potentially 
the Authentication Aura is acting too confidently with the highest setting and consequently 
intelligent devices are providing excessive contribution. 
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Logically the overall confidence percentage is maintained at a higher level for longer and is 
slower to degrade. With this occurring the user would have more high-level applications and 
functionality available for their use for greater periods of time. 
If the intelligent contribution is reset to the initial value of 20 and the token device 
contribution varied with values of 0.75, 1.5 (the default), 2.25 and 3 the following graphs are 
obtained. Figure 7-13 has once again been repetitively reproduced for ease of discussion. 
 
Figure 7-12. Token device contribution 0.75 
 
Figure 7-13. Token device contribution 1.5 
 
Figure 7-14. Token device contribution 2.25 
 
Figure 7-15. Token device contribution 3.0 
The graphs illustrate that overall the number of authentications across the different token 
contribution values remains unaltered at eight. The lowest value would imply that a dumb 
device given the highest security rank will only contribute 7.5% towards the calculation, a 
quarter of the capped maximum 30%, whilst in Figure 7-15 the same device would unilaterally 
provide the maximum. The one difference that is noticeable is the frequency of peaks and 
troughs exhibited by the lowest value in Figure 7-12, there are many more rapid fluctuations in 
the confidence calculation although it could be argued that this makes the Authentication Aura 
more responsive to the devices in the environment; potentially an advantage. Proceeding from 
this point, if the capped maximum token contribution parameter is varied and each token 
contributes 1.5 as a minimum, Figure 7-16-Figure 7-20 result. 
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Figure 7-16. Maximum token contribution 10 
 
Figure 7-17. Maximum token contribution 20 
 
Figure 7-18. Maximum token contribution 30 
 
Figure 7-19. Maximum token contribution 40 
 
Figure 7-20. Maximum token contribution 50 
Amending this value does not have a significant performance upon the Authentication Aura as 
shown in the graphs although it does produce a spurious result. When the maximum token 
contribution threshold is at its lowest test value of 10, it has the affect of delaying the first 
required authentication for longer than a higher value as illustrated in Figure 7-16; in fact upon 
simulated activation it immediately sets its own confidence to 100%. This is because the 
simulation is being extrapolated across all detected devices and at 8am the subject’s home PC 
is detected. One of the assumptions of the simulation was that when an intelligent device was 
detected for the first time, without any prior knowledge it was assumed that authentication 
had just been performed on the item of equipment and confidence would then be degraded 
from that point on. If the subject had just authenticated on the PC at 8am it would contribute 
its rank multiplied by the 20% intelligent device contribution without any erosion, which in this 
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instance is 5x20%. In the other variations there is sufficient confidence gained from the Aura to 
prevent the PC authenticating which in-turn bars this anomaly from reoccurring. 
Throughout the simulations that have been discussed so far, one set of parameters that have 
remained unaltered are the security weightings for the three locations defined during the 
experiment. It could be argued that the comparison of performance of the selected subject 
against the baseline screen lock example is unfair because in the most vulnerable locale (away 
from work and home) it still takes 30 minutes for 100% confidence to be eroded to zero, rather 
than the baseline’s 10 minutes. If the location weights are widened to increase the caution 
exhibited by the Authentication Aura when at work or at home the resultant graph might be 
deemed more comparable. To this end the tariff whilst at home was left unchanged at 2.5, 
work was increased to 10, and away was allocated a weighting of 30 the equivalent of eroding 
100% to zero in ten minutes; the resultant graph can be seen in Figure 7-21. 
 
Figure 7-21. Subject 3 on the same day with increased location weightings 
The immediate observation is the unsurprising increase in fluctuations of confidence when the 
subject is away from their safer environments. However, across the day still only 10 
authentications are required compared with the baseline 32. Even if 9am-5pm is taken in 
isolation, the time when the user is at work or out of the office (away) and the associated risk 
is at its greatest, the number of authentications is less than half the number experienced on 
the baseline graph. During this time frame the user accesses their device on 17 occasions and 
the existing screen-lock security would require a corresponding 17 PIN entries, whilst the 
Authentication Aura invokes only 7 such actions. This simulation certainly seems to underline 
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the resilience of the Authentication Aura to changes in locations even when strict security 
arguments are set. 
All simulations so far have been examining a low tariff app or service that within the realms of 
the Authentication Aura only requires 20% or more confidence to function. If this threshold is 
now raised to 60% simulating the use of a much more sensitive app the resultant graph is 
shown in Figure 7-22. 
 
Figure 7-22. User 3 on the simulated day with an increased authentication threshold 
Even with the user accessing a higher tariff application the Authentication Aura still only 
requires ten authentications to be performed throughout the day, 31.25% of the baseline 32. 
The graph illustrates how the confidence remains high and even capped at its maximum for 
extended periods, a combination of the number of host authentications and those also 
performed more frequently upon the other simulated devices; the entire Aura have all uplifted 
their security response and positively bolstered each other. 
It is also possible to extend the influence of location to assess the effect of varying the 
authentication threshold dependent on the locale at which the app is being activated. For 
instance if the threshold is set to 20% when the user is at home, 40% when they are at work, 
and 60% in all other instances the graph shown in Figure 7-23 is produced. On analysis the 
number of authentications is unchanged from the comparative simulation with a fixed 20% 
threshold. In fact the only observed difference is a single delayed authentication which occurs 
at 3:00pm rather than 2:30pm because other devices within the Aura have been simulated as 
re-authenticating earlier than they did previously. 
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Figure 7-23. Illustration of user 3 with a location based variable authentication threshold 
A final important question to evaluate which would be at the forefront of most users’ mind is 
how does the Authentication Aura respond when a device is stolen? To simulate this, the 
parameters were all reset to their original values and the modelling script amended so from 
2.01pm all device detections were blocked. This replicates the theft of the host device and its 
removal from familiar surroundings out of detectable range from other Aura equipment. The 
simulated theft of the host device is illustrated below in Figure 7-24. 
 
Figure 7-24. Simulated host device theft from subject 3 at 2.01pm on the same day 
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Upon theft the Aura immediately reverts to the default location of away and it can be seen 
that without the influence of known devices within twelve minutes the confidence has fallen 
below 20%; it takes twenty five minutes in total for the confidence to degrade from the last 
activation at maximum confidence (100%) and flatten out at zero. Intuitively, as the Aura 
reaches this point all potential services and applications would have been barred and without 
re-authentication, the simulated device rendered unusable. It should be remembered that for 
the simulations the Aura calculations have been rerun every ten minutes. In a real life 
application it is anticipated that this will occur more frequently and so the response to theft 
would be quicker. In comparison to an unprotected or unlocked mobile phone being 
continually used, this is a significant improvement to the device only being blocked when the 
battery’s charge is spent and it shuts down. 
One of the major objectives of this research is to produce an approach which will postpone the 
need for a user to authenticate immediately upon activating a device, overcoming the 
inconvenience of repetitive imposition when using multiple devices. The simulation has indeed 
shown this to be an outcome of the Authentication Aura as demonstrated by Figure 7-25 
below. This graph represents data captured by subject 13 on the first Sunday of their 
experiment participation, and indicates that the first authentication they were required to 
make was on the fourth simulated use of the device at 9.30am. This is a postponement of 90 
minutes from first activation which will intuitively enhance the user experience. 
 
Figure 7-25. Illustration of initial authentication being delayed 
The delay in authentication being requested shown in the figure above is aided significantly by 
the data being gathered on a Sunday when the subject decided to stay at home. The green 
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authentication threshold indicates the relaxed approach to security that the Authentication 
Aura is taking, which in turn erodes confidence at its slowest rate. This attitude is then further 
enhanced by detected devices which immediately raise confidence to 25% upon activation and 
although it then drops below the threshold, the arrival of additional Aura members lifts the 
value to the capped maximum prior to the second service access being undertaken. This series 
of events alone encouragingly support the Authentication Aura concept and can be regarded 
as a significant success. 
This section has introduced the simulations of the Authentication Aura that have been 
performed, in the next tranche of this chapter the results of extrapolated simulations are 
presented and the results mathematically analysed to review their significance. 
7.2 Assessment of Extended Simulation Results 
In the previous section graphs illustrating the simulations that have been carried out have 
been presented and the underlying variations discussed. However, to visually compare the 
adjustment in calculation parameters it has been necessary to repetitively illustrate a single 
user consistently. To ascertain a better understanding of the efficacy of the Authentication 
Aura it is appropriate to extrapolate the simulations across all experiment subjects for the 
entirety of their participation and mathematically assess the results; this section presents 
these findings. 
When the Authentication Aura with the initial variable settings, and a higher location tariff as 
detailed earlier, were simulated the quantities of invoked authentications were recorded and 
are presented in Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 respectively. 
Table 7-3 shows the number of simulated authentications for each user based on the scenario 
of a mobile phone with a ten minute screen lock and user invoked service access every 30 
minutes. Compared to the baseline total of 8,448 authentications, during this simulation a 
total of 2,205 authentications were observed at an average rate of 8.38 per day with a 
standard deviation of 2.75 – a large variation. When examined the data reveals lowest and 
highest values of 4 and 16 authentications respectively and the total value is only 26.20% of 
the baseline quantity, representing an improvement of 73.80%. User 9’s experiment data 
generated the greatest numerical saving of 384 fewer authentications, whilst in percentage 
terms subject 5 exhibited a reduction of 83.04 %. 
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14 9 15 16 8 12 13 14 6 16 8 8 7 8 7 10 7 8 9 7 
8 5 11 12 5 7 8 7 7 10 9 12 9 14 9 10 8 10 9 8 
8 5 5 8 4 7 9 7 5 6 9 9 5 11 9 10 7 8 9 7 
6 6 7 12 5 7 8 6 6 6 13 11 6 5 7 9 7 11 9 7 
5 5 6 12 4 8 5 5 8 7 5 6 5 9 11 13 10 10 11 11 
6 8 5 16 6 5 7 5 8 6 7 7 8 7 8 15 6 10 11 9 
6 12 8  6 5 11 5 6 8 6 6 12 7 7 11 9 7 9 6 
13 5 8   7 8 9 5 14 7 16 10 7 8 11 7 10 9 7 
13 6 9   8 11 8 5 5 8  9 11 10 15 7 6 8 6 
6 6 7   5  8 6 7 8  10 11 8 12 8 8 8 7 
7 6 7   7  8 6  5  5 12 9 10 8 8 7 10 
5 6 7   9  7 6  10  5 7 7 12 6 10 13 10 
5 6 4   6  11 4  7  8 8 10 14 9 9 7 6 
7 5 7   8  5 5  7  9 7 10 11 8 9 13 8 
9  9   13  16 13  16   13 15 12 12 11 11 11 
                     
Total 118 90 115 76 38 114 80 121 96 85 125 75 108 137 135 175 119 135 143 120 
                     
Baseline 480 448 480 192 224 480 288 480 480 320 480 256 448 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Table 7-3. The number of simulated authentications shown per user per day 
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26 16 30 32 10 20 24 28 6 31 14 13 12 12 10 20 13 12 15 11 
9 6 19 20 5 9 12 9 7 16 13 22 12 28 14 17 13 17 16 9 
8 6 5 9 4 9 11 9 6 10 14 13 5 21 13 21 13 10 17 8 
8 4 5 22 5 9 10 8 9 7 23 20 5 5 10 19 12 22 15 8 
5 6 6 20 4 10 5 5 11 8 5 6 5 15 14 25 15 25 20 23 
6 13 5 31 8 6 10 5 11 7 11 8 13 12 10 27 9 17 17 6 
8 22 12  8 6 18 5 6 17 11 6 20 12 10 17 15 10 16 6 
26 8 10   10 10 14 5 26 12 32 16 11 10 21 11 23 16 11 
8 4 12   9 17 14 5 5 13  12 20 15 28 12 9 15 10 
8 4 12   5  14 8 11 12  16 19 11 19 12 17 15 11 
10 4 8   9  13 7  5  5 21 16 20 12 9 14 8 
6 3 11   14  10 9  18  5 10 9 20 8 5 26 12 
6 4 4   7  21 4  12  13 12 18 24 14 18 10 9 
11 6 9   12  5 7  12  11 12 18 20 13 12 24 11 
16  12   22  31 24  30   24 30 22 23 23 24 21 
                     
Total 161 106 160 134 44 157 117 191 125 138 205 120 150 234 208 320 195 229 260 164 
                     
Baseline 480 448 480 192 224 480 288 480 480 320 480 256 448 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Table 7-4. The number of simulated authentications with higher location tariffs shown per user per day 
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26 18 30 32 14 21 24 29 8 32 16 13 15 15 13 21 13 17 18 15 
15 9 21 21 7 11 13 10 10 18 14 23 17 28 18 21 14 20 17 17 
13 13 7 11 7 12 14 11 8 11 14 15 7 23 15 21 13 17 17 14 
12 11 19 22 7 12 13 10 11 12 24 21 9 7 11 21 13 23 17 15 
7 9 10 20 7 12 7 7 12 12 7 7 7 16 22 25 16 26 20 24 
7 16 7 31 15 8 11 7 11 12 13 9 16 13 13 29 9 19 17 16 
12 24 20  13 8 19 7 7 18 13 7 22 15 13 21 15 15 17 15 
27 13 16   12 13 16 7 26 13 32 19 12 14 22 13 25 17 15 
29 12 21   12 19 14 7 7 14  18 21 17 30 13 15 16 14 
10 12 19   7  15 10 15 13  18 20 14 24 13 20 16 14 
13 11 18   12  14 9  7  7 22 17 21 13 16 15 22 
7 12 14   17  12 11  19  7 12 10 23 10 25 26 23 
7 12 7   9  22 7  13  20 14 20 24 16 19 12 11 
14 9 18   13  7 9  13  19 14 19 22 14 22 24 16 
17  20   24  32 25  30   25 31 24 24 24 24 24 
                     
Total 216 181 247 137 70 190 133 213 152 163 223 127 201 257 247 349 209 303 273 255 
                     
With Aura 161 106 160 134 44 157 117 191 125 138 205 120 150 234 208 320 195 229 260 164 
                     
Baseline 480 448 480 192 224 480 288 480 480 320 480 256 448 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Table 7-5. The number of simulated authentications with higher location tariffs but without influence from the Aura 
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The discussion presented earlier relating to Figure 7-21 and the use of higher location 
weightings, suggested a tariff of 10 when the subject was at work and 30 when they were in an 
alien environment. Extending this simulation across all subjects produced the figures shown in 
Table 7-4; 3,418 polled authentications at a mean daily rate of 13.00 but with an extremely 
high standard deviation of 6.76. In this scenario, surprisingly the lowest number of 
authentications was 3 and the highest 32, a maximum figure equivalent to having no benefit 
from the Authentication Aura whatsoever. However, during the simulations if any devices 
were detected at some point during a given day, the entire day was incorporated into the 
results. Thus, if after an hour’s use the PDA sensor’s battery went flat and the device 
deactivated for the remainder of the day, as long as one other device had been detected 
during the operational hour, the simulation would indicate that for 15 hours the subject was in 
an alien environment without any other Aura devices nearby, incurring a large quantity of 
authentications. This factor means that the presented average daily value will be higher than 
the true operational value, and even with a 59.39% improvement on the baseline the support 
it offers for the efficacy of the Authentication Aura in reducing the quantity of required user 
interventions is even greater. This effect is demonstrated in Figure 7-26 below. 
 
Figure 7-26. Example of a device that becomes inactive part way through a day 
In the above example subject number 14’s PDA possibly became inactive at approximately 
3.30pm and so for the remainder of the day a maximum number of authentications have been 
simulated even though the device would not have been working, skewing the results. 
Using the high location weightings (i.e. home=2.5, work=10 and away=30) should intuitively 
have more of an impact upon the working week when more time is spent away from home, as 
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opposed to the weekend. If the weekdays and weekends are analysed separately with these 
high tariffs the simulation produces average daily authentication requests of 13.54 and 11.42 
respectively but with extremely high standard deviations of 6.56 and 7.12. This analysis 
underlines how the Authentication Aura gains more advantage when operating in a familiar 
and trusted environment, although there is a higher variation in readings during the weekend 
because it is likely subjects moved from high safety (at home) to high risk (away from home) 
more frequently. For comparison and completeness when the same analysis is performed 
using the default parameters an average of 8.59 for weekdays and 7.79 for weekends was 
observed but with improved standard deviations of 2.65 and 2.93. 
One of the fundamental principles of the collective approach utilised by the Authentication 
Aura is the influence of the member devices and the contribution to the host’s identity 
confidence that they make. To establish how much additional confidence they offer the 
simulation was re-run, across all days but still with the high location weightings, and the only 
incorporated effect was the influence of location, both token and intelligent contributions 
were ignored. This simulated activity returns the results collated in Table 7-5 on page 173 and 
for ease of comparison the totals from the simulation including the Aura’s influence (Table 7-4) 
have been included. 
This simulation reveals an extremely large variation in the influence of other Aura members. 
For subject 4 the location influence is significantly reducing the number of authentications 
from a baseline of 192 to 137, however the inclusion of the Aura only reduces this figure by a 
further three authentications across their entire experiment participation. The Aura effect is 
numerically greatest for user 20 who had their baseline authentications reduced from 480 to 
255 initially by location but then by an additional 91 with the inclusion of the Aura. In 
percentage terms subject 2 exhibited the largest improvement through the Aura’s influence 
with a drop of 41.44% from 181 to 106; the average reduction in the number of 
authentications was 17.89%. Overall the total daily number of authentication requests without 
the Aura influence was 4,146 with a mean daily value of 15.76 and a standard deviation of 
6.20. These figures certainly support the principle of the Authentication Aura and suggest that 
even when at greatest risk it offers a significant improvement upon traditional security. 
7.3 Lexical Emulation  
Part of the proposed framework outlined the message interchange that would have to occur 
between cooperating member devices to enable the Authentication Aura to function. To 
investigate the efficacy of the message syntax and vocabulary, a lexical emulator has been 
developed and run on a laptop computer using the gathered experiment data as input. The 
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program utilised a user specified time, day and subject, and then proceeded at given time 
intervals, introducing new devices as they were sensed, and removed them when their 
detection ceased. The operator could interactively create the host device and control the 
strength of authentication it used. As the Aura operated and the confidence of the 
incorporated devices altered, the effect was observed. 
Figure 7-27 illustrates a screen shot that was captured whilst the lexical emulation was 
running. The top portion of the screen represents a control panel with which the user interacts 
to adjust various parameters such as date, time, user, authentication threshold and whether or 
not authentication is performed automatically. Intelligent devices are created in a large 
window, and token equipment in smaller windows with just a close button for control. The 
background colour of the intelligent devices window reflects the current confidence held and 
changes at 20% intervals during degradation, from green to red. In the example above, the 
‘Mobile Phone #0000007056’ host device was created manually during operation and with a 
confidence level of 53% is displayed with an amber background. The remaining devices were 
created automatically by the emulator using the experiment data for User 1 on Day 3. On the 
host device the list box labelled ‘A’ displays the intelligent elements of the active Aura, whilst 
the one labelled ‘T’ shows the token devices. The 12 character hexadecimal codes shown in 
these two list boxes represent the RFID tags of the devices captured and stored in the 
experiment data. 
 
Figure 7-27. Screen capture during operation of the lexical emulation 
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Within the operation of this emulation, the data is only used to create and delete devices in 
isolation; they discover each other and trade information using the vocabulary specified. A 
device is created as a self contained instance of a compiled program and has no knowledge of 
those invoked either before or after, it learns independently. Empirically the vocabulary 
appears sufficient and able to support the proposed communication, and the status of each 
Aura member indicates information exchange is functioning well. During operation the folder 
through which information passed dynamically showed message arrival and collection, and 
also the replies to requests for detail. It fully supports the concept and proposed framework 
logic. 
One further benefit observed during the production of the software was the structure 
imparted by the proposed framework. With distinct processes identified it naturally dictated 
the separation of the code into structured internal functions, each with its own role and 
responsibilities. This subdivision of functionality and approach performed well, creating a 
program that was easy to maintain and debug, whilst reinforcing the design integrity of the 
framework. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has reported the results recorded during an extensive investigation into the 
Authentication Aura concept and how it might reduce the burdensome requirement to 
repeatedly re-authenticate on a mobile device during regular daily use. Mathematical 
modelling software has been used to simulate a functioning Authentication Aura and gauge 
the influence of parameter alteration upon a single user, and then extrapolated across all 
users. 
The reproduced graphs have given a visual indication to the detected improvement in 
performance with subjects’ data showing up to an 80.36% reduction in requests for 
authentication even when the higher location weightings were used, imitating a risk averse 
user.  These results were further supported by the extraction of quantitative results that 
mathematically illustrate the observed improvements and support the acceptance of the 
hypothesis proposed in section 7.1. There is indeed a significant reduction in the number of 
simulated authentications; Table 7-3 presents the results for all users across the entirety of 
their experiment participation, and indicates a drop from 8,416 authentications to 2,205 - a 
decrease of 73.8%. 
Although a large amount of data was harvested from the experiment some anomalies have 
surfaced which appear to have been caused by device failure or user misuse. The effect of this 
upon the discussed calculations is to adversely influence the results because of the failsafe 
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approach that the simulation takes in defaulting the user to an alien environment, divested of 
the assurance contribution from other Aura members. 
An additional simulation illustrated how the Authentication Aura would respond to theft, 
should the host device be removed by an unscrupulous individual. In contrast to traditional 
security that would not be invoked if regular use was maintained or screen lock deactivated, 
this new approach reached an entirely unusable and secure state within twelve minutes based 
on the parameters and timeframe used. In normal functioning with a realistic timeframe 
(much less than the simulated ten minutes), these findings suggest that the response would be 
rapid providing assurance to the owner. 
A secondary emulation technique was used to investigate the message and status logic that 
was outlined as part of the framework. This second exploration further supported the 
proposals and illustrated that the vocabulary was sufficient to fulfil its requirements.  
The results produced during this investigation have gone further to reinforce the novel 
concept of an Authentication Aura, illustrating how user controlled parameters can be altered 
to adjust its response to threat and just how assured in performance it is. The following 
chapter will review the work presented in this document as a whole and proceed by outlining 
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8. Conclusion 
Now that the research has been presented and the analysis detailed, this final chapter will 
review the work that has been undertaken, discuss some of the wider issues and implications, 
and assess the extent to which it has met its aims and objectives that were specified in Chapter 
1.  
The scope of the project has been to establish through experimentation and analysis what 
potential existed in the portable devices, familiar surroundings, and possessions that 
individuals carry for the formation of a novel approach to user authentication, and then to 
design and test a framework by which an implementation could be built in the future. It was 
proposed that, if successful, such an approach would reduce the number of intrusive 
authentications required by a user during normal device usage, and additionally in some 
instances remove the need to authenticate altogether. The project required an experiment to 
capture data from sets of co-workers that could be used to test the proposed hypotheses, 
based upon normal daily activity and across multiple locations.  Although prior works have 
been conducted in the field of non-intrusive mobile security, the Aura research has not built 
directly upon them, and has been independently scoped and executed, leading to an entirely 
autonomous and novel thesis.  
Given the nature of the proposed approach, it is worth briefly reflecting upon the related 
issues that may be raised from the legal, ethical, and social standpoints.  From the legal 
perspective, one should consider how the user’s activities would come to be monitored, and 
what data would then be collected. Should it be adopted and implemented to a large degree, 
it is anticipated that such an approach would be offered as a selectable alternative that would 
most likely be pulled by the user from an app repository. It is unlikely to be an all-or-nothing 
option that was presented to any mobile device owner. The data it gathers and uses within its 
operation is either from open and readily available infrastructure, or exchanged between 
trusted and (in the majority) owned devices. There is nothing that is required to be covert in its 
actions, with the only encryption occurring during the potential transfer of biometric data 
samples. 
Equally it is not considered that the framework in isolation poses any ethical issues. Although it 
proposes to utilise biometric techniques to attain unobtrusive authentications where required, 
which may in themselves raise ethical issues, the framework per se does not.  It should be the 
responsibility of any underlying biometric system to manage and secure the individual’s 
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identity template, and (assuming an appropriately robust implementation) the Aura 
framework itself should not introduce an additional basis for exposure. 
Similarly there are no significant social issues within the operating framework. During its 
operation any information received into the framework is only ever used to establish location 
or as part of the user’s confidence calculation; each is appropriately incorporated near 
instantaneously and then discarded. There is a complete absence of data logging and location 
tracking that could potentially impinge upon privacy and social identification. Additionally the 
framework does not have access to, or require use of, any specific personal information during 
operation, merely the details outlined above. 
The remainder of this chapter further reviews the undertaken work and takes a pragmatic view 
of some of the shortcomings of the research, discussing the implications these may have had 
for the results before finally outlining future work and how the research could proceed from 
this point. 
8.1 Fulfilment of the Aims and Objectives 
Upon reviewing the aims and objectives that were set out at the beginning of this document it 
is clear that specified details have indeed been met and satisfied by the executed work. Initially 
a full review of the evolution of mobile devices and personal electronic equipment was 
performed, to provide a foundation to the research and gauge the development towards this 
current point-in-time. It is certainly remarkable to revisit what is relatively recent history and 
review how these now ubiquitous devices have pervaded into everyday life. With the 
continuing fulfilment of Moore’s Law and the inherent capability it delivers, the future is one 
that is full of potential. 
Building upon the review of technology and to provide further understanding, an exhaustive 
investigation of the true meaning of identity was made in Chapter three, revealing how it is 
perceived both philosophically and psychologically. The work revealed how identification is 
founded upon two key issues, awareness of the traits that are unique to the subject and 
persistence of those traits over time. Although it could be argued that this exploration was 
outside of the scope of this project, the understanding it gave supported the research and 
highlighted the uniqueness of the individual. Indeed, some of the intricacies of this area could 
also be incorporated into the framework as a means of ongoing authentication. Behavioural 
psychometrics could well provide a method of individuation, and allow further developments 
to harness this approach to identity confirmation.  
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Chapter three then continued by examining the current state of authentication and the 
techniques that are employed on state-of-the-art devices, revealing some of the inherent 
weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. These elements met the criteria specified in 
the first aim and objective, and indeed provided knowledge that advanced the research. 
To assess the proliferation of an individual’s items of electronic devices and possessions and to 
gauge the suspected information their presence contains, an experiment was designed and 
executed. Twenty experiment subjects were recruited who undertook the two week 
experiment in four groups of five individuals, selected so that during the experiment at times 
they would encounter each other and concurrently occupy the same location. Each person was 
equipped with an RFID tag reader and tags to label equipment and personal possessions both 
at home and in the workplace. Data was gathered every minute around the clock and yielded 
1,576,340 readings at an average of 78,817 per subject. The associated analysis revealed the 
extent to which people are surrounded by items, their Aura, which could be detected and used 
to identify location; it led to the suggestion that inert devices might actually be more 
significant than previously considered. It also clearly supported the premise that this Aura 
could be used in a novel cooperative approach to security and satisfied the second aim and 
objective. In an ideal situation, additional sets of subjects would have been recruited to 
provide a greater data set. However, the resultant size was deemed sufficient to yield 
statistically significant analysis and a robust set of results. 
The research carried out an extensive examination of user identity confidence and how this 
could be influenced by location and the user’s Authentication Aura. Degradation of service 
availability based upon the identity confidence was also investigated and a skeleton equation 
that would satisfy the proposal was outlined. The true novelty of this research stems from the 
proposal to use both location and cooperative data from other owned devices to contribute to 
the user’s identity confidence, enabling it to react to an individual’s movement and even theft 
of the host device.  
The next aim and objective was met by the detailed explanation of the Authentication Aura’s 
framework. This extremely detailed work examined the processes, databases, operational logic 
and communication vocabulary required to produce a functioning Authentication Aura. Taking 
a top down approach, it firstly introduced the anatomy of a software agent capable of 
performing the required tasks, and then proceeded to explain the autonomous processes 
contained within it. A communication vocabulary was presented which explained how 
information could be exchanged between participating devices, the effect of changes in status 
and how the associated triggers would be managed. To investigate this an emulation was 
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developed which lexically analysed this proposed vocabulary and provided a visual 
confirmation of the efficacy of the approach. 
The final aim and objective was satisfied by the extensive mathematical modelling which was 
performed. This was used to simulate the detailed confidence equation and inter-device 
communication from the experiment data, producing numerous plots and statistics which 
illustrated that indeed an Authentication Aura did provide an improvement upon current 
security implementations. The performed simulations highlighted that location alone could be 
used to reduce the number of baseline intrusive authentications experienced by a user by 
50.74%, and when the influence of the Authentication Aura was incorporated the 
inconvenience was lessened by a further 17.56%. 
The simulation further supported the novel idea that under certain circumstances 
authentication following activation of a device could be delayed if sufficient imparted 
confidence was received from a user’s Aura. Within the analysis one user was found to have 
had their first authentication delayed by up to 90 minutes, a significant improvement and 
reduction in inconvenience. 
During the course of the research a number of peer-reviewed papers have been produced and 
presented at conferences and also accepted into journal publications. These are provided in 
Appendix C at the back of this document and include one that received a ‘best paper’ award, 
because of the work’s novelty and the progress it brought to this field of research. 
8.2 Research Limitations 
With the aims and objectives of this research being met the project as a whole is deemed to be 
a success. However, as with any project there are some issues and limitations that may have 
impacted upon the findings to varying degrees and these are detailed in the section below. 
The research experiment was conducted to ascertain the profile and quantity of devices, 
possessions and infrastructure that surround people during their daily lives. Any statistical 
investigation requires as many participants as possible to yield results that are regarded as 
significant and robust to scrutiny. Selecting a data gathering method that used RFID 
technology satisfied the requirements but was achieved with substantial financial cost. This 
available budget restricted the number of concurrent subjects that could be enrolled to five 
and subsequently limited the quality of the collected data. Each participant was only allocated 
15 RFID tags and requested to divide these between home and work, fewer than in an ideal 
scenario.  
 Chapter 8: Conclusion 
- 184 - 
The obtained active RFID tags were constructed with an onboard battery which provided them 
with the ability to remain continually active. However, they were constructed with an open 
battery slot to permit easy exchange of batteries but in some instances the experiment 
subjects dislodged the batteries or moved them sufficiently to stop the tag transmitting, 
rendering the tag powerless for the duration of the project and barring its inclusion in the 
survey. 
Participants were unfortunately required to ensure that the PDA RFID readers remained 
charged for the duration of the experiment. The restricted battery life of the units resulted in 
them needing to be recharged twice every day, once overnight but also during waking hours as 
well. Although higher capacity batteries were purchased the additional weight of these caused 
them to detach from the back of the device and were only successfully used by a couple of the 
participants. These two issues combined to create periods of time when the PDAs were 
without power and data was missed. The times when this occurred are clearly evident in the 
gathered dataset and although during the simulation these periods are treated as worst case 
scenarios (time when the user is in an alien environment, out of range of any other owned 
devices) they have not impacted significantly upon the experiment’s success. 
Although as discussed the collected data was compromised to some degree there was still an 
extremely large volume collected. The number of daily observations for an individual has in 
turn slightly impacted upon the analysis that could be performed and for clarity the graphs 
were plotted in ten minute time-slices, reducing some of the detail that might otherwise have 
been available. 
Finally, in the modelled simulation identical parameters were applied across all devices as they 
were encountered. This of course is not a completely accurate representation of real life 
because different devices would have differing setups and methods of authentication. Even so, 
the simulation was inclusive and reassuringly confirmed the potential of the Authentication 
Aura. 
8.3 Future Work 
This research has proved that there is scope for a cooperative approach to mobile device 
security that can improve user convenience and even delay required authentication upon 
activation. Mathematical modelling and simulation have quantified potential improvement 
and demonstrated how knowledge can be shared amongst Aura members. The next step in 
future work would be the development of a fully functioning prototype that could be installed 
upon a set of devices to further test efficacy. This work has a solid foundation in the detailed 
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framework specification contained within Chapter 6 and is a natural progression from the 
research performed so far. 
Additional exploration into the simulation would also further refine the observed results. 
Adapting the utilised simulation routine to incorporate different operational parameters for 
each device as discussed in section 8.2 would provide a more realistic set of results, truer to a 
real life implementation. It is anticipated however that with some devices operating more 
restrictively and others less so, the resultant effects would potentially balance themselves out 
and not severely alter the findings but merely provide an enhanced degree of confidence. 
Another area of future work is the further investigation of distributing authentication across 
devices. If one device can capture data but is incapable of processing it, the framework has 
outlined how this information could be communicated to another device that has the 
necessary capability to perform the authentication and then return the outcome. To confirm 
the suitability of this approach a practical investigation is required and a trial performed. 
With additional investigation into methods of user identification such as habitual behaviour, 
scope exists to provide new ways in which the user’s surroundings and actions could be 
incorporated into the Authentication Aura framework. Although the novelty of the framework 
is founded upon its cooperative nature, these types of approach to identification can bring an 
additional layer of sophistication that will aid its operation when in isolation. Leveraging the 
information that can be ascertained from the user’s environment can only support the degree 
of accuracy to which the framework operates and the speed of response. 
These elements of work present significant opportunity to advance this research to the next 
level and further substantiate the Authentication Aura as an improvement upon traditional 
methods of mobile device security. 
8.4 The Future for User Authentication on Mobile Devices 
With the proliferation of mobile devices and smartphones offering ubiquitous connectivity, 
these high cost items have become an essential piece of equipment in both personal and 
business life. With owners utilising them for banking, email and storing personal information, 
in addition to making telephone calls and sending text messages, the need to protect these 
devices becomes evermore important. 
Although mechanisms are in place in an attempt to provide a secure means of access, the 
unwillingness or inability of owners to implement these rigorously is an inherent risk. Typical 
security is point-of-entry and once passed unrestricted access is available to the user, 
providing them with the opportunity to roam freely through the information contained within. 
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When timed barriers are invoked, with individuals porting a number of devices concurrently 
the associated inconvenience of multiple authentications is an inescapable burden which must 
be fulfilled. 
The future of user authentication on mobile devices will have to consider all of these factors 
whilst ensuring its ease of implementation and ability to adapt to future requirements. With 
the introduction of smart glasses and watches, the human love of technology and its 
dependence upon it is only ever going to grow. It is the responsibility of those within the 
security arena to ensure this happens in the most secure way possible, and methods that are 
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Public Class Form1 
 
    ' Define global variables ----------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
    Dim minutes As Decimal = 1 ' Alter this to adjust the time between polls of the 
environment 
    Dim minutesFromStart As Decimal = (0 - minutes) ' Keeps an accumulative time since 
start of reading cycle 
    Dim lastDay, outputFilePath, outputFileRoot, userId As String 
    Dim outputFile, summaryFile As System.IO.TextWriter 
    Dim nodeEnabled As Boolean = True 
    Dim fileNumber As Integer = 0 
    ' ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
 
    ' Settings for spPort1 --------- 
    ' spPort.BaudRate = 38400 
    ' spPort.Parity = Parity.None 
    ' spPort.PortName = "COM4" 
    ' spPort.ReadTimeout = 1000 
    ' spPort.StopBits = StopBits.One 
    ' ------------------------------ 
 
    Private Sub Form1_Load(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As System.EventArgs) 
Handles MyBase.Load 
        btnStop.Visible = False 
        btnListen.Visible = True 
 
        ' Initialise variables --- 
        outputFileRoot = "Tagdata" 
        lastDay = "" 
        ' ------------------------ 
 
        ' Immediately begin ------ 
        startListening() 
        ' ------------------------ 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub openFile() 
        Dim format As String = "yyMMdd" 
 
        If Not lastday = Now.ToString(format) Then 
            If Not lastday = "" Then 
                ' lastDay = "" signifies first time through, so close file because it 
must be open 
                outputFile.Close() 
                outputFile.Dispose() 
 
                summaryFile.Close() 
                summaryFile.Dispose() 
            End If 
 
            lastDay = Now.ToString(format) 
 
            ' Open new file for new day 
            outputFilePath = outputFileRoot + lastDay + "_" + userId 
            outputFile = New StreamWriter(outputFilePath + ".txt", True) 
 
            summaryFile = New StreamWriter("Summary" + lastDay + "_" + userId + ".txt", 
True) 
 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub nodeSwitch(ByVal state As String) 
        If state = "on" Then 
            If Not nodeEnabled Then 
                spPort1.WriteLine("TE1" + vbCr) ' Enables the node 
                nodeEnabled = True 
            End If 
        Else 
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            spPort1.WriteLine("TE0" + vbCr) ' Disables the node 
            nodeEnabled = False 
        End If 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub readComPort() 
        Dim txt As String = "Nothing read" 
        Dim bufferTxt As String = "" 
        Dim bufferArray As String() 
        Dim bufferPos, signal, position As Integer 
        Dim foundTags, tagSignal, tagCount As New ArrayList() 
        Dim format As String = "dd/MM/yy,HH:mm:ss" 
 
        lbText.Items.Add(" ") 
 
        Try 
            bufferTxt = spPort1.ReadExisting ' Read input buffer from node 
 
            If bufferTxt.Length > 0 Then 
 
                bufferArray = Split(bufferTxt, vbCrLf) 
 
                For bufferPos = 0 To bufferArray.Count - 1 
 
                    txt = bufferArray(bufferPos).ToString 
 
                    If txt.Length = 32 Then ' Tag replies are 32 bytes long 
 
                        signal = Convert.ToInt16(Mid(txt, 7, 2), 16) ' Extract the 
signal strength as HEX and converts to decimal 
                        signal = Int((signal / 255) * 100) ' Convert the signal into a 
percentage 
 
                        txt = Mid(txt, 21, 12) ' Extract the tag id 
 
                        position = foundTags.IndexOf(txt) 
                        If position < 0 Then ' First time the tag has been seen 
 
                            foundTags.Add(txt) ' Keeps track of whats already been found 
this cycle 
                            tagCount.Add(1) 
                            tagSignal.Add(signal) 
 
                        Else ' Existing tag 
 
                            tagCount(position) += 1 
                            tagSignal(position) += signal 
 
                        End If 
 
                    End If 
 
                Next bufferPos 
 
                ' Loop through and write details to list box and file 
                For arrayPos = 0 To foundTags.Count - 1 
                    txt = foundTags(arrayPos).ToString 
 
                    lbText.Items.Add(txt) 
                    lbText.Refresh() 
 
                    txt += "," + userId + "," + Now.ToString(format) + "," + 
minutesFromStart.ToString + "," + _ 
                           (Int(tagSignal(arrayPos) / tagCount(arrayPos))).ToString 
                    outputFile.WriteLine(txt) 
 
                Next arrayPos 
 
                outputFile.Flush() 
 
            End If 
 
            ' --------------------------------------------------- 
 
            lbText.Items.Add(" ") 
            txt = foundTags.Count.ToString 
            lbText.Items.Add(txt + " Found") 
            txt += "," + userId + "," + Now.ToString(format) + "," + 
minutesFromStart.ToString 
            summaryFile.WriteLine(txt) 
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            summaryFile.Flush() 
 
        Catch ex As Exception 
            ' MessageBox.Show("Read timed out!", "Fatal error") 
 
            lbText.Items.Add("*** FATAL ERROR ***") 
            lbText.Items.Add("Close and restart application") 
 
        End Try 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnStop_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles btnStop.Click 
        btnStop.Visible = False 
        btnListen.Visible = True 
 
        tmrNodeTimer.Enabled = False 
        tmrListenTimer.Enabled = False 
 
        If spPort1.IsOpen Then 
 
            ' nodeSwitch("on") ' Leave the node in an "on" state 
            spPort1.DiscardInBuffer() 
            spPort1.Close() 
            spPort1.Dispose() 
        End If 
 
        outputFile.Close() 
        summaryFile.Close() 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub tmrNodeTimer_Tick(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles tmrNodeTimer.Tick 
        tmrNodeTimer.Interval = minutes * 60 * 1000 ' Timer uses milliseconds so convert 
to true minutes 
        minutesFromStart += minutes 
 
        lbText.Items.Clear() 
        lbText.Items.Add("About to read..." + Now.TimeOfDay.ToString) 
        lbText.Refresh() 
 
        spPort1.DiscardInBuffer() ' Clear unprocessed data 
        nodeSwitch("on") ' Activate node 
        tmrListenTimer.Enabled = True  ' Enable listening timer so node active for 10 
secs 
        openFile() ' Checks on date and opens output text files 
 
        ' If it's the first time through write block of asterisks to files 
        If minutesFromStart = minutes Then 
            outputFile.WriteLine("*************************************") 
            outputFile.Flush() 
            summaryFile.WriteLine("*************************************") 
            summaryFile.Flush() 
        End If 
        ' ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    End Sub 
    Private Sub tmrListenTimer_Tick(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles tmrListenTimer.Tick 
        tmrListenTimer.Enabled = False 'Ends 10sec listening 
        ' ************************ 
        'tmrNodeTimer.Enabled = False 
        ' ************************ 
        nodeSwitch("off") ' Turn off node 
 
        readComPort() 'Process received data 
 
        spPort1.DiscardInBuffer() ' Clear unprocessed data 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub btnListen_Click(ByVal sender As System.Object, ByVal e As 
System.EventArgs) Handles btnListen.Click 
        startListening() 
    End Sub 
 
    Private Sub startListening() 
        Dim delay, seconds, separation As Integer 
        btnListen.Visible = False 
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        btnStop.Visible = True 
        lbText.Text = vbNullString 
        Me.Refresh() 
 
        getUserId() 
 
        Try 
 
            If spPort1.IsOpen = False Then 
                spPort1.Open() 
                spPort1.DiscardInBuffer() 
            Else 
                MessageBox.Show("Want to open port but it is still open") 
            End If 
 
            ' Work out the first delay to offset al.l 5 PDAs by an even no. seconds ----
--------------- 
            delay = Convert.ToInt32(userId) 
            separation = minutes * 60 
            delay = (delay Mod 5) * (separation / 5) 
            seconds = ((Now.Minute * 60) + Now.Second) Mod separation 
            delay = delay - seconds ' Work out no. seconds to go 
            If delay < 0 Then ' If delay -ve then add minutes 
                delay = delay + separation 
            End If 
 
            nodeSwitch("off") ' Switch off node so it doesn't block others 
            lbText.Items.Add("System commencing in " + delay.ToString + " seconds") 
 
            delay = (delay * 1000) + 100 ' Convert to miliseconds and add 100 for peace 
of mind 
            ' --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- 
 
            tmrNodeTimer.Interval = delay ' Forces first read to happen at offset amount 
            tmrNodeTimer.Enabled = True 
 
            lbText.Refresh() 
 
        Catch ex As Exception 
            MessageBox.Show("Port '" + spPort1.PortName + "' could not be opened! You 
will have to reset the PDA and restart the program again.", "Fatal error") 
            spPort1.Close() 
            spPort1.Dispose() 
 
            If Not lastDay = "" Then ' lastday is set once a file has been opened 
                outputFile.Close() 
                summaryFile.Close() 
            End If 
 
            btnListen.Visible = True 
            btnStop.Visible = False 
 
        End Try 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub getUserId() 
        Dim userIdFile As String = "UserId.txt" 
 
        If 1 = 0 Then 
            If File.Exists(userIdFile) Then 
                System.IO.File.Delete(userIdFile) 
            End If 
 
            Dim userFile As System.IO.TextWriter = New StreamWriter(userIdFile, True) 
 
            userId = 13 ' Change this to the required number 
 
            userFile.WriteLine(userId) 
 
            userFile.Close() 
            userFile.Dispose() 
 
            Application.Exit() 
        End If 
 
        If File.Exists(userIdFile) Then 
            Dim userFile As System.IO.TextReader = New StreamReader(userIdFile, True) 
 
Appendix A: PDA Software 
- 209 - 
            userId = userFile.ReadLine 
 
            userFile.Close() 
            userFile.Dispose() 
        End If 
 
        If userId = "" Then 
            Dim userFile As System.IO.TextWriter = New StreamWriter(userIdFile, True) 
 
            userId = Now.ToString("HHmmss") 
 
            userFile.WriteLine(userId) 
 
            userFile.Close() 
            userFile.Dispose() 
        End If 






Figure 0-1. The visual basic form associated with the PDA software 
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Appendix B. MATLAB Simulation Script 
% This script plots the confidence factor based on the experiment data. 
% This is done for all selected days and users. 
% Observations are grouped into 10 minute clusters and the days start at 8am. 
% Infrastructure is also included as a contributing device. 
% Plots start at 8am and usage is required every paameterised minutes 
 








  fileName='Tag xref 1-5'; userStart=1; userEnd=5; 
end; 
if userGroup==2; 
  fileName='Tag xref 6-10'; userStart=6; userEnd=10; 
end; 
if userGroup==3; 
  fileName='Tag xref 11-15'; userStart=11; userEnd=15; 
end; 
if userGroup==4; 
  fileName='Tag xref 16-20'; userStart=16; userEnd=20; 
end; 
 
[xref,xrTxt,xraw] = xlsread(strcat('Data\',fileName,'.xlsx')); 
 
periodLength=10; % Number of minutes for each period 
periodCutOff=49; % Start of day e.g. 37 for 10 min period = 6am, 49 8am 
periodMax=144; % Total number of periods 





%userStart=13; %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Maintain %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%userEnd  =13; %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Maintain %%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
tokenContribution=1.5; tokenContributionText='1pt5'; % was 1.5 
tokenContributionMax=30; % was 30 
intelligentDeviceContribution=20; % was 20 
intelDegrade=1; % Boolean 
intelDegradeText='_deg'; 
 








     
    userCount=userCount+1;     
 
    clear d* f* g* l* m* txt raw conf*; 
     
    fileName=strcat('MatlabTagData',num2str(user)) 
    [data,txt,raw] = xlsread(strcat('Data\',fileName,'.xlsx')); 
 
    dataSize=size(data); 
    maxReads=dataSize(1); 
    devicePresence{periodMax,77,21}='O'; % 10 mins, tag, day 
     
    % Set logon parameters ------------------------------------------------ 
    logonTrigger=20; % was 20 
    periodDegradation=2; % Every period this figure is subtracted from conf 
    simDeviceAuthenticationLevel=3; % Set as reverse - 5=secure, 1=weak 
    logonPercentage=110-(simDeviceAuthenticationLevel*10); 
    % --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Change these to control how many days are done and which 
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% are included 
    weekday=[1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12 15 16 17 18 19]; 
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    weekend=[6 7 13 14 20 21]; 
      
    %incDays=[1 2 3]; 
    %incDays=[1 2 3 4 5 6 7]; 
    %incDays=[8 9 10 11 12 13 14]; 
    %incDays=[15 16 17 18 19]; 
    incDays=[1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19]; 
    %incDays=[5 6 7]; 
    %incDays=[1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12 15 16 17 18 19]; % weekdays 
    %incDays=[6 7 13 14]; % weekends 
    %incDays=[9]; 
    %weekday=[1 2 3 4 5]; 
    %weekend=[6 7]; 
    %weekday=[3 6]; 
    %weekend=[4, 7]; 
 
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
    dow=0; % Day of week - M=1,Tu=2 etc. 
    lastPeriod=-1; 
    confRow=1; 
    PeriodCount=0; 
    lastDow=0; 
    lastDay=0; 
    noDays=0; 
    daysDone=0; 
 
    % First build the array to show which devices are visible at each time 
    % slot 
    for row=1:maxReads; 
        dataRow=row; 
         
        % Get variable values 
        dataTemp=data(dataRow,1:7); 
        xXrefRow=dataTemp(1,1); 
        xrefTemp=xref(xXrefRow,1:9); 
        txtTemp=xrTxt(xXrefRow+1,1:10); 
         
        dow=dataTemp(1,5); 
        includeDay=0;     
        if any(abs(incDays-dow)<1e-10); % Checks if dow in include array 
            includeDay=1; 
        end; 
 
        if includeDay==1; 
             
            if dow~=lastDay; 
                lastDay=dow; 
                noDays=noDays+1; 
                daysDone(noDays)=dow; 
                 
                dayPos=mod(dow, 7); 
                if dayPos==0; 
                    dayPos=7; 
                end; 
                 
                allDaysDone(dow)=1; 
 
            end; 
             
            tag=txtTemp(1,1); 
            userId=dataTemp(1,1); 
            % count=dataTemp(1,5); 
            period=floor(dataTemp(1,4)*1440/periodLength)+1; % Time, 1440=(60*24) 
            strength=dataTemp(1,7); 
            location=txtTemp(1,4); 
            item=txtTemp(1,5); 
            label=xXrefRow; 
            type=txtTemp(1,6); 
            intel=txtTemp(1,7); 
            rank=xrefTemp(1,7); 
            maxCont=xrefTemp(1,8); 
            minStrength=xrefTemp(1,9); 
            tagUserId=xrefTemp(1,2); 
             
            % Allow for shared devices ------------------------------------ 
            if tagUserId==99; 
                tagUserId=user; 
            end; 
            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
Appendix B: MATLAB Simulation Script 
- 212 - 
             
            %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
             
            includeObs=1; 
             
            % Work out if item is infrastructure -------------------------- 
            infrastructure=0; 
            if strcmp(type,'I'); 
                infrastructure=1; 
            else 
                if tagUserId~=user; % Exclude other's devices that aren't Inf. 
                    includeObs=0; 
                end; 
            end; 
            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
            % Work out if observation is to be included ------------------- 
            if period<periodCutOff; % Cut off day at 6am = 36 10 minute periods 
                includeObs=0; 
            end; 
            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
             
            %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
             
            if includeObs==1; 
                devicePresence{period, xXrefRow, dow}=location; 
            end; 
         
        end; % end of include 
         
    end; % end of row loop 
 
    if noDays>0; 
        dataSize=size(daysDone); 
        maxDays=dataSize(2); 
         
        for dayNo=1:maxDays; 
            dow=daysDone(dayNo); 
 
            % Null the working variables 
            clear auraDevice deviceDetail; 
            deviceDetail(77,8)=0; 
            auraDevice(1,8)=0; 
            periodUsageCount=3; 
 
            for period=periodCutOff:periodMax; 
 
                % Set up the current devices for this period -------------- 
                location='A'; 
                locationMultiplier=10; % was 10 high=30 
                locationFlag=3; 
                clear currentDevices; 
                lastDevice=0; 
                for device=1:77; 
                    loc=devicePresence{period, device, dow}; 
                    if isempty(loc); 
                        % Wipe out device detail for those not present 
                        deviceDetail(device,1)=0; 
                    else 
                        if strcmp(loc,'H') || (location=='H'); 
                            location='H'; 
                            locationMultiplier=2.5; 
                            locationFlag=1; 
                        else 
                            if strcmp(loc,'W') && (location~='H'); 
                                location='W'; 
                                locationMultiplier=5; % was 5 high=10 
                                locationFlag=2; 
                            end; 
                        end; 
                         
                        lastDevice=lastDevice+1; 
                        currentDevices(lastDevice)=device; 
                    end; 
                end; 
                 
                % Maintain location array --------------------------------- 
                if auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1)==0; 
                    auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1)=2; 
                    auraLocations(userCount,dow,2,1)=period-periodCutOff+1; 
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                    auraLocations(userCount,dow,2,2)=locationFlag; 
                else 
                    if 
auraLocations(userCount,dow,auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1),2)~=locationFlag; % 
Location changed 
                        
auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1)=auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1)+1; 
                        
auraLocations(userCount,dow,auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1),1)=period-periodCutOff+1; 
                        
auraLocations(userCount,dow,auraLocations(userCount,dow,1,1),2)=locationFlag; 
                    end; 
                end; 
                % --------------------------------------------------------- 
                 
                % Set current devices for this period 
                for deviceNum=1:lastDevice; 
                    device=currentDevices(deviceNum); 
                     
                    if deviceDetail(device,1)==0; % New device or just back 
                         
                        xrefTemp=xref(device,1:9); 
                        userId=xrefTemp(1,2); 
                        deviceDetail(device,1)=userId; 
                         
                        if deviceDetail(device,4)==0; % New 
                            txtTemp=xrTxt(device+1,1:10); 
 
                            type=txtTemp(1,6); 
                            intel=txtTemp(1,7); 
                            rank=xrefTemp(1,7); 
                            maxCont=xrefTemp(1,8); 
 
                            if strcmp(type,'D'); 
                              deviceDetail(device,2)=1; % 1 indicates device, 0 
everything else 
                            else 
                                deviceDetail(device,2)=0; 
                            end; 
                            if strcmp(intel,'I'); 
                                deviceDetail(device,3)=1; % 1 indicates intelligent, 0 
dumb 
                            else 
                                deviceDetail(device,3)=0; 
                            end; 
                            deviceDetail(device,4)=rank; 
                            deviceDetail(device,5)=maxCont; 
                        end; 
 
                        deviceDetail(device,6)=0; % Confidence 
                        deviceDetail(device,7)=0; % Time of last authentication 
                        deviceDetail(device,8)=0; % Contribution from other devices 
                         
                    end; 
                end; 
                 
                % Work out current device confidences 
                for deviceNum=1:lastDevice; 
                    device=currentDevices(deviceNum); 
                    auraCont=0; 
                    tokenCont=0; 
                     
                    for deviceTempNum=1:lastDevice; % Loop through and work out aura 
cont for this device 
                        if deviceTempNum~=deviceNum; 
                            deviceTemp=currentDevices(deviceTempNum); 
                             
                            token=0; 
 
                            if deviceDetail(deviceTemp,1)==deviceDetail(device,1); % 
Same users 
                                if deviceDetail(deviceTemp,3)==1; % Intelligent 
                                     
                                    level=simDeviceAuthenticationLevel; % Authentication 
security 
                                     
                                    if deviceDetail(deviceTemp,7)==0; % Not 
authenticated 
                                        % If not authenticated then cannot 
                                        % contribute any confidence but can 
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                                        % act as token I guess!! 
                                        token=1; 
                                    else % Authenticated 
                                        if period==deviceDetail(deviceTemp,6); 
                                            auraCont=auraCont+((6-
level)*intelligentDeviceContribution); 
                                        else 
                                            if intelDegrade==1; 
                                                auraCont=auraCont+(((6-
level)*intelligentDeviceContribution) / (period-deviceDetail(deviceTemp,6))); 
                                            else 
                                                auraCont=auraCont+((6-
level)*intelligentDeviceContribution); 
                                            end; 
                                        end; 
                                    end; 
                                else % Dumb 
                                    token=1; 
                                end; 
                            else % Different users 
                                token=1; 
                            end; 
                             
                            if token==1; 
                                % tokenCont / rank 
                                
tokenCont=tokenCont+(tokenContribution*deviceDetail(deviceTemp,4)); 
                            end; 
 
                        end; 
                    end; % end of deviceTempNum loop 
                     
                    if tokenCont>tokenContributionMax; 
                        tokenCont=tokenContributionMax; 
                    end; 
                     
                    % Used to remove Aura influence ----------- 
                        %auraCont=0;tokenCont=0; % was commented out 
                    % ----------------------------------------- 
 
                    deviceDetail(device, 8)=auraCont+tokenCont; 
 
                     
                    % Check if it can and needs to authenticate and then do 
                    % so - check if intelligent & low confidence+aura cont 
                    if (deviceDetail(device,3)==1); 
                        if 
((deviceDetail(device,6)+deviceDetail(device,8))<logonTrigger); % was this line 
%                        if 
((deviceDetail(device,6)+deviceDetail(device,8))<(logonTrigger*locationFlag)); 
                            deviceDetail(device,6)=logonPercentage; 
                            deviceDetail(device,7)=period; 
                        else 
                            deviceDetail(device,6)=deviceDetail(device,6)-
(periodDegradation*locationMultiplier); 
                        end;                        
                    end; 
                     
                end; % end of deviceNum loop 
                % --------------------------------------------------------- 
                 
                 
                % Work out confidence of aura device ---------------------- 
                auraCont=0; 
                tokenCont=0; 
                for deviceNum=1:lastDevice; 
                    device=currentDevices(deviceNum); 
                     
                    token=0; 
 
                    if deviceDetail(device,1)==user; % Same users 
                        if deviceDetail(device,3)==1; % Intelligent 
 
                            level=simDeviceAuthenticationLevel; % Authentication 
security 
 
                            if deviceDetail(device,7)==0; % Not authenticated 
                                % If not authenticated the cannot 
                                % contribute any confidence but can 
                                % act as token I guess!! 
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                                token=1; 
                            else % Authenticated 
                                if period==deviceDetail(device,6); 
                                    auraCont=auraCont+((6-
level)*intelligentDeviceContribution); 
                                else 
                                    if intelDegrade==1; 
                                        auraCont=auraCont+(((6-
level)*intelligentDeviceContribution) / (period-deviceDetail(device,7))); 
                                    else 
                                        auraCont=auraCont+((6-
level)*intelligentDeviceContribution); 
                                    end; 
                                end; 
                            end; 
                        else % Dumb 
                            token=1; 
                        end; 
                    else % Different users 
                        token=1; 
                    end; 
 
                    if token==1; 
                        % tokenCont / rank 
                        tokenCont=tokenCont+(tokenContribution*deviceDetail(device,4)); 
                    end; 
 
                end; % end of deviceNum loop 
                 
                if tokenCont>tokenContributionMax; 
                    tokenCont=tokenContributionMax; 
                end; 
 
                % Used to remove Aura influence ----------- 
                %    auraCont=0;tokenCont=0; % was commented out 
                % ----------------------------------------- 
 
                auraDevice(1, 8)=auraCont+tokenCont; 
                 
                auraDevice(1,6)=auraDevice(1,6)-(periodDegradation*locationMultiplier); 
                 
                % Check if needs to authenticate and then do so 
                % Check if low confidence+aura cont 
                if 
((auraDevice(1,6)+auraDevice(1,8))<logonTrigger)&&(periodUsageCount==periodUsage); % was 
this line                 
%                if 
((auraDevice(1,6)+auraDevice(1,8))<(logonTrigger*locationFlag))&&(periodUsageCount==peri
odUsage); 
                    auraLogons(userCount,dow,1)=auraLogons(userCount,dow,1)+1; % Tracks 
the logon count 
                    logonPos=(auraLogons(userCount,dow,1)*2); 
                    auraLogons(userCount,dow,logonPos)=period-periodCutOff+1; 
                    if (auraDevice(1,6)+auraDevice(1,8)) < 0; 
                        auraLogons(userCount,dow,logonPos+1)=0; 
                    else 
                        
auraLogons(userCount,dow,logonPos+1)=(auraDevice(1,6)+auraDevice(1,8)); 
                    end; 
 
                    auraDevice(1,6)=logonPercentage; 
                    auraDevice(1,7)=period; 
                %else 
                    %auraDevice(1,6)=auraDevice(1,6)-
(periodDegradation*locationMultiplier); 
                end; 
                 
                conf=auraDevice(1,6)+auraDevice(1,8); 
                if conf>100; 
                    conf=100; 
                elseif conf<0; 
                    conf=0; 
                end; 
                 
                auraData(userCount, dow, period-periodCutOff+1) = conf; 
                     
                % --------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                if periodUsageCount==3; 
                    periodUsageCount=0; 
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                    auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, 1) = auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, 
1)+1; 
                    auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, 
1)+1) = conf; 
                end; 
                periodUsageCount=periodUsageCount+1; 
                 
            end; % End of period loop 
             
            %%%% Sort out plot details %%%% 
            clear x y xl yl ylz xdu ydu 
            numPeriods=0; 
            numLogons=1; 
            numExtras=0; 
            for period=periodCutOff:periodMax; 
                numPeriods=numPeriods+1; 
 
                % Add in extra logon points where necessary --------------- 
                if (numLogons<=auraLogons(userCount, dow, 1)); 
                    if (auraLogons(userCount, dow, numLogons*2)==period-periodCutOff+1); 
                        if period>periodCutOff; % Stops logon on axis 
                            x(numPeriods+numExtras)=auraLogons(userCount, dow, 
((numLogons*2)+1)); 
                            y(numPeriods+numExtras)=period-periodCutOff+1;       
                            numExtras=numExtras+1; 
                        end; 
                        numLogons=numLogons+1; 
                    end; 
                end; 
                % --------------------------------------------------------- 
                 
                x(numPeriods+numExtras)=auraData(userCount, dow, period-periodCutOff+1); 
                y(numPeriods+numExtras)=period-periodCutOff+1; 
            end; 
             
            % Location plots ---------------------------------------------- 
            if auraLocations(userCount,dow, 1, 1) > 0; 
                for i=2:auraLocations(userCount,dow, 1, 1); 
                    if auraLocations(userCount,dow, i, 2)==1; % Home 
                        colour=[0 1 0]; % Green 
                        logonTriggerTemp=20; 
                    else 
                        if auraLocations(userCount,dow, i, 2)==2; % Work 
                            colour=[1 0.5 0]; % Orange 
                            logonTriggerTemp=40; 
                        else % Away 
                            colour=[1 0 0]; % Red 
                            logonTriggerTemp=60; 
                        end; 
                    end; 
                     
                    x1=auraLocations(userCount,dow, i, 1); 
                    if auraLocations(userCount,dow, i+1, 1)==0; % No upper 
                        x2=periodMax-periodCutOff+1; 
                    else 
                        x2=auraLocations(userCount,dow, i+1, 1); 
                    end; 
 
                    clear xdummy ydummy; 
                    pos=0; 
                    for j=x1:x2; 
                        pos=pos+1; 
                        xdummy(pos)=j; 
                        ydummy(pos)=logonTrigger; % was logonTrigger; 
                    end; 
                    plot(xdummy,ydummy,'Color',colour,'Linewidth',10); 
                    hold on;                     
                end; 
            else 
                clear xdummy; 
                ydummy(numPeriods)=logonTrigger; 
                plot(y,ydummy,'Color','red','Linewidth',5); 
                hold on; 
            end; 
            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
            % Percentage plot --------------------------------------------- 
            plot(y,x,'Color','Blue','Linewidth',2); 
            hold on;            
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            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
             
            % Logon markers ----------------------------------------------- 
            if auraLogons(userCount, dow, 1)>0; 
                for pos=1:auraLogons(userCount, dow, 1); 
                    xl(pos)=auraLogons(userCount, dow, pos*2); 
                    yl(pos)=logonPercentage; 
                    ylz(pos)=0; 
                end; 
                 
                % Plot black squares at authentication points 
                scatter(xl,yl, 's','MarkerEdgeColor','k'); 
                scatter(xl,ylz,'s','MarkerEdgeColor','k'); 
            end;             
            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
            % Device usage markers ---------------------------------------- 
            if auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, 1)>0; 
                for pos=1:auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, 1); 
                    xdu(pos)=(pos-1)*periodUsage+1; 
                    ydu(pos)=auraDeviceUsage(userCount, dow, pos+1); 
                end; 
                 
                % Plot black plus at device usage points 
                scatter(xdu,ydu, '+','MarkerEdgeColor','k', 'LineWidth', 2); 
            end;             
            % ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
            axis([1 numPeriods+1 0 100]); 
            xlabel('Time', 'fontSize', 12); 
            set(gca, 'TickDir', 'out', 'YTick', [0:10:100], 'XTick', 
[1:12:numPeriods+1], 'XTickLabel', {'8:00' '10:00' '12:00' '14:00' '16:00' '18:00' 
'20:00' '22:00' '24:00'}); 
            set(gca, 'box', 'off'); 
            % Legend 
            %legend(txt{1:nextOwnTag-2,1}, 'Location', 'EastOutside'); 
            %legend_handle = findobj(gcf,'Tag','legend'); 
            %legend_title = get(legend_handle,'Title'); 
            %set(legend_title,'fontSize',12,'String','Device'); 
 
            %%%% Sort out frame size and send to file %%%% 
            scrsz = get(0,'ScreenSize'); 
            set(gcf,'Position',[scrsz(1) scrsz(2)+scrsz(4)/20 scrsz(3) scrsz(4)*17/20]); 
            % Background 
            % set(gca, 'Color', [0 0 0]); % Background colour of plot 
            fig_handle = figure(1); % Returns the handle to the figure object 
            set(fig_handle, 'color', 'white'); % Sets the colour to white 
            % Write 
            frame=getframe(gcf); 





Alternate to saveas(fig_handle, fileName, 'tif'); 
            imwrite(frame.cdata, 
strcat(outputPath,'_user=',int2str(user),'_day=',int2str(dow),'.bmp')); % Alternate to 
saveas(fig_handle, fileName, 'tif'); 
            close(fig_handle); 
 
 
        end; % end of dayNo loop 
                            
    end; % end of noDays if 
         
end; % end of user loop 
 
% Section used for getting stats out of the system ------------------ 
if 1==0; % Logons per day 
    userCount=0; 
    for user=userStart:userEnd; 
        userCount=userCount+1; 
        userCount 
        for day=1:20; 
            z=auraLogons(userCount,day,1); 
            if z>0; 
                z                
            end; 
        end; 
    end; 
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end; 
 
if 1==0; % Total logons 
    userCount=0; 
    for user=userStart:userEnd; 
        userCount=userCount+1; 
        userCount 
        z=sum(auraLogons(userCount,:,1)); 
        if z>0; 
            z 
        end; 
    end; 
end; 
 
if 1==0; % Latest first logon 
    userCount=0; 
    for user=userStart:userEnd; 
        userCount=userCount+1; 
        latestDay=0; latestLogon=0; 
        for day=1:20; 
            z=auraLogons(userCount,day,1); 
            if z>0; 
                z=auraLogons(userCount,day,2); %%%%%%%%%% first logon 
                if z>latestLogon; 
                    latestLogon=z; 
                    latestDay=day; 
                end; 
            end; 
        end; 
        user 
        latestDay 
        latestLogon 
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Abstract—As the requirement for companies and individuals to 
protect information and personal details comes more into 
focus, the implementation of security that goes beyond the 
ubiquitous password or Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
is paramount. With the ever growing number of us utilizing 
more than one device simultaneously, the problem and need is 
compounded. This paper proposes a novel approach to security 
that leverages the collective confidence of user identity held by 
the multiplicity of devices present at any given time. User 
identity confidence is reinforced by sharing established 
credentials between devices, enabling them to make informed 
judgments on their own security position. An Adaptive 
Security Control Engine (ASCE) is outlined, illustrating how 
an environment sensitive and adaptive security envelope can be 
established and maintained around an individual. 
Keywords- authentication, identification, mobile, security, 
biometric, identity 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The aspiration of people to be mobile and yet remain in 
communication with colleagues, family and friends has 
driven the use of devices that support and complement this 
lifestyle. Estimates suggest that worldwide Wi-Fi hotspot 
usage during 2009 increased to 1.2 billion connections, an 
increase of 47% from 2008, with this being driven by a 50% 
increase in the sale of Wi-Fi capable handsets between 2007 
and 2008 [1]. Technological evolution has enabled powerful 
and sophisticated systems to be accommodated into these 
handheld electronic gadgets furnishing them with extensive 
storage and processing capabilities, making them an 
increasing target for thieves. In 2007-8 over 700,000 
handsets were stolen in the UK, with 50% of all robberies 
targeting a mobile phone in the items taken and in 33% of 
those offences it was the only stolen possession [2]. Between 
May and June 2009 alone, the UK saw an 11% increase in 
the reporting of missing/stolen mobile phones, with 84% of 
theft victims failing to retrieve their lost handsets [3].  
However, theft is not the sole reason for concern; a New 
York survey revealed that during a six month period in 2008, 
31,544 phones and 2,752 other types of handheld device 
(laptops, PDAs, memory sticks etc.) were simply left in the 
city‟s Yellow Cabs, an average of more than two per cab [4]. 
In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the 
potentially large volumes of sensitive and personal 
information contained within these desirable pieces of 
equipment is imperative and even acknowledged and 
supported by Government [5],[6]. 
The problem is magnified because users are finding 
themselves in possession of an ever growing number of 
digital devices, each one having its own associated security 
requirements. With several being carried concurrently, at the 
moment of initial use it is likely that similar procedures of 
authentication are undertaken repeatedly across the disparate 
entities to ensure full activation. This repetitive and time-
consuming operation raises the question of whether there is a 
better way and does the collective identity knowledge 
possessed by the multiplicity of secured devices utilized by 
an individual at any given time present an opportunity to 
improve security. As each device is activated a set of 
authentication credentials are determined and access is either 
granted or denied. By enabling the individual and distinct 
devices to communicate their own authentication status and 
to share established user identity confidence it may be 
possible to synthesize an enhanced form of security. 
This paper explores this concept and proposes an 
approach through which authentication credentials can be 
distributed amongst devices and how this information can be 
used to create a novel method of security and user control. It 
addresses the requirements to produce a flexible, adaptive 
and non-intrusive security mechanism that will meet future 
demands and provide a foundation for further development. 
Firstly, the background explores the current methods of 
securing mobile devices and the associated weaknesses. 
Once these foundations have been laid the paper continues to 
outline the new proposals and considers how they will 
improve upon the situation at present. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Security is founded on three key principles – something 
an individual knows, they possess or they are [7]. 
Knowledge and possession based security both rely upon the 
inherently weak link in the chain – the user. The first utilizes 
a piece of significant or memorable information which is 
often forgotten or written down [8]; the second, the 
presentation of a physical key or token at the required 
moment. Forgetting, mislaying or losing the crucial item or 
information will bar further access attempts.  
The ubiquitous point of entry user identity code/password 
has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability 
or unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this 
sensitive information correctly [9]. To maintain security it is 
supposedly known or more precisely memorized exclusively 
by the creator [10] but is too often shared or inadvertently 
communicated [11]. Although different; identification and 
authentication both rely upon the recognition of the identity 
of a user interacting with a device at any given moment. 
Hand held mobile devices typically assume the identity of 
the user and utilize personal identification numbers (PINs) to 
authenticate
1
 this at point-of-entry. The authentication is 
Boolean; the subject is either deemed to be whom they 
purport to be or they are not, without any middle ground. 
Frequently passing the one-off process will permit 
unregulated access to all facilities and utilities installed on 
the device [12]. Therefore once access has been gained the 
ability to incur large telephone bills or excessive high-cost 
data downloads is readily available to impostors who 
compromise the PIN.  
In the search for evermore appropriate and robust 
authentication, attention has turned to biometrics (something 
the user is) to establish methods that cannot easily be 
compromised, are non-intrusive and equally eliminate the 
potential threat posed by social engineering [13]. A finer 
granularity of identification can be achieved; ultimately the 
device will either issue or refuse access to the user, however 
the starting confidence can precisely reflect how well the 
supplied identity matches the known template sample. 
Having this ability will allow a device to tailor its reaction to 
strong and weak authentication attempts accordingly. 
Further, without fundamentally changing the habits to which 
users are accustomed improvements can be implemented. As 
a supplementary development, layered authentication 
techniques have been explored and employed to compound 
protection and expand the sophistication required to 
circumvent defense mechanisms including; password and 
facial recognition [14], fingerprint scan and tokenized 
random number [15], teeth imaging and voice pattern 
verification [16]. This can then be reinforced by elements 
such as location information which indicates whether or not 
a user is operating in a known and unsurprising locale [17]. 
Currently security that is founded on point of entry 
authentication that remains static for the duration of 
interaction is unable to prevent misuse succeeding a hijack, 
when following a legitimate log-on the piece of equipment is 
illicitly removed or used by another. If this occurs and the 
device is kept active and not switched off, free and open use 
can be maintained for a significant period of time. With 85% 
of owners admitting their mobile phone is on for over 10 
hours per day [9], to counteract this weakness proposals to 
degrade service availability over time have been made 
[13],[14] enabling the device to shut down functionality 
unless re-authentication occurs.  
As several gadgets are frequently carried simultaneously 
any intrinsic security weakness is amplified especially as 
                                                          
1 As opposed to devices such as laptop computers that generally rely on a 
user name and associated password. 
people will often use the same PIN for more than one device, 
if not all of them [9]. Once one is compromised by the 
discovery or disclosure of the PIN then it is possible that all 
the owned devices become vulnerable. 
To circumvent the associated weaknesses of point-of-
entry authentication it would be advantageous to augment 
the process with ongoing reassurances. Establishing user 
identification during the initial sign-on and then 
authenticating at intervals to maintain confidence allows 
opened devices to be secured against potential theft or loss. 
Although a device may be open and fully usable upon 
stealing, without successful re-authentication within a 
limited timeframe it would become inoperable. Ongoing re-
authentication can be either intrusive by interrupting the user 
and requiring a password or PIN to be entered, or non-
intrusive in the case of biometrics where for example the 
user‟s identity is confirmed by their typing characteristics 
[18],[19]. If correctly implemented, either will be an 
improvement upon the current situation but it is important to 
consider the most flexible and appropriate approach. 
Section III discusses and then outlines a potential 
framework that addresses these weaknesses and provides a 
means by which mobile device security could be enhanced. 
III. ENHANCING SECURITY FOR MOBILE DEVICES 
With individuals being likely to carry more than one 
portable device and simultaneously interact with, or at least 
be known to, other technology in their local vicinity at any 
given time, possibilities exist to maximize this security 
potential. For instance, in the morning on leaving the house a 
worker might activate their business phone and Personal 
Digital Assistant (PDA) whilst at the same time picking up 
their car keys. By leveraging the relationship the user has 
with these multiple devices and associating the identification 
knowledge that each independently possesses, enhanced 
assurance of the owner‟s identity can be determined. At the 
time of authentication, each device establishes a confidence 
in the identity of the user, either true or false. Facilitating a 
means of communicating the current security status between 
the unique entities would allow them to bolster their own 
confidence in the user‟s identity. 
Utilizing environmental awareness
2
 and enabling the 
devices to request and trade their current authentication 
confidence, would provide a more flexible approach to 
security administration. This self-governing method would 
allow the party devices to adjust their own status through the 
consideration of their peers and the surrounding 
environment. The main drive is to achieve a position where a 
newly activated piece of equipment would not require an 
authentication process to be undertaken because the 
surrounding near vicinity contains sufficient confidence in 
the user‟s identity, that it is considered unnecessary to do so. 
Additionally, as the user relocates between areas of differing 
threat (public spaces to a home or work environment), the 
                                                          
2 Devices such as mobile phones and laptop computers detect cellular and 
wireless networks and other such information that provide a means to 
recognize their current locale at any given time. 
devices could relay the situation to their counterparts 
allowing each to react accordingly.  
In order for such a system to operate, it is necessary to 
first give some consideration to the underpinning 
requirements: 
A. Biometrics 
Using biometrics fits the requirements of a heightened 
security methodology for mobile devices, on the basis that 
they are characteristics that cannot be forgotten, divulged or 
lost by their owner [20]. Further, biometrics divides into two 
distinct tranches of study, physiological and behavioral [21]. 
The use of physiological biometrics is more often preferred 
for identification purposes because of the greater degree of 
uniqueness, experienced consistency and resilience to 
external corruption [22]. However, it is best suited to point-
of-entry scenarios where an individual would be happy or 
certainly less discontent to tolerate the inconvenience 
necessary to undergo the required process of identification. 
For instance, having to place a hand upon a particular device, 
or head at a specific angle, to enable the relevant scan to be 
taken are both obtrusive procedures. Conversely, behavioral 
biometrics lend themselves to authentication scenarios where 
the identity of the individual is already established and 
confirmation of a user's continuing presence is sought. 
Behavioral traits can be detected unobtrusively enabling 
validation to be carried out imperceptibly to the user [9],[14], 
[18]. Capturing a voice sample during a mobile telephone 
conversation would allow the device to compare extracted 
voice patterns and nuances against a known and expected 
reference vocal template. Executing such a process regularly 
during use, facilitates a means by which the mobile device 
could gain appropriate confidence in the user‟s identity 
during extended periods of otherwise unchecked access. 
Although upon first consideration a single layer of 
protection maybe deemed sufficient, [23] observed that 
“Unimodal biometric systems have to contend with a variety 
of problems such as noisy data, intra-class variations, 
restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof 
attacks, and unacceptable error rates”. With individual 
biometrics failing to meet appropriate levels of acceptance, 
attention has been turned to combining techniques in 
multimodal authentication systems [14],[24]. There are a 
plethora of circumstances where multimodal biometrics are 
advantageous and would be the authentication method of 
choice but not readily available because of technological 
limitations. 
By combining devices and available techniques it may be 
possible to achieve the same objective without multi-layering 
on any individual piece of equipment. Drawing together 
authentication confidence from a number of disparate 
devices would enable any one entity to make stronger and 
more informed judgment calls. With the likelihood that 
distinct devices will utilize different biometric techniques 
with differing rigor and strength, combining the otherwise 
unilateral decisions will further improve the ultimate 
recognition process. An added advantage of this is that 
captured identity samples could be communicated from 
devices without the processing capability to analyze the data, 
to a local entity sufficiently powerful to complete the 
operation. However, if no local device was available but 
network or internet services were, the samples could 
alternatively be passed to a remote authentication system 
where the analysis could be executed and decision returned. 
B.  Security degradation 
It can be argued that rather than remain static, the 
authentication confidence should be eroded over time, 
reducing service and application availability
3
 [13]. Upon 
reaching a significant point, re-authentication would be 
necessary to re-determine the user‟s credentials and once 
more allocate appropriate confidence. Should this 
undertaking be unsuccessful (as anticipated in the case of a 
hijacking), service provision would degrade to such a degree 
that the entity would be rendered un-usable; protecting the 
information stored within and further misuse.  
Some functions of mobile devices are more sensitive than 
others and their illicit use could potentially incur greater cost 
or harm. Rather than regarding every type of feature equally 
it is sensible to enable a degree of flexibility in how each is 
treated and protected with the introduction of confidence cut-
offs. Operative tasks and applications could be allocated a 
security tariff allowing some functions to be carried out with 
a low confidence whilst at an equal level others would be 
blocked entirely. For instance with low confidence it would 
be acceptable to operate a calculator application but the 
ability to instigate a telephone call would be barred. 
Additionally, the calculator application would not only 
function at a lower tariff but it could be allowed a slower rate 
of degradation implying that it would take longer for it to 
reach the cutoff point of inoperability [20]. 
Dynamically adjusting the rate of decay to reflect the 
environment in which a device is being used will enable the 
model to adapt. In public, high-risk areas, a steeper rate of 
erosion could be utilized, whilst in a familiar and perceived 
low risk environment a flatter more sedate timescale 
employed. Indeed the decay space becomes a complex n-
dimensional curve with degrees of freedom including 
application sensitivity, time, location, method of 
authentication and user behavior. Consideration of these 
factors and more will dictate at what percentage point 
confidence will be at any given moment in time. 
Section III(C) builds on this approach and further 
explores how it could be used to improve security. 
C. Device interaction 
As proposed in section III(A) enabling disparate devices 
owned by the user to communicate will bring advantages in 
achieving strong methods of authentication. Additional 
identity confidence could also be obtained by gathering the 
authentication status of nearby devices. Distinct devices are 
likely to utilize different methods of authentication and using 
this array of approaches arguably establishes a more robust 
security profile. By enabling entities to recognize each other 
                                                          
3 For instance, within the first few minutes following device activation the 
likelihood that the owner has been replaced by an impostor is much less 
than it would be after an hour. 
and communicate their current state of user identity 
confidence, the degradation process could be slowed or even 
reversed.  
Fig. 1 below shows a conceptual diagram of the 
relationship paths that might be established by a user‟s set of 
personal devices
4
 and the variety of authentication 
techniques that might be employed. 
Information sharing would be carried out between trusted 
pairs via a near field communication (NFC) channel such as 
Bluetooth. Utilizing NFC will ensure the security envelope is 
restricted to the local vicinity and acquired confidence is 
confined to entities within the physical proximity of the 
requesting device. Additionally, ensuring the intra device 
trust would effectively eliminate responses from unknown 
third party entities. Without doing this, a degrading device 
might poll the surrounding near vicinity for listening pieces 
of equipment and one owned by a different user might 
respond with an assurance of confidence which although 
true, would not be in the same user‟s identity. If accepted 
and permitted to proceed, the alien device would falsely 
bolster the observed identity confidence. 
Furthermore, associating a weighting tariff to the method 
of authentication would allow equipment to utilize robust 
techniques that they would otherwise not have the ability to 
use [13]. The tariff system could then be extended to either 
slow or accelerate the rate of confidence decay (see section 
III(B)). For instance, a laptop computer might have an inbuilt 

















Figure 1.  The potential intra-device relationship and authentication 
techniques for a given user 
                                                          
4 The mobile telephone is shown as centric to the scheme because of the 
likelihood that it is the one device that is ever present upon the legitimate 
user‟s person. 
person‟s mobile telephone might only authenticate via a PIN 
number; a far less rigorous form of authentication. Thus by 
drawing upon the laptop‟s high tariff confidence, the mobile 
phone could gain an enhanced state of assurance and thereby 
extend a slower degradation than would otherwise have been 
appropriate. Introducing additional items and allowing every 
device to trade and negotiate confidence with every other 
will synthesize a flexible and self maintaining security 
environment. 
This region of localized security can also be augmented 
by constructing the system in such a way that it can be 
introduced and subsequently recognize the local 
environment. This could be achieved by sensing available 
wireless networks and associating them with locations, 
allowing degradation tariffs to be correspondingly allocated 
within an administration function. The tariffs or weightings 
associated with public spaces can be utilized to degrade 
confidence more rapidly than those linked with more private 
arenas. By integrating the ability to detect and consequently 
recognize known locales, the model will react and adapt 
independently of human intervention. Hence, as the user 
crosses environment boundaries security and awareness can 
be immediately heightened or relaxed respectively increasing 
or reducing the frequency that re-authentication is requested. 
It may even be possible to associate the user‟s behavior and 
device interaction with locations or at least perceived 
security threats. That is, through use and experience each 
device might be able to recognize that the user only activates 
certain applications when at home or in equally low threat 
surroundings. Vice versa particular services or operations 
might be utilized in public areas or correspondingly high risk 
locations, allowing immediate yet discrete security 
adjustments to be made. This is achievable via the adaptation 
of behavior based identification techniques [25]. 
IV. SYSTEM ANATOMY 
Having explored the core features and requirements of 
the proposed approach to mobile device security it is now 
possible to examine and discuss in greater detail how such a 
framework could be implemented. This section addresses the 
core elements, the role each plays and how they might be 
united to achieve a robust and adaptive security system. 
The suggested system would consist of a core control 
engine with the ability to hook into and utilize five peripheral 
elements; the local environment, database storage, device 
operating system, one or more authentication mechanisms 
and the other member devices. Fig. 2 outlines how the 
elements would combine and the direction of information 
flow between the disparate parts of the anatomy. It also 
illustrates the elements that are located within the physical 
body of the device and those that lie beyond. 
Centric to each device is envisaged to be the Adaptive 
Security Control Engine (ASCE), which will manage and 
direct the internal security.  It will be required to hook into 
the device operating system in order to influence and apply 
relevant security policies based upon the action and 
authentication success of the user.  Post-initial authentication 
and the establishment of an identity confidence the ASCE  
Figure 2.  Adaptive security environment 
will administer the degradation of confidence using the 
methodology (or similar to) outlined in subsection III(B).  
This concept of degradation will potentially be further 
influenced by the environment in which the device is being 
operated.  To achieve this, ASCE will need to utilize an 
environment-sensing module that will learn to recognize 
localities and their associated threat, and use this to affect the 
rate at which the confidence in the user's identity is being 
eroded.  As discussed earlier in this document, operating a 
laptop at home is expected to be less of a threat than using 
one whilst waiting in a public space; by adjusting the rate of 
decay accordingly, these expectations can be incorporated 
into the framework. 
Authentication, although controlled and requested by the 
ASCE, will be carried out by authentication mechanisms that 
communicate via a generic interface. This will allow the 
ASCE to be a portable concept that can be applied to many 
different types of device, making it independent of a specific 
set of hardware.  The generic approach aligns itself with the  
 
 
Figure 3.  Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent 
contribution to the authentication process. 
objectives of the BioAPI Consortium [26] which has 
specified an international standard for interfacing to 
biometric systems. Utilizing this framework and extending it 
to both biometric and non-biometric methodologies would 
enable a single engine to accept and function with a number 
of identity confirming processes. That is, a mobile phone 
should be typically capable of utilizing authentication via 
PIN, voice recognition, facial recognition or even keystroke 
analysis. One or more of these could be plugged into the 
engine facilitating the necessary provision of identity 
recognition. 
Some devices will operate a two-way interaction with 
their surrounding security counterparts; for instance a laptop 
computer will both request and provide security details. 
However, it may be possible to utilize some entities that only 
contribute by their presence, providing a form of token-based 
security. Car keys are an example of such an item;  
incorporating these so that their mere presence, indicated by 
replying to a polled request, can be used to bolster security 
confidence in the user‟s identity (i.e. because the holder can 
show themselves to be in possession of a larger set of 
physical artifacts associated with the legitimate user). 
Fig. 3 above shows a succinct representation of the 
relative sophistication of devices that might be used by the 
ASCE. It can be argued that any device that can be placed on 
the scale from “Full two-way” to “Passive presence only” 
can in some way contribute to the security envelope. Thus 
this approach is ultimately flexible and scalable to a huge 
variety of devices with or without built in processing 
intelligence. 
Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the ASCE will use a data 
repository to store relevant information, parameters and 
details, of its own status and other devices in the security 
partnership.  The repository is made up of a number of data 
tables that would store both persistent reference information 
and working details updated in real-time. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
In addition to the base technological concepts there are 
other matters that will require careful consideration prior to 
implementation of the framework. Privacy and the associated 
risk of transmitting biometric template information between 
devices when one is incapable of unilaterally processing a 
sample, is such an example. Appropriate encryption and 
communication channel security will have to be employed to 
protect against eavesdropping and remove the potential for 
man-in-the-middle attacks. Introducing such protection will 
incur additional processing overheads that will impact upon 
the operational performance of the framework. 
Indeed, computational, memory, battery and network 
performance issues also demand investigation to ensure that 
the framework can be adapted to function on as many 
categories and types of device as possible. Ultimately it is 
desirable to employ the smallest footprint possible, so it is 
inevitable that there will be some element of compromise to 
avoid precluding potential technology. 
Although this paper has proposed biometrics as a suitable 



























distinct methods greatly differing levels of performance can 
be experienced. This is amplified by the need to adapt some 
biometric techniques so they can be employed in a non-
intrusive manner [9]. Designing the framework to operate 
with a plug-and-play capability will lessen some of these 
demands and enable alternatives to be used but will 
concurrently increase the complexity of the necessary 
interface.  
Trust is another major area of focus. Trust between 
devices will need to be established and at times revoked. It is 
imperative that this process correctly addresses usability and 
is implemented in a way that is logical, secure, yet easy to 
use. Aside from aesthetics, devices will also need the ability 
to receive and utilize un-trusted environmental information. 
Parsing this information correctly will enable devices to 
draw appropriate detail whist remaining secure and removed 
from threat. 
Operational thresholds for applications and device 
services are one final area that requires further investigation. 
As yet it is unclear how best to invoke them; a simple 
ranking and user selected scale may be suitable for some 
applications but for others a more complex approach 
dependent upon a number of variables might be more fitting. 
As the design of the framework evolves it is hoped that these 
factors will clarify and allow appropriate decisions to be 
taken. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is desirable that security and the way in which most 
users authenticate themselves with mobile devices should 
now evolve to a more holistic level. For too long 
manufacturers have had little choice but to rely upon 
password or PIN-based mechanisms to secure what are 
becoming ever more sophisticated devices, with ever 
increasing replacement and misuse costs. This paper 
suggests an approach that will allow disparate personal 
devices to trade security information and glean confidence of 
identity from their peers. It may potentially offer a way in 
which user identity can be ascertained and communicated to 
non-personal devices, supporting the interactions 
individual‟s have and augmenting the safeguards that are 
currently in place. 
The ability to create a near-field security space will 
enable technologists to review device activation procedures. 
Under certain circumstances they may even be able to 
demote or possibly remove a user‟s requirement to 
repetitively logon to multiple entities during successive 
activations. Further work will undertake the development of 
a prototype framework to determine the feasibility and 
working advantage of such an approach, whilst reviewing the 
perception and response of the wider user population. 
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Abstract: The ubiquitous password or personal identification 
number (PIN) has been the accepted form of user authentication 
on mobile devices since their inception. With increasing 
numbers of owners failing to implement these simple barriers or 
taking any greater precaution against misuse, the requirement 
to secure the information contained within has never been so 
great. This paper proposes a new approach to identity 
authentication on mobile devices based upon a framework that 
can transparently improve user security confidence. 
Information pertaining to user authentication is shared amongst 
the owner’s devices, collectively enabling a near field adaptive 
security envelope to be established and maintained around the 
individual; the user’s Authentication Aura. 
 
Keywords: authentication, identification, mobile, security, 
biometric, authentication aura.  
 
I. Introduction 
The aspiration of people to be mobile and yet remain in 
communication with colleagues, family and friends has 
driven the use of devices that support and complement this 
lifestyle. Estimates suggest that worldwide Wi-Fi hotspot 
usage during 2009 grew to 1.2 billion connections, an 
increase of 47% from 2008, with this being driven by a 50% 
growth in the sale of Wi-Fi capable handsets between 2007 
and 2008 [1]. Surveys indicate that, mobile devices have 
become the preferred method of accessing the Internet 
amongst young users [2]. With technological evolution 
enabling powerful and sophisticated systems to be 
accommodated into these handheld electronic gadgets, their 
extensive storage and processing capabilities has made them 
an increasing target for thieves. In 2007-8 over 700,000 
handsets were stolen in the UK, with 50% of all robberies 
targeting a mobile phone in the items taken and in 33% of 
those offences it was the only stolen possession [3]. Between 
May and June 2009 alone, the UK saw an 11% increase in 
the reporting of missing/stolen mobile phones, with 84% of 
theft victims failing to retrieve their lost handsets [4].  
However, theft is not the sole reason for concern; a New 
York survey revealed that during a six month period in 2008, 
31,544 phones and 2,752 other types of handheld device 
(laptops, PDAs, memory sticks etc.) were simply left in the 
city‟s Yellow Cabs, an average of more than two per cab [5]. 
In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the 
potentially large volumes of sensitive and personal 
information contained within these desirable pieces of 
equipment is imperative and even acknowledged and 
supported by Government [6], [7]. 
As time passes and the proportion of technically-aware 
digital natives (i.e. those who have been born and grown up 
surrounded by technology) [8] grows, one would expect 
security usage and awareness to be greatly improved. 
Surprisingly though, this is not the case. Recent research has 
indicated that there has been no significant improvement in 
users‟ attitudes or habits during 2005 to 2010 [2], [9]. In this 
period the use of a PIN as a means of security by 18-25 year-
olds has in fact dropped by 50% [2]. Device owners are 
simply failing to take responsibility for protecting 
themselves. 
The problem is magnified because users are finding 
themselves in possession of an ever growing number of 
digital devices, each one having its own associated security 
requirements. With several being carried concurrently, at the 
moment of initial use it is likely that similar procedures of 
authentication are undertaken repeatedly across the disparate 
entities to ensure full activation. This repetitive and time-
consuming operation raises the question of whether there is a 
better way and does the collective identity knowledge 
possessed by the multiplicity of secured devices utilized by 
an individual at any given time present an opportunity to 
improve security. As each device is activated a set of 
authentication credentials are determined and access is either 
granted or denied. By enabling the individual and distinct 
devices to communicate their own authentication status and 
to share established user identity confidence it may be 
possible to synthesize an enhanced form of security. 
This paper explores this concept and proposes an 
approach through which authentication credentials can be 
distributed amongst devices and how this information can be 
used to create a novel method of security and user control. It 
addresses the requirements to produce a flexible, adaptive 
and non-intrusive security mechanism that will meet future 
demands and provide a foundation for further development. 
Firstly, the background explores the current methods of 
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securing mobile devices and the associated weaknesses. 
Once these foundations have been laid the paper continues to 
outline the new proposals and considers how they will 
improve upon the situation at present. 
II. Background 
Security is founded on three key principles – something an 
individual knows, they possess or they are [9]. Knowledge 
and possession based security both rely upon the inherently 
weak link in the chain – the user. The first utilizes a piece of 
significant or memorable information which is often 
forgotten or written down [11]; the second, the presentation 
of a physical key or token at the required moment. 
Forgetting, mislaying or losing the crucial item or 
information will bar further access attempts.  
The ubiquitous point of entry user identity code/password 
has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability 
or unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this 
sensitive information correctly [9]. To maintain security it is 
supposedly known or more precisely memorized exclusively 
by the creator [12] but is too often shared or inadvertently 
communicated [13]. Although different; identification and 
authentication both rely upon the recognition of the identity 
of a user interacting with a device at any given moment. 
Hand held mobile devices typically assume the identity of 
the user and utilize personal identification numbers (PINs) to 
authenticate
1
 this at point-of-entry. The authentication is 
Boolean; the subject is either deemed to be whom they 
purport to be or they are not, without any middle ground. 
Frequently passing the one-off process will permit 
unregulated access to all facilities and utilities installed on 
the device [14]. Therefore once access has been gained the 
ability to incur large telephone bills or excessive high-cost 
data downloads is readily available to impostors who 
compromise the PIN.  
In the search for evermore appropriate and robust 
authentication, attention has turned to biometrics (something 
the user is) to establish methods that cannot easily be 
compromised, are non-intrusive and equally eliminate the 
potential threat posed by social engineering [15]. A finer 
granularity of identification can be achieved; ultimately the 
device will either issue or refuse access to the user, however 
the starting confidence can precisely reflect how well the 
supplied identity matches the known template sample. 
Having this ability will allow a device to tailor its reaction to 
strong and weak authentication attempts accordingly. 
Further, without fundamentally changing the habits to which 
users are accustomed improvements can be implemented. As 
a supplementary development, layered authentication 
techniques have been explored and employed to compound 
protection and expand the sophistication required to 
circumvent defence mechanisms including; password and 
facial recognition [16], fingerprint scan and tokenized 
random number [17], teeth imaging and voice pattern 
verification [18]. This can then be reinforced by elements 
such as location information which indicates whether or not a 
 
1 As opposed to devices such as laptop computers that generally rely on 
a user name and associated password. 
user is operating in a known and unsurprising locale [19]. 
Currently security that is founded on point of entry 
authentication that remains static for the duration of 
interaction is unable to prevent misuse succeeding a hijack, 
when following a legitimate log-on the piece of equipment is 
illicitly removed or used by another. If this occurs and the 
device is kept active and not switched off, free and open use 
can be maintained for a significant period of time. With 85% 
of owners admitting their mobile phone is on for over 10 
hours per day [9], to counteract this weakness proposals to 
degrade service availability over time have been made [15], 
[16] enabling the device to shut down functionality unless re-
authentication occurs.  
As several gadgets are frequently carried simultaneously 
any intrinsic security weakness is amplified especially as 
people will often use the same PIN for more than one device, 
if not all of them [9]. Once one is compromised by the 
discovery or disclosure of the PIN then it is possible that all 
the owned devices become vulnerable. 
To circumvent the associated weaknesses of point-of-entry 
authentication it would be advantageous to augment the 
process with ongoing reassurances. Establishing user 
identification during the initial sign-on and then 
authenticating at intervals to maintain confidence allows 
opened devices to be secured against potential theft or loss. 
Although a device may be open and fully usable upon 
stealing, without successful re-authentication within a limited 
timeframe it would become inoperable. Ongoing re-
authentication can be either intrusive by interrupting the user 
and requiring a password or PIN to be entered, or non-
intrusive in the case of biometrics where for example the 
user‟s identity is confirmed by their typing characteristics 
[20], [21]. If correctly implemented, either will be an 
improvement upon the current situation but it is important to 
consider the most flexible and appropriate approach. 
Section III discusses and then outlines a potential 
framework that addresses these weaknesses and provides a 
means by which mobile device security could be enhanced.  
III. Enhancing Security for Mobile Devices 
With individuals being likely to carry more than one portable 
device and simultaneously interact with, or at least be known 
to, other technology in their local vicinity at any given time, 
possibilities exist to maximize this security potential. For 
instance, in the morning on leaving the house a worker might 
activate their business phone and Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) whilst at the same time picking up their car keys. By 
leveraging the relationship the user has with these multiple 
devices and associating the identification knowledge that 
each independently possesses, enhanced assurance of the 
owner‟s identity can be determined. At the time of 
authentication, each device establishes a confidence in the 
identity of the user, either true or false. Facilitating a means 
of communicating the current security status between the 
unique entities would allow them to bolster their own 




 and enabling the devices 
to request and trade their current authentication confidence, 
would provide a more flexible approach to security 
administration. This self-governing method would allow the 
party devices to adjust their own status through the 
consideration of their peers and the surrounding 
environment. The main drive is to achieve a position where a 
newly activated piece of equipment would not require an 
authentication process to be undertaken because the 
surrounding near vicinity contains sufficient confidence in 
the user‟s identity, that it is considered unnecessary to do so. 
Additionally, as the user relocates between areas of differing 
threat (public spaces to a home or work environment), the 
devices could relay the situation to their counterparts 
allowing each to react accordingly. 
In order for such a system to operate, it is necessary to 
first give some consideration to the underpinning 
requirements: 
A. Biometrics 
Using biometrics fits the requirements of a heightened 
security methodology for mobile devices, on the basis that 
they are characteristics that cannot be forgotten, divulged or 
lost by their owner [22]. Further, biometrics divides into two 
distinct tranches of study, physiological and behavioural 
[23]. The use of physiological biometrics is more often 
preferred for identification purposes because of the greater 
degree of uniqueness, experienced consistency and resilience 
to external corruption [24]. However, it is best suited to 
point-of-entry scenarios where an individual would be happy 
or certainly less discontent to tolerate the inconvenience 
necessary to undergo the required process of identification. 
For instance, having to place a hand upon a particular device, 
or head at a specific angle, to enable the relevant scan to be 
taken are both obtrusive procedures. Conversely, behavioural 
biometrics lend themselves to authentication scenarios where 
the identity of the individual is already established and 
confirmation of a user's continuing presence is sought. 
Behavioural traits can be detected unobtrusively enabling 
validation to be carried out imperceptibly to the user [9], 
[16], [20]. Capturing a voice sample during a mobile 
telephone conversation would allow the device to compare 
extracted voice patterns and nuances against a known and 
expected reference vocal template. Executing such a process 
regularly during use, facilitates a means by which the mobile 
device could gain appropriate confidence in the user‟s 
identity during extended periods of otherwise unchecked 
access. 
Although upon first consideration a single layer of 
protection maybe deemed sufficient, [25] observed that 
“Unimodal biometric systems have to contend with a variety 
of problems such as noisy data, intra-class variations, 
restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof 
attacks, and unacceptable error rates”. With individual 
biometrics failing to meet appropriate levels of acceptance, 
attention has been turned to combining techniques in 
multimodal authentication systems [16], [26]. There are a 
 
2 Devices such as mobile phones and laptop computers detect cellular 
and wireless networks and other such information that provide a means to 
recognize their current locale at any given time. 
plethora of circumstances where multimodal biometrics are 
advantageous and would be the authentication method of 
choice but not readily available because of technological 
limitations. 
By combining devices and available techniques it may be 
possible to achieve the same objective without multi-layering 
on any individual piece of equipment. Drawing together 
authentication confidence from a number of disparate 
devices would enable any one entity to make stronger and 
more informed judgment calls. With the likelihood that 
distinct devices will utilize different biometric techniques 
with differing rigor and strength, combining the otherwise 
unilateral decisions will further improve the ultimate 
recognition process. An added advantage of this is that 
captured identity samples could be communicated from 
devices without the processing capability to analyze the data, 
to a local entity sufficiently powerful to complete the 
operation. However, if no local device was available but 
network or internet services were, the samples could 
alternatively be passed to a remote authentication system 
where the analysis could be executed and decision returned. 
B. Security degradation 
It can be argued that rather than remain static, the 
authentication confidence should be eroded over time, 
reducing service and application availability
3
 [15]. Upon 
reaching a significant point, re-authentication would be 
necessary to re-determine the user‟s credentials and once 
more allocate appropriate confidence. Should this 
undertaking be unsuccessful (as anticipated in the case of a 
hijacking), service provision would degrade to such a degree 
that the entity would be rendered un-usable; protecting the 
information stored within and further misuse.  
Some functions of mobile devices are more sensitive than 
others and their illicit use could potentially incur greater cost 
or harm. Rather than regarding every type of feature equally 
it is sensible to enable a degree of flexibility in how each is 
treated and protected with the introduction of confidence cut-
offs. Operative tasks and applications could be allocated a 
security tariff allowing some functions to be carried out with 
a low confidence whilst at an equal level others would be 
blocked entirely. For instance with low confidence it would 
be acceptable to operate a calculator application but the 
ability to instigate a telephone call would be barred. 
Additionally, the calculator application would not only 
function at a lower tariff but it could be allowed a slower rate 
of degradation implying that it would take longer for it to 
reach the cut-off point of inoperability [22]. 
Dynamically adjusting the rate of decay to reflect the 
environment in which a device is being used will enable the 
model to adapt. In public, high-risk areas, a steeper rate of 
erosion could be utilized, whilst in a familiar and perceived 
low risk environment a flatter more sedate timescale 
employed. Indeed the decay space becomes a complex n-
dimensional curve with degrees of freedom including 
application sensitivity, time, location, method of 
authentication and user behaviour. Consideration of these 
 
3 For instance, within the first few minutes following device activation 
the likelihood that the owner has been replaced by an impostor is much less 
than it would be after an hour. 
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factors and more will dictate at what percentage point 
confidence will be at any given moment in time. 
Section C builds on this approach and further explores how it 
could be used to improve security. 
C. Device interaction 
As proposed at the start of this section, enabling disparate 
devices owned by the user to communicate will bring 
advantages in achieving strong methods of authentication. 
Additional identity confidence could also be obtained by 
gathering the authentication status of nearby devices. 
Distinct devices are likely to utilize different methods of 
authentication and using this array of approaches arguably 
establishes a more robust security profile. By enabling 
entities to recognize each other and communicate their 
current state of user identity confidence, the degradation 
process could be slowed or even reversed.  

















Figure 1. Potential intra-device relationship and 
authentication techniques 
 
relationship paths that might be established by a user‟s set of 
personal devices
4
 and the variety of authentication 
techniques that might be employed. 
Information sharing would be carried out between trusted 
pairs via a near field communication (NFC) channel such as 
Bluetooth. Utilizing NFC will ensure the security envelope 
or authentication aura is restricted to the local vicinity and 
acquired confidence is confined to entities within the 
physical proximity of the requesting device. Additionally, 
ensuring the intra device trust would effectively eliminate 
responses from unknown third party entities. Without doing 
this, a degrading device might poll the surrounding near 
vicinity for listening pieces of equipment and one owned by 
a different user might respond with an assurance of 
confidence which although true, would not be in the same 
user‟s identity. If accepted and permitted to proceed, the 
alien device would falsely bolster the observed identity 
 
4 The mobile telephone is shown as centric to the scheme because of the 
likelihood that it is the one device that is ever present upon the legitimate 
user‟s person. 
confidence. 
Furthermore, associating a weighting tariff to the method 
of authentication would allow equipment to utilize robust 
techniques that they would otherwise not have the ability to 
use [15]. The tariff system could then be extended to either 
slow or accelerate the rate of confidence decay (see section 
B). For instance, a laptop computer might have an inbuilt 
fingerprint scanner with a high tariff of robustness. The same 
person‟s mobile telephone might only authenticate via a PIN 
number; a far less rigorous form of authentication. Thus by 
drawing upon the laptop‟s high tariff confidence, the mobile 
phone could gain an enhanced state of assurance and thereby 
extend a slower degradation than would otherwise have been 
appropriate. Introducing additional items and allowing every 
device to trade and negotiate confidence with every other 
will synthesize a flexible and self maintaining security 
environment. 
This region of localized security can also be augmented by 
constructing the system in such a way that it can be 
introduced and subsequently recognize the local 
environment. This could be achieved by sensing available 
wireless networks and associating them with locations, 
allowing degradation tariffs to be correspondingly allocated 
within an administration function. The tariffs or weightings 
associated with public spaces can be utilized to degrade 
confidence more rapidly than those linked with more private 
arenas. By integrating the ability to detect and consequently 
recognize known locales, the model will react and adapt 
independently of human intervention. Hence, as the user 
crosses environment boundaries security and awareness can 
be immediately heightened or relaxed respectively increasing 
or reducing the frequency that re-authentication is requested. 
It may even be possible to associate the user‟s behaviour and 
device interaction with locations or at least perceived 
security threats. That is, through use and experience each 
device might be able to recognize that the user only activates 
certain applications when at home or in equally low threat 
surroundings. Vice versa particular services or operations 
might be utilized in public areas or correspondingly high risk 
locations, allowing immediate yet discrete security 
adjustments to be made. This is achievable via the adaptation 
of behaviour based identification techniques [27]. 
IV. System Anatomy 
Having explored the core features and requirements of the 
proposed approach to mobile device security it is now 
possible to examine and discuss in greater detail how such a 
framework could be implemented. This section addresses the 
core elements, the role each plays and how they might be 
united to achieve a robust and adaptive security system. 
The suggested system would consist of a core control 
engine with the ability to hook into and utilize five peripheral 
elements; the local environment, database storage, device 
operating system, one or more authentication mechanisms  
and the other member devices. Figure 2 outlines how the 
elements would combine and the direction of information 
flow between the disparate parts of the anatomy. It also 
illustrates the elements that are located within the physical 
body of the device and those that lie beyond. 
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Centric to each device is envisaged to be the Adaptive 
Security Control Engine (ASCE), which will manage and 
direct the internal security.  It will be required to hook into 
the device operating system in order to influence and apply 
relevant security policies based upon the action and 
authentication success of the user.  Post-initial authentication 
and the establishment of an identity confidence the ASCE 
will administer the degradation of confidence using the 
methodology (or similar to) outlined in subsection B.  This 
concept of degradation will potentially be further influenced 
by the environment in which the device is being operated.  
To achieve this, ASCE will need to utilize an environment-
sensing module that will learn to recognize localities and 
their associated threat, and use this to affect the rate at which 
the confidence in the user's identity is being eroded.  As 
discussed earlier in this document, operating a laptop at 
home is expected to be less of a threat than using one whilst 
waiting in a public space; by adjusting the rate of decay 
accordingly, these expectations can be incorporated into the 
framework. 
Authentication, although controlled and requested by the 
ASCE, will be carried out by authentication mechanisms that 
communicate via a generic interface. This will allow the 
ASCE to be a portable concept that can be applied to many 
different types of device, making it independent of a specific 
set of hardware.  The generic approach aligns itself with the 
objectives of the BioAPI Consortium [28] which has 
specified an international standard for interfacing to 
biometric systems. Utilizing this framework and extending it 
to both biometric and non-biometric methodologies would 
enable a single engine to accept and function with a number 
of identity confirming processes. That is, a mobile phone 
should be typically capable of utilizing authentication via 
PIN, voice recognition, facial recognition or even keystroke 
analysis. One or more of these could be plugged into the 
engine facilitating the necessary provision of identity 
recognition. Figure 2 indicates that these authentication 
mechanisms can potentially be either internal or external to 
the physical device. Thus it is imperative that the generic 
interface be capable of meeting this additional requirement 
and interacting seamlessly with either approach. 
Some devices will operate a two-way interaction with their 
surrounding security counterparts; for instance a laptop 
computer will both request and provide security details. 
However, it may be possible to utilize some entities that only 
contribute by their presence, providing a form of token-based 
security. Car keys are an example of such an item;  
incorporating these so that their mere presence, indicated by 
replying to a polled request, can be used to bolster security 
confidence in the user‟s identity (i.e. because the holder can 
show themselves to be in possession of a larger set of 
physical artefacts associated with the legitimate user). 
Figure 3 below shows a succinct representation of the 
relative sophistication of devices that might be used by the 
ASCE. It can be argued that any device that can be placed on 
 
Figure 3. Varying levels of device sophistication and 
consequential contribution to authentication 
 
the scale from “Full two-way” to “Passive presence only” 
can in some way contribute to the authentication aura. Indeed 
it can be argued that the use of passive technology carries a 
greater significance than active devices. Items that contribute 
only by their presence are likely to be carried out-of-sight, 
for instance car keys or contactless travel cards are held in a 
pocket or handbag and are not readily visible to a potential 
thief. Thus this inclusive approach is ultimately flexible and 
scalable to a huge variety of devices with or without built in 
processing intelligence. 
Finally, as illustrated in Figure 2, the ASCE will use a data 
repository to store relevant information, parameters and 
details, of its own status and other devices in the security 
partnership.  The repository is made up of a number of data 
tables that would store both persistent reference information 
and working details updated in real-time. 
V. Discussion 
In addition to the base technological concepts there are other 
matters that will require careful consideration prior to 
implementation of the framework. Privacy and the associated 
risk of transmitting biometric template information between 
devices when one is incapable of unilaterally processing a 
sample, is such an example. Appropriate encryption and 
communication channel security will have to be employed to 
protect against eavesdropping and remove the potential for 




























man-in-the-middle attacks. Introducing such protection will 
incur additional processing overheads that will impact upon 
the operational performance of the framework. 
Indeed, computational, memory, battery and network 
performance issues also demand investigation to ensure that 
the framework can be adapted to function on as many 
categories and types of device as possible. Ultimately it is 
desirable to employ the smallest footprint possible, so it is 
inevitable that there will be some element of compromise to 
avoid precluding potential technology. The greater the 
number of devices that can be usefully employed within the 
aura, the more robust the system will become. 
Although this paper has proposed biometrics as a suitable 
authentication candidate, it is important to note that with 
distinct methods greatly differing levels of performance can 
be experienced. This is amplified by the need to adapt some 
biometric techniques so they can be employed in a non-
intrusive manner [15]. Designing the framework to operate 
with a plug-and-play capability will lessen some of these 
demands and enable alternatives to be used. Extrapolating 
this concept further, it will even allow devices to respond to 
the environment or mode of operation accordingly. 
Transparent authentication is the most desirable solution and 
equipping a mobile phone with the ability to undertake voice, 
facial and typing pattern recognition will provide techniques 
that cover the majority of occasions. However, such 
flexibility will concurrently increase the complexity of the 
necessary interface.  
Trust is another major area of focus. Trust between 
devices will need to be established and at times revoked. It is 
imperative that this process correctly addresses usability and 
is implemented in a way that is logical, secure, yet easy to 
use. Aside from aesthetics, devices will also need the ability 
to receive and utilize un-trusted environmental information. 
Parsing this information correctly will enable devices to 
draw appropriate detail whist remaining secure and removed 
from threat. Gaining the trust of users is one further aspect 
that should not be underestimated. For too long, owners have 
relied upon passwords and PINs to uphold their security. It 
will not be easy to sufficiently reassure them to accept an 
approach that could potentially not require them to enter any 
form of identity confirmation. If enough recognisable 
devices are present and the aura is strong, a newly activated 
device may be content to allow usage without any form of 
polled authentication. 
Operational thresholds for applications and device 
services are one final area that requires further investigation. 
As yet it is unclear how best to invoke them; a simple 
ranking and user selected scale may be suitable for some 
applications but for others a more complex approach 
dependent upon a number of variables might be more fitting. 
It is required to empirically establish the latent potential that 
is believed to exist in the surroundings and the devices that 
are in regular everyday use. Through this experimentation, 
ongoing research and as the design of the framework evolves 
it is hoped that these factors will clarify and allow 
appropriate decisions to be taken. 
VI. Conclusion 
It is desirable that security and the way in which most users 
authenticate themselves with mobile devices should now 
evolve to a more holistic level. For too long manufacturers 
have had little choice but to rely upon password or PIN-
based mechanisms to secure what are becoming ever more 
sophisticated devices, with ever increasing replacement and 
misuse costs. This paper suggests an approach that will allow 
disparate personal devices to trade security information and 
glean confidence of identity from their peers. It may 
potentially offer a way in which user identity can be 
ascertained and communicated to non-personal devices, 
supporting the interactions individual‟s have and augmenting 
the safeguards that are currently in place. 
The ability to create a near-field authentication aura will 
enable technologists to review device activation procedures. 
Under certain circumstances they may even be able to 
demote or possibly remove a user‟s requirement to 
repetitively logon to multiple entities during successive 
activations. Further work will undertake the development of 
a prototype framework to determine the feasibility and 
working advantage of such an approach, whilst reviewing the 
perception and response of the wider user population. 
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Abstract 
Smartphones and other highly mobile yet sophisticated technologies are rapidly spreading through society and 
increasingly finding their way into pockets and handbags. As reliance upon these intensifies and familiarity 
grows, human nature dictates that more and more personal details and information is now to be found upon 
such devices. The need to secure and protect this valuable and desirable information is becoming ever more 
prevalent. Building upon previous work which proposed a novel approach to user authentication, an 
Authentication Aura, this paper investigates the latent security potential contained in surrounding devices in 
everyday life.  An experiment has been undertaken to ascertain the technological infrastructure, devices and 
inert objects that surround individuals to establish if these items might be significant. The results suggest that 
inert possessions may offer a surprisingly large potential with some being in close proximity to experimental 
subjects for over 45% of the entire period. With other graphical analysis illustrating the consistency of presence, 
this work suggests that everyday possessions and devices can be leveraged to augment traditional approaches 
and even in certain circumstances, during device activation remove the need to authenticate. 
Keywords 
Authentication, identification, mobile, security, identity 
INTRODUCTION 
As modern communication technology permeates ever further throughout society, the desire to remain in 
constant contact with colleagues, friends and family is increasingly met. The recent surge in sales of smart 
phones and other sophisticated mobile devices has driven a correlated explosion in Wi-Fi hotspot usage (In-stat, 
2009; In-stat, 2011). Technological boundaries are stretching and the devices people carry are evolving with 
expanding storage capabilities and processing power, enabling the porting of greater amounts of information and 
personal details. As this becomes the norm for us all, these personal items become an ever-increasing target for 
theft (CPP, 2010; Home Office, 2009).  In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the potentially 
large volumes of sensitive and personal information contained within these desirable pieces of equipment is 
imperative and even acknowledged and supported by Government (Design Council, 2010; Rohde, 2001). 
Authentication of the user’s identity by any device provides the first line of defence in the battle to maintain data 
integrity following theft or loss. Establishing as far as possible that the operator is whom they purport to be, 
provides a device with the necessary degree of confidence to allow access and service utilisation. However, 
although steps have been taken to ensure the devices are only accessed by accredited individuals, the ubiquitous 
point of entry user identity code and password has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability or 
unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this sensitive information correctly (Albrechtsen, 2007; 
Clarke and Furnell, 2005). In the event that several devices are carried simultaneously, the repeated intrusive 
accreditation process becomes laborious and inconvenient. Improving and evolving the employed authentication 
mechanism will go some way to counteract this burden and potentially provide an opportunity to increase the 
confidence in user identity. 
Previous research established a proposal through which authentication credentials could be distributed amongst 
devices, providing a novel, flexible and adaptive security mechanism; termed an Authentication Aura (Hocking 
et al., 2010). In this approach disparate devices with established trust will trade user identity confidence between 
each other. Information relating to time since last authentication and rigour of method used is relayed via a near 
filed communication channel. This is then coupled with details of unintelligent detected equipment and 
environment awareness to form a bolstered and reactive user identity confidence which is used to delay re-
authentication or even postpone the login process upon a device’s activation. 
This paper builds upon the concept of an Authentication Aura, investigating the latent potential contained within 
the electronic devices and currently dumb objects that are pervasive within everyday life. Experiments have been 
carried out to assess the potential and quantify the contribution that could be made by a user’s localised 
surrounding gadgets and possessions.  
The following two sections briefly outline the Authentication Aura concept and then proceed to detail an 
experiment which has been undertaken to investigate the potential of using localised equipment to support 
established user identity. This is then succeeded by an analysis of the experimental findings, exploring the 
manner in which identity confidence could be influenced and how it could be utilised to calculate a new and 
reactive status. A summary of the paper’s findings are then outlined in a conclusion. 
BACKGROUND 
With the accepted fragility of the ubiquitous point of entry user identity and password authentication, research 
has been widespread in attempting to improve upon this current situation (O‟ Gorman, 2003; Vu et al., 2007). 
One tranche of work, the Authentication Aura, suggested a distributed approach in which trusted and known 
devices that had all performed unilateral authentication, shared information between one another to bolster 
confidence in their own user‟s identity (Hocking et al., 2010). This section briefly outlines the concept of the 
Aura, enabling the reader to gain an understanding for the motivation behind the current research. 
As an individual authenticates with a personal device, the piece of equipment establishes a confidence in the 
user‟s identity. In most scenarios this is Boolean, the user is either whom they claim to be (they pass the 
authentication process) or they are not (they fail); thus the confidence is set at either complete (100%) and access 
is granted or it is none and the user is barred. The Authentication Aura suggests the use of confidence erosion 
following validated access which can in turn be utilised to reduce the availability of device functionality. High 
confidence will permit the use of expensive applications and access to sensitive data, whilst reduced confidence 

















Figure 1.The potential intra-device relationship and authentication techniques (Hocking et al., 2010) 
Then when confidence has eroded to a suitably low level, re-authentication of the user will be necessary to 
ensure continuing availability of use. To counteract this one-way-street, information pertaining to location, time 
since and method of authentication can be communicated between devices, providing the potential to boost the 
receiving equipment‟s confidence in its user‟s identity. Figure 1 shows an example of how the information might 
be relayed amongst a group of commonly owned devices. 
For some intelligent devices it might be possible to undertake continuous authentication (such as voice 
recognition during telephone calls) to provide frequently reconfirmed identity details and a valuable confidence 
contribution, whilst others might simply act as tokens, their presence the only information of use. Figure 2 
summarises this. 
  
Figure 2. Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent contribution to the authentication process 
If the Authentication Aura is successfully implemented, there is the potential to achieve device activation 
without the need for authentication. For instance, if a user with a number of present and active devices proceeds 
to switch on another item of equipment, there might be sufficient relayed confidence available to make the newly 
activated item content to permit access immediately without additional intervention. With users currently 
performing many authentications during a day, any savings that can be gleaned must intuitively be of benefit. 
EXPERIMENT 
Motivation and approach 
The concept of an Authentication Aura relies on the intercommunication of information between intelligent 
devices supplemented by the detection of inert household or personal items (Hocking et al., 2010). To initially 
gauge the viability of this concept it is imperative that a data gathering exercise be undertaken to ascertain what 
devices are present within a short distance of an experimental participant at various points in time. This 
information can then be analysed to determine if there is a latent potential in surrounding devices that can be 
leveraged to augment traditional security. 
It would have been relatively straightforward to execute such a task on entirely intelligent devices however the 
premise dictates that both dumb objects and those that might be intelligent in the future (such as household white 
goods), are also included. An obvious solution would be to provide experimental subjects with pen and paper to 
record devices and items that surround them at any given moment, over a period of days. Intuitively this is far 
from practical. Forgetfulness and sheer imposition renders this an inappropriate approach; an alternative means 
of surveying an individuals surrounding locale needed to be found.  
With the requirement to include dumb and currently incapable devices, the selected method by which the 
appropriate information could be identified and recorded uses radio frequency identity (RFID) tags and 
associated sensing equipment. Each tag transmits a unique identification marker continuously across a short 
distance. By positioning a number of these on or near individual devices and objects of interest, it is possible for 
a small portable lightweight RFID reader to be constantly carried by a subject, allowing all detected tags to be 
recorded at discrete time intervals. This is of suitable imposition to ensure experimental volunteers were 
forthcoming. 
Details 
To facilitate the experiment equipment was purchased to enable the recording of data simultaneously for five 
subjects. Although in an ideal world as many candidates as possible would undertake the experiment at any one 
time, the prohibitive cost of equipment restricted the sample groups to five, an affordable number that would 
yield a meaningful set of results. The PDA RFID readers were Dell Axim x51s, each equipped with 
CompactFlash RFID nodes, capable of reading both passive and active RFID tags. Passive tags transmit their 
identity in response to a polled request from the reader inducing their power from the received signal; active tags 
however contain their own independent power supply in the form of a battery. Although active tags are much 
more expensive to buy their main advantage is that they can be detected over a far greater range, 10-15m in clear 
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Contactless credit card 
connections over a wide area and so with the need to emulate this, the experiment requires detection of tags 
across several metres and through walls; it was therefore deemed prudent to spend the extra resource and secure 
the active variety. As such, seventy-five active tags were purchased enabling each individual volunteer to be 
supplied with fifteen, permitting them to identify and record a sufficient number of devices both at home and in 
their workspace. 
 
Mobile phone Work PC Home PC/Laptop Work Wi-Fi point 
Home Wi-Fi Point TV (s) Car interior Car keys 
Wallet/purse mp3 player Work bag/briefcase Home telephone 
Bedside clock Fridge Hi-Fi Coat pocket 
 
Table 1. Suggested locations for the RFID tags 
Groups of volunteers that worked together were picked to ensure there was a degree of crossover within their 
daytime activity allowing each subject’s recording equipment to detect other participant’s tags. In a functioning 
Aura environment additional security could be engendered from familiar devices belonging to friends or 
colleagues even though they are not specifically owned by the same user. Selecting groups in this way would 
provide a dimension to the results data that could be analysed to assess this premise.  
Each group of five subjects was instructed to undertake the experiment for fourteen days continuously, carrying 
the PDA with them at all times whilst ensuring that it remained charged and active. Software was written and 
deployed to the PDAs which recorded all detectable tag identities within range, their signal strength and time 
stamp, at one minute intervals. The individual’s tags were placed upon or attached to items of interest 
representing intelligent and dumb devices, personal possessions and infrastructure. A cross-reference list of tag 
identities and locations was recorded, enabling the identification of relevant items during later phases.  
Initial observations 
Upon removing the data files and commencing analysis some initial observations have been made. With 
observations occurring each and every minute, twenty four hours a day, seven days a week the data set is 
intuitively large. For each of the participants the experiment yields 1,440 sets of readings each day which 
equates to 10,080 in total across a single week.  
 
Figure 3. A typical user's weekday observations 
Figure 3 illustrates the number of unique devices observed by an individual during a working week (Monday-
Friday). Each day is plotted as a separate set of readings with individual data points representing the average 
number of detected devices within a fifteen minute period plotted against the time of day that the observation 
was made. 
  
Figure 4. The same typical user's weekend observations 
The weekday plot exhibits a maximum average of ten devices being detected in any given fifteen minute slot 
whilst at the weekend this figure peaks at twelve, suggesting that more static tags were located at home rather 
than at work. However, with such a high number of observations being recorded at both home and work it is 
apparent that the majority of tags were placed on portable possessions that the subject carried with them 
throughout the day. 
During the workdays there appears a high degree of variation in the number of observed devices implying that 
this subject is active during their employment and even spends time out of the office. Time away from their 
usual location can be perceived from the data on Tuesday and Thursday between 10a.m. and 4p.m. where the 
average falls to a single unit. 
With the observed variations, fluctuations and even periods of consistency it is possible to immediately 
conjecture that scope exists to leverage this information for use in security. 
 
Figure 5. A single user's specific device observations 
Figure 5 above illustrates a histogram that has been compiled from observations of specific devices for a user 
throughout the duration of their fourteen day experimental participation. It shows the percentage of observations 
that recorded each of their fifteen RFID tags, cross-referenced to identify the specific devices or items of 
equipment. Clearly from this diagram, there is one personal item that was detected far more often than any other. 
The subject’s wallet was observed during approximately 45% of all recordings executed during the two week 
experiment. So do inert devices or personal items provide greater security leverage than intelligent ones? For the 
same user, by plotting days’ observations in isolation (Figures 6 and 7) it is possible to examine more clearly 
how the user’s routine affects the devices that are detected. These diagrams illustrate the continuity of presence 
for each possession or item of equipment across the day, when contact is established and when it is lost. 
Additionally other user’s devices are also shown (Other devices) indicating when they are also detected. 
Intuitively, these foreign device contacts mainly appear on the weekday plot (Figure 6) because the other 
members of the experimental group were all work colleagues but there is a single set of blips visible at 
approximately 16:15 at the weekend, suggesting that the subject briefly visited their work premises. 
It is interesting to note that in both examples nearly the entire observation window from 6a.m. to 12p.m. has at 
least one device within detection range at any given moment. Indeed, closer examination appears to suggest that 
the inert devices are present most consistently throughout the day, supporting the potential for security leverage. 
 
Figure 6. A user’s isolated single weekday activity 
 
Figure 7. The same user’s isolated single weekend day activity 
The discussion above has concentrated upon and examined the data from just a single user. It would require a 
study of many subjects to ascertain if this is unequivocally true or false, a volume of data that is not currently 
available. However within the current sample set high percentages of experimental detection are attributed to 
inert personal items when they were selected by an individual; indeed coats, work bags and hand bags all topped 
the frequency chart for particular participants. Intuitively it cannot be stated that they provide a greater security 
potential but equally it is important they should be utilised where possible because of their persistence and 
inconspicuous presence. 
CONFIDENCE 
Confidence of identity 
The concept of an Authentication Aura utilises confidence of the user’s identity in two ways. When a device is 
activated and the initial security check (if there is one) is passed, the confidence of the device in the user’s 
identity at that moment in time is high. The authentication has been passed and usually an implicit trust is made 
by the device in giving the user unrestricted access to the services and data it holds. This level of trust remains 
unwavering and unchallenged unless barriers such as a PIN protected screen saver/lock are implemented. Rather 
than continuing in this way the Aura concept erodes the user identity confidence over time; the longer it has been 
since an authentication was undertaken the lower the confidence will be. This degrading value will then be 
assessed and utilised to restrict some of the processes and applications available for use; eventually at a 
prescribed threshold unobtrusive re-authentication will be executed to reaffirm the user’s identity. It is of course 
rather simplistic to simply erode the confidence and so to counteract this effect the concept incorporates 
communicated authentication details from other trusted devices to positively boost the devices identity 
confidence. Thus at a point in time the device has a confidence in the user’s identity that is a combination of time 
since last authentication, the authentication method used and information received from surrounding devices. 
The Aura concept’s calculation of user identity confidence is encapsulated by Equation 1. 
 
                         
 
   
  
    
      
 
 
Equation 1. Formula for calculating a device's user identity confidence  
In the equation:   
o x signifies the user device on which the confidence C is being calculated. C is bounded within 
the range 0.0 to 100.0 inclusively. 
o Function F1 calculates the amount of confidence using t the time since authentication was 
carried out on the given device (x) and m the authentication method that was used. 
o n represents the number of devices (both intelligent and dumb) that constitute the current 
Authentication Aura. 
o Function F2 yields the contribution to confidence that each Aura member (i = 1..n) makes to 
the receiving device x. Similarly to F1 this function utilises both time since authentication (t) 
and the method used (m) in its calculation. 
With confidence eroding and a re-authentication threshold in situ the influence of the surrounding Aura members 
will delay and even potentially postpone the need for the reaffirmation process to be undertaken. If the 
framework and process model are designed with an appropriate logical path, it may indeed be the case that initial 
activation authentication be by-passed because a suitably high level of confidence can be drawn from the 
surrounding trusted devices. 
It is appropriate to examine the potential of the confidence contribution to establish if there is sufficient evidence 
to progress this concept and hone the method by which function F2 might be invoked. 
Contribution from Aura members 
It is vital to establish or at least explore how the function (F2 in Equation 1) might be conceived and operate. 
Previous work has indicated that inherited confidence should be influenced by and adapt to location, the types of 
devices active within the Aura and the authentication methods they use (Hocking et al., 2010); these should thus 
be incorporated into the implemented function. To achieve this it is necessary to quantify scales of numeric 
values that can be implemented and then assessed to gauge performance. 
As an initial first step, location can be allocated a simple tri-value range, home, work or other; equated to 3, 2 or 
1 respectively. Apportioning values in this way will enable a variation in confidence contribution to be 
accomplished. It is reasonable to argue that whilst at home devices should operate with less heightened security 
and be more relaxed about the way in which they are being used. Similarly at work, although assured the 
operating environment is less safe than within the owner’s home. Finally being away from both home and work 
is the time when a device should be most wary and inherit least confidence from surrounding pieces of 
equipment. Initially for assessment purposes this three point scale can be used as a simple multiplier resulting in 
inherited confidence at home being 50% more significant than that received from the same devices at work and 
three times more whilst in other unrecognised locations. 
In addition to location, it is imperative that the significance of the device is somehow incorporated into the 
contribution formula. As highlighted earlier in this paper some devices are more often detectable and less visible, 
a combination which arguably makes them of greater significance. With this being a mathematical calculation it 
seems sensible to allocate a ranking value (in the range 1..10) to each item of equipment owned by a user and 
use this within the formula, this will be referred to as the device’s rank. It is proposed that a rank of 1 should 
indicate the most significant pieces of equipment whilst 10 the least. This value can then be used as a divisor to 
reduce the relative contribution of each device. 
To establish the latent potential of drawing confidence from surrounding devices it is initially advantageous to 
keep the function as simple as possible. Therefore, although Equation 1 indicated that the specific confidence of 
any communicating device would be used currently a rigid maximum value will be set for each. To initiate 
investigation this will be fixed at 15%. In a fully operational model this would be allocated on a device by device 
basis and then reduced by the time that has elapsed since authentication and the method used. 
Thus the initial formula for F2 and the contribution made by device i becomes:- 
 
    
  
  
      
 
Equation 2. Formula for F2 to test the potential of confidence contribution made by each device  
Where …  
o i signifies the contributing device. 
o r is the significance rank of device i (in the range 1..10). 
o l is the location multiplier (in the range 1..3). 
Thus a device whose presence is regarded as being most significant (i.e. has a rank of 1) that is detected whilst 
the user is at home (location multiplier equal to 3) contributes 45% to the confidence of the host device. 
However, in the same location a device of medium significance (rank 5) would only contribute 9% and one of 
least significance (rank 10) just 4.5%. 
To aid in the clarity of this brief investigation a single day’s data for one user will be isolated and plotted so a 
subjective appraisal can be made. 
 
Equipment Rank  Equipment Rank  Equipment Rank 
Wallet 2  Car (Home) 3  Bag 4 
Fridge 4  Microscope 5  MP3 6 
Locker 6  Coat 4  PC 6 
Bed clock 4  Fax 9  Car (Work) 5 
Laptop (Work) 8  WiFi (Home) 5  Mobile (Work) 5 
 
Table 2. Table of selected equipment and allocated rankings 
The user chose to tag the fifteen items of equipment shown in the table above, enabling them to be detected 
during the experiment. The table also indicates the allocated ranking to each device: 
 Figure 8. Subjective rankings for a single day's data and the associated percentage contribution 
Introducing the subjective rankings as shown in Table 2 to the data has the effect of yielding the cumulative 
percentage contribution plot shown in Figure 8. The most significant devices and those set with the lowest rank 
were the subject's home appliances, bag, personal car and mobile phone, whilst the remaining gadgets and 
possessions were set with mid to high range values. Although this allocation is subjective it is based on the 
premise that the higher ranking objects should be those that are personal or large and immoveable, providing less 
obvious security enforcement. For instance, the user’s wallet is the highest ranking device (2), closely followed 
by their personal car, bag, fridge and coat. Applying these ranking values to the devices and employing the 
user’s location, the cumulative percentage contribution for the observed items, at each given point in time, was 
calculated and then plotted against the associated time of day. This allocation of rankings appears to deliver a 
good spread of contribution percentages, reflecting the environment and highlighting the potential of this 
approach to deliver security enhancement. Without any degradation of confidence occurring on the 
communicating devices the percentage contribution tops out at nearly 90%, a far greater figure than would 
normally be observed. Although abnormally high this value further supports the argument that it may indeed be 
possible in certain circumstances for newly activated devices to avoid having to perform a sequence of 
authentication at all; the communicated confidence in the user's identity being sufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
An investigation into inherited confidence has demonstrated that there is indeed scope for such a methodology to 
positively contribute toward this alternative approach to device security. Although the assessment of confidence 
contribution was founded on simplistic algorithms the findings confirmed the latent potential of this method. 
Extroverted awareness of surroundings and other objects can be positively leveraged both unilaterally and within 
a cooperative set of devices. Surprisingly perhaps some of the greatest security reassurance can be drawn from 
inert possessions that we might not readily expect, especially those that are not readily visible but are carried on 
a daily basis. 
Utilising these findings as ground work for the next stage of investigation it is now possible to develop a 
working prototype based upon the concepts outlined in this paper. Functioning agent software can now be 
written and tested to further establish the practicality of this method and if there are restrictions that are currently 
unforeseen. 
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a b s t r a c t
IT usage today is typified by users that operate across multiple devices, including tradi-
tional desktop PCs, laptops, tablets and smartphones. As a consequence, users can regu-
larly find themselves having a variety of devices open concurrently, and with even the
most basic security in place, there is a resultant need to repeatedly authenticate, which can
potentially represent a source of hindrance and frustration for the user. Building upon
previous work by the authors that proposed a novel approach to user authentication, called
an Authentication Aura, this paper investigates the latent security potential contained in
surrounding devices in everyday life and how this may be used to augment security. An
experiment has been undertaken to ascertain the technological infrastructure, devices and
inert objects that surround individuals throughout the day to establish whether or not
these items might be utilised within an authentication solution. The experiment involved
twenty volunteers, over a 14-day period, and resulted in a dataset of 1.23 million recorded
observations. Using the data provided by the experiment as a basis for a simulation, it
investigated how confidence in the user’s identity is influenced by these familiar everyday
possessions and how their own authentication status can be ‘leveraged’ to negate the need
to repeatedly manually authenticate. The simulation suggests a potential reduction of
74.04% in the daily number of required authentications for a user operating a device once
every 30 min, with a 10-min screen lock in place. Ultimately, it confirms that during device
activation it is possible to remove the need to authenticate with the Authentication Aura
providing sufficient confidence.
ª 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Authentication of the user’s identity by any device provides
the first line of defence in maintaining data confidentiality
following theft or loss. Establishing, as far as possible, that the
user is whom they claim to be provides a device with the
accepted degree of confidence to allow access and service
utilisation. However, although steps have been taken to
ensure the devices are only accessed by authorised in-
dividuals, the usual point of entry username and password
has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability
or unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this
sensitive information correctly (Dobyns, 2012; Albrechtsen,
2007; Clarke and Furnell, 2005). With the accepted fragility of
this ubiquitous point of entry authentication, research has
been widespread in attempting to improve upon this current
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situation (Jansen, 2003; O’Gorman, 2003; Furnell et al., 2008; Vu
et al., 2007). However, in the event where several devices are
carried simultaneously, there will always be a degree of
repeated intrusive authentication, a process that can become
laborious and inconvenient; an issue that is of particular note
when one considers the general complacency of users around
security issues onmobile devices (Mylonas et al., 2013), which
could render it easily abandoned if it is perceived as too
burdensome. If a user has previously authenticated upon a
device then it may be feasible to use the confidence arising
from this to provide automated access to other devices within
a close proximity to the device on which they have just
authenticated. Alternatively, authentication judgements
made across several devices could also be used to deliver a
collective confidence level e increasing the level of identity
confidence that any one unilateral device could obtain.
The aim of this paper is to further investigate the potential
of such a distributed and co-operative approach to device
security. First, a summary of this novel approach is presented,
establishing the premise and discussing the types of devices
and personal items that might be incorporated. The investi-
gation then proceeds to explain a series of experiments that
have been undertaken to assess the practical feasibility, based
upon the presence of devices and infrastructure surrounding
them throughout the day, examining the observed results.
Following this a simulation has been performed based upon
the gathered experimental data, the results have been plotted,
revealing supportive evidence for the proposed approach. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the results and observes
how theft of a device operating with this security might
perform whilst in an impostor’s possession.
2. A distributed approach
In current systems, each authentication measurement is
treated as discrete and independent, and users may have to
remember a variety of information and/or carry a variety of
physical tokens with them, in order to achieve authentication
in the different contexts (Tanvi et al., 2011). When considered
from a holistic perspective, this can be seen to be inconve-
nient, and potentially over-complex. For example, if a user has
just submitted to a biometric authentication on their desktop
PC, is there then any real benefit to be gained from the same
user then authenticating to a mobile phone via a weaker, PIN-
based method? Given that the two devices can be in
communication with each other anyway (e.g. via wireless
networking), there is clear potential to remove the need for
the user to authenticate to each one.
The Authentication Aura proposes a distributed approach
that can improve the situation by bringing together a range of
authentication methods (e.g. based upon secret knowledge,
physical tokens, and biometrics) within a flexible framework
that can operate across multiple devices and services within a
user’s Personal Area Network (Hocking et al., 2010, 2011). The
intention is not to simply achieve a single sign-on, whereby
authentication to one device automatically authenticates the
user to all others for an unlimited period. Instead, by intelli-
gently combining authentication measures from the different
devices and techniques used within this network, the concept
of an ‘Authentication Aura’ can be established. When access
to a new device or service is requested, the strength of the
user’s Aura will determine whether they will be granted ac-
cess automatically, or be required to perform an explicit
authentication. This strength will vary depending upon when
the user last performed an authentication, and with which
technique it was achieved (e.g. a measure obtained from a
physiological biometric could well be weighted higher than
that from a password) (Hocking et al., 2010, 2011;
AuthenticationWorld, 2006; Clarke and Furnell, 2007). This
distributed and collaborative environment seeks to improve
the level of authentication security and improve the conve-
nience for users.
On the majority of personal devices, as an individual au-
thenticates, the piece of equipment establishes a confidence
in the user’s identity. In most scenarios this is Boolean, in that
the user is either believed to be whom they claim to be (they
pass the authentication process) or they are not (they fail). As
a consequence, the confidence is either set at total (100%) and
universal application access granted, or it is none and the user
is barred. The Authentication Aura uses a continuous identity
confidence measure following validated access which can in
turn be utilised to control the availability of device function-
ality. High confidence will permit the use of expensive appli-
cations and access to sensitive data, whilst reduced
confidence can be used as a cue to block the use of these
functions (Clarke, 2011). Then when confidence erodes to a
suitably low level, or a high-level action is attempted with
insufficient confidence, re-authentication of the user will be
necessary to ensure continuing availability of use (Furnell
et al., 2008; Hocking et al., 2010, 2011; Clarke and Furnell, 2007).
Information relating to location, time since and method of
authentication can be communicated between trusted devices
(which, in a full implementation, could utilise encrypted
communications between devices based upon a prior pairing
process). The Authentication Aura utilises each set of details,
and the presence of other detected possessions, to calculate a
positive confidence contribution.With a suitably strong ‘Aura’
users should be able to achieve device accesswithout the need
for an explicit/intrusive authentication. For instance, if a user
with a number of present and active devices then switches to
another item of equipment, there ought to be sufficient con-
fidence available to enable the newly activated item to grant
access immediately without additional intervention. With
users currently performingmany authentications per day, the
savings that can be achieved will greatly reduce the overhead
and potential inconvenience they experience.
The Aura utilises both intelligent and dumb devices.
Intelligent devices are those that have computational capa-
bilities and are able to interact with the user and one another,
whilst dumb possessions are those that do not currently
possess this ability. For some intelligent devices it might be
possible to undertake continuous authentication (such as
voice recognition during telephone calls) to provide frequently
reconfirmed identity details and a valuable confidence
contribution, whilst others might simply act as tokens, their
physical presence at a location being the only information of
use. Fig. 1 illustrates how the information might then be
relayed amongst a group of commonly owned devices and
where relevant, some of the authentication techniques that
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 4 8 6e5 0 2 487
could be employed. Note that the three intelligent devices
receive and provide information (signified by the arrows with
two-way information flows), whereas the possessions and
infrastructure act as providers only (signified by one-way
flows). As such, the possessions and infrastructure elements
do not have any reciprocal activity with other devices,
whereas intelligent devices are able to perform mutual
verifications.
With devices, technical infrastructure, possessions and
other factors playing such a pivotal role in the Authentication
Aura’s approach, a key step towards evaluating the viability is
to assess the degree towhich such informationwould actually
be available to be leveraged during normal day-to-day usage.
As such, experiments have been carried out to assess the
amount of time individuals spend within detectable range of
these contributing items.
3. Experiment
The concept of an Authentication Aura relies upon the
intercommunication of information between intelligent de-
vices, supplemented by the detection of dumb items within
the user’s surrounding environment. However, to date there
is no evidence to suggest the interactions exist in such a
volume as to be useful. This section details the motivation,
methodology, and results of an experiment that has sought
to support this theory and assess the potential contribution
to be made by incorporating these factors into the authenti-
cation process.
3.1. Motivation and approach
The purpose of the experiment is two-fold:
 To initially gauge the viability of this concept through the
identification of whether sufficient interactions (i.e. devices
coming into close proximity with each other) exist to be
useful within the Aura.
 To subsequently use the dataset to model the Aura
framework and evaluate the security and usability
attributes.
Unfortunately, no datasets currently exist that provide
information regarding the interaction of technologies in close
proximity. Furthermore, as the devices (both intelligent and
dumb) would not necessarily currently have the required
functionality, a simulated environment was constructed by
placing RFID tags on/in physical equipment such as mobile
phones, laptops, cars, houses andwallets. It is considered that
the use of such tags could also be representative of a future
deployment scenario, with more objects likely to have RFID
tags within them by default (Sakr, 2011; RSA Laboratories,
2012). As an aside here, it is recognised that RFID tags have
known security issues and in a full implementation of the
Authentication Aura approach the intelligent devices would
utilise more active communication approaches (e.g. Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth), which could in turn be encrypted. Dumb devices/
objects might still be detected via RFID tags, but their influ-
ence on the authentication decision process is relatively
small, and would only really work as a supplement to the
strength acquired from the presence and interaction with
intelligent devices.
3.2. Methodology
The experiment involved twenty participants, grouped into 4
groups of 5, with each group collecting interaction data for a
14-day period. Each participant was given 15 RFID tags (bat-
tery-powered rather than passive, in order to increase the
detection range), which they were then asked to place upon
items within their home and work environments. Whilst it
would be preferable to have had a larger population sample,
the nature of the tasks involved (i.e. placing tags on items and
ensuring the PDA RFID reader remains charged and in their
possession) and the prolonged period (14 days) of data capture
placed a practical limit upon this. It was felt that having a
smaller population with data collected over a longer period of
time would bemore beneficial to the experimental hypothesis
than merely collecting data for a few days.
Volunteers were grouped based upon whether they had
pre-existing relationships (i.e. that they worked together).
This enabled a degree of crossover within their daytime ac-
tivity allowing each subject’s recording equipment to detect
other participants’ tags. In a fully operational Aura environ-
ment additional confidence could be derived from the pres-
ence of familiar devices belonging to friends or colleagues
even though the same user does not specifically own them. As
such selecting groups in this way would provide an additional
dimension to the results data that could be analysed to assess
this theory.
Fig. 1 e The potential intra-device relationship and
authentication techniques.
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Software was written and deployed to the PDAs that
recorded all detectable tag identities within range, their signal
strength and time stamp, at 1 min intervals. The individual’s
tags were placed upon or attached to items of interest repre-
senting intelligent and dumb devices, personal possessions
and infrastructure. A cross-reference list of tag identities and
locations was recorded, enabling the identification of relevant
items during later analysis. The items that were specifically
given to experiment participants as suggested locations for
the placement of tags were as follows:
3.3. Results
With observations continuously recorded from the PDAs
during the collection period the experiment yielded 1440
sets of readings each day. With each reading potentially
capturing multiple tags, this resulted in a dataset with 1.23
million samples within the population. Overall, during the
hours of 6ame12pm, all participants were close to devices
that would contribute positively towards their Aura confi-
dence on average 97% of the time. With tags being split
between work and home, movement between these loca-
tions is easily identifiable, as well as periods away from
either. This is an extremely encouraging proportion that
clearly demonstrates that technologies do and can interact
on a regular basis.
In order to further investigate the nature of these in-
teractions, an analysis of individual participant interactions
would be useful. However, given the scope of the paper, it is
not possible to do this for each and every participant, so an
analysis of a random participant is presented below as an
illustration.
The histogram in Fig. 2 illustrates the observations of
specific devices for a user throughout the duration of their 14-
day experimental participation. It shows the percentage of
time (between 6am and 12pm) for the entire 14 days, that the
user spent in the presence of each of their selected items of
equipment. From this diagram, one can see that there is one
personal item that was detected far more often than any
other. The subject’s wallet was observed during approxi-
mately 45% of all recordings executed during the two week
experiment. So with inert devices or personal items being
discretely carried for large proportions of the day and
throughout differing locations they have the potential to
provide significant security leverage and possibly more than
intelligent ones which are often overtly visible. One point of
caution here, however, might be that some items become
naturally paired for a large proportion of the time (e.g. as a
result of being carried together in a bag), and thus it would be
important to guard against a false assurance being gained
from this. For example, if a wallet/purse and phone were
routinely carried together in a bag, and the bag were to be
stolen, then the phone is no longer in the possession of the
owner, yet still close to the wallet/pursue for a false sense of
security to arise. As such, it would be appropriate for the
system to learn about items that are always (or almost always)
in close proximity to each other, and thus come to regard
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Fig. 2 e A randomly selected user’s specific device observations.
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By plotting daily observations in isolation (Figs. 3 and 4) it
is possible to examine more clearly how the same user’s
routine affects the devices that are detected. These dia-
grams illustrate the continuity of presence for each
possession or item of equipment across the day, when
contact is established and when it is lost. Additionally, de-
vices belonging to other users (Other devices) and infra-
structure are also shown indicating when they are detected.
These foreign device contacts only appear on the weekday
plot (Fig. 3) because the other members of the experimental
group were all work colleagues. Although specifics of
movement are unknown, the data provides an indication of
what action the participant has taken. For instance, it ap-
pears that the user left work shortly after 5pm and returned
home, and in the evening between 6pm and 8pm the subject
was travelling in their car having left their wallet behind.
Although statements of this kind can correctly raise con-
cerns of privacy issues (Dritsas et al., 2006), it is important to
clarify that the Aura approach will not be attempting to use
data in this manner, and a full implementation would have
to take steps to ensure third parties were also prevented
from doing so. It is interesting to note that, in both exam-
ples, nearly the entire observation window from 6am to
12pm has at least one device within detection range at any
given moment. Indeed, analysis of the entire dataset reveals
that, when all twenty subjects are considered as a whole,
only 7254 of the 237,473 observations (i.e. 3.06% of all polled
detections) failed to identify one or more devices. It can also
be observed that some items serve to mirror each other’s
detection (because of being situated in close proximity). For
instance, in Fig. 4 one of the subject’s cars must have been
parked at home in the garage during the recorded day as the
sporadic detection pattern for this is virtually identical to
their garage phone.
Closer examination of the dataset appears to suggest that
inert devices are detected most consistently throughout the
day, supporting their proposed potential for inclusion in the
approach. Indeed coats, work bags and hand bags all topped
the frequency chart for particular participants. However,
when the frequency profile of the 1.23 million recorded ob-
servations is compared with the proportions of tagged device
type it is virtually identical in distribution as shown in Table 1.
The only differences being a 2% increase in the proportion of
intelligent devices detected and a corresponding 2% reduction
in the detection of dumb devices. This certainly demonstrates
the clear potential for both categories of device to make a
contribution to the Aura, based upon the frequency with
which users are likely to encounter them.
4. AURA confidence
Central to the Aura approach to security is the computation of
confidence in the identity of the user interacting with a device
at a given point in time. This section consequently explores
the calculation of identity confidence and how it can be used
to influence service availability on Aura empowered devices.
4.1. Confidence of identity
The Authentication Aura utilises confidence in the user’s
identity differently to the Boolean manner in which tradi-
tional authentication employs it. Currently, when a device is
activated and the initial security check (if there is one) is
passed, the confidence (of the device) in the user’s identity at
that moment in time is absolute, irrespective of the authen-
tication technique that has been invoked. The authentication
has been passed and usually an implicit trust is made by the
Fig. 3 e A user’s isolated single weekday activity.
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device in giving the user unrestricted access to the services
and data it holds. This level of trust remains unwavering and
unchallenged unless barriers such as a PIN or password pro-
tected screen saver/lock are implemented.
Initial assessment of confidence in the user’s identity is
established by the Aura in one of twoways. Upon activation of
a piece of intelligent equipment, the surrounding locale is
polled for trusted and recognised devices to establish a con-
fidence level. If recent and high-level authentication has been
performed on one or more nearby devices, the inherited
confidence can be established and may well be sufficient to
postpone intrusive authentication. If the contribution from
the Aura devices is insufficient to achieve this state, the sec-
ondmethod is invoked and explicit authentication is required
from the user to directly establish the confidence in their
identity. Upon completion of either of these processes and
with the confidence level set, the device will proceed to
operate within the Aura framework.
A notable difference to the traditional approach to
authentication is that the Aura continuously monitors the
confidence in the user identity, basing its calculation upon the
authentication method used, the user’s location and the
elapsed time since the last authentication. Whilst at home
and in a trusted location the threat to a device is deemed less
than if it is in a foreign and unfamiliar environment, and the
longer the time since authentication, the lower the confi-
dence. To counteract the effect of these factors, the Aura in-
corporates communicated authentication details from other
trusted devices to positively boost the device’s identity con-
fidence and stave-off the point at which the user is asked for
unnecessary re-authentication. This value will then be
assessed and utilised to restrict some of the processes and
applications available for use. Research has already been un-
dertaken to establish how threats to mobile devices should be
assessed and restriction of application usage determined
based upon a sliding scale of confidence (Ledermuller and
Clarke, 2011). If and when a prescribed threshold is reached,
re-authentication will be executed to reaffirm the user’s
identity; non-intrusively where possible. To reflect the
different types of authentication being employed it is impor-
tant to incorporate consideration of their strength and
robustness within the Aura framework. This is achieved by
associating amaximum level of contributionwith each type of
authentication method. For instance an iris scan (extremely
robust) would be allocated a high-level tariff (e.g. 5 out of 5)
and an associated 100% maximum Aura confidence, whereas
PIN-based authentication might attract a tariff of 1 and
maximum confidence of 60%. Thus, at any point in time, the
device has an Aura Confidence in the user’s identity that is a
combination of time since last authentication, the authenti-
cation method used, the current location, and information
received from surrounding intelligent and dumb devices. One
approach to the Aura’s calculation of user identity confidence
is presented in Equation (1), reflecting the elements outlined
above. Each of the three functions will be explained fully in
the succeeding section.




























In the equation: x signifies the user device on which the Aura
Confidence AC is being calculated. AC is bounded within the
range 0.0e100.0 inclusively. Function F1 calculates the amount
of core confidence using t the time since authentication was
carried out on the given device (x), m the authentication
method that was used and the location l of the user (home,
work or away), n represents the number of intelligent devices
and d the number of dumb that constitute the current
Fig. 4 e The same user’s isolated single weekend day activity.
Table 1 e Comparison of proportions of tagged items and
recorded observations.
Infrastructure (%) Intelligent (%) Dumb (%)
Tagged items 5 19 76
Observations 5 21 74
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Authentication Aura. Function F2 yields the contribution to
confidence that each intelligent Auramember (i¼ 1.n) makes
to the receiving device x. This function utilises time since
authentication (t) on the contributingand themethodused (m).
The confidence contribution assessment of dumb and inert
items to the receiving device x is calculated by function F3.
Each of these Aura members’ (j ¼ 1.d) addition is simply
based upon their rank (r), a numeric indicator used to repre-
sent their significance. The total dumb device contribution is
bounded at an upper limit a to block excessive influence being
gained from this element of the Aura.
4.2. Core confidence F1
The calculation of the core confidence incorporates the
erosion of certainty in the user’s identity since the last
authentication was made on the host device x, the centre of
the Aura. Currently, the proposed function to calculate this at
each time interval is
Equation (2): Core confidence calculation
Core confidence ¼ Last core confidence
 ðPeriod degradation Location multiplierÞ
(2)
The Last core confidence is initially derived from a local
authentication, if present. Its value and subsequent weight
being dependent upon the authentication technique utilised.
The period degradation value will control how rapidly confi-
dence is eroded. If confidence is eroded everyminute then this
value is likely to be a fraction of a percentage point but can be
altered during analysis to investigate how this affects the
operation of the Aura.
This is further influenced by the location multiplier, a tri-
value argument that is set dependent upon the device’s cur-
rent location, home, work or away. The premise for this
approach being certain locations can derived a higher level of
trust than others. Subsequent analysiswill need to specifically
determine appropriate values for these but it should be noted
thathome iswhere thedevice is likely to be safest (a lowvalue),
work is next and then away is the environment in which the
device is at greatest risk (high). The location is detected via the
presence of known static possessions and infrastructure.
An iterative approach is used to maintain the history of
location; that is, when a user moves between location if the
equation calculated its confidence just based upon the current
locale an enormous drop in this value would be experienced
when moving from home to away, or a falsely large increase
witnessed when travelling in the opposite direction. However,
it should be noted that the calculation of core confidence is
unbounded and can become negative, eventually overriding
any contribution from other devices.
4.3. Contribution from intelligent Aura members F2
As outlined earlier, the contribution made by each intelligent
device is a function based upon the method of authentication
last performed on that device and the time since the
authentication was made. It is important to note that the
contribution of such devices cannot be based upon their cur-
rent overall confidence because they aremembers of the Aura,
and as such will be calculating their own value inclusive of a
contribution from the host device. If this were done, a
pingepong effect would be created as values were traded back
and forth, falsely elevating the confidence of each partici-
pating device. Each intelligent device is allocated a percentage
proportion upon which its contribution is calculated, intro-
ducing a degree of flexibility and customisation. Of course, in
the simplest form all devices can be treated equally but by
incorporating this approach it allows for future device
dependent enhancement. Thus function F2 is proposed as
follows:
Equation (3): Intelligent device contribution
For the sake of discussion, contribution portionmight be set to a
value of 20% and authentication method in the range 1e5. An
authentication method of value 5 would indicate an extremely
secure and robust (resistant to circumvention) method of
authentication and 1 the least secure method possible. Time
since authentication is not a strict time such as the number of
seconds or minutes but a degradation multiplier based upon
the time. For example, this argument might be the number of
10-min intervals since authentication. Thus for an authenti-
cation method of 3 (an averagely secure method) that was per-
formed 1 h 30 min ago (9 10-min periods) and providing the
device has been continuously present in communicable
range, the confidence contribution would be ((20  3)/
9)¼ 6.66%. Adjusting the value of the contribution portionwill of
course correspondingly alter the amount of contribution
made by each intelligent device.
4.4. Contribution from dumb Aura members F3
Dumb pieces of equipment that are unable to authenticate or
communicate with other members of the Aura will simply act
as tokens and contribute by their presence. The amount by
which they contribute is simply dependent upon their rank,
an allocated value between 1 and 10, the lower the rank the
greater the security significance of the item. For example, in
the earlier histogram (Fig. 2) because the subject’s wallet is so
often detected, yet hidden, it is conceivable that this item
would be allocated a rank of 1 or 2, whilst the meeting table is
far less personal and would therefore be ranked at a much
higher level, perhaps 9. At this time it is anticipated that the
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Equation (4): Dumb device contribution
Token contribution ¼ Dumb contribution portion
Rank
(4)
Within Equation (4) the dumb contribution portion provides the
basis of the calculation. Token devices when detected will
contribute a static confidence percentage and so to get a bal-
ance between these and the intelligent devices it is proposed
to allocate a value such as 15% to the dumb contribution portion.
Thus a significant item (wallet) with a rank of 2 when detected
would add 7.5% to the Aura’s confidence total. The sum of all
of the contributions from dumb devices will have an upper
bound threshold applied to ensure Aura confidence is not
maintained at an artificially high level by a large number of
these devices that can easily be appropriated by an impostor.
If, for instance, an upper bound of 30% was applied, in the
above example it would require four such items to be
concurrently removed to maintain this maximum contribu-
tion. Even if this were achieved, at this level only a very
limited service would be available and with the fundamental
core confidence eventually becoming negative its effect would
be eradicated and the device rendered unusable.
When intelligent devices are present but have not been
through an authentication process it is proposed that theywill
be treated as dumb devices. Without authentication they
would be incapable of making a contribution and so, by
treating them in this way, at least their detected presence will
be used positively.
Another point to note relates to scenario in which a
participating device becomes lost or stolen. In this case, the
user would ideally need to ensure they removed the device
from the trusted list, in order to ensure the device did not have
the on-going ability to participate within the Aura and gain
further access. Over time, a device operating outside the Aura
would have progressively locked itself down in any case, and
re-detection of such a device within the proximity of other
intelligent Auramembers could be used to alert the legitimate
user and help them to locate and recover the lost item.
5. Simulation and validation
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed Aura, and
to model the aforementioned formulae to understand the
impact the variables have upon the authentication security, a
simulation based upon the observed experimental data has
been undertaken.
5.1. Simulating typical usage
A script was written to calculate the Aura for an intelligent
device based upon the observed data for a particular user. As
devices became visible and then disappeared their influence
was incorporated and used to offset a degrading confidence.
The simulation was performed upon all users, running from
8am until midnight, but because of the sheer volume of data,
this was evaluated in 10-min periods. Table 2 lists the fifteen
items of equipment that an illustrative user chose to tag,
enabling them to be identified during the experiment and also
the ranking allocated to each device. The subjective rankings
were based upon visibility, mobility and how likely the item
was to remain in the user’s possession. For instance, the
subject’s fridge is static and unlikely to move, and there is
little chance of it changing ownership; however the fax is a
publicly visible work machine that is non-specific to the sub-
ject and available to multiple people. The intelligent devices
have also been ranked in case they are treated as a dumb
device (as discussed in the previous section).
For the purposes of the simulation it has been necessary to
set some initial values that will be used and these are shown
in Table 3. It should be noted that these values are merely for
the purposes of simulation rather than being definitive and
will in practice be set based upon an independent assessment.
During the simulation it was assumed that the user attempted
to access a low risk, low tariff application (e.g. texting on a
mobile phone) once every 30 min. Whilst this model is not
reflective of normal user behaviour it does provide a worst-
case scenario from which to understand the performance of
the framework. Furthermore, controlling the application var-
iable assists in understanding the impact of the Aura attribute
directly rather than any affect the application access might
play. It reality, it is likely that user interactions with their
device are batched rather than once every 30 min and as such
the performance of the framework would be better than what
is presented here. This application is deemed to be available at
a confidence level at or above 20%, the chosen re-
authentication threshold. If the confidence level was below
the 20% threshold at point of operation, authentication was


















Table 3 e List of parameter values used in the simulation.
Variable Value
Authentication method tariff 3
Re-authentication threshold 20%
Device access frequency 30 min
Location multipliers: home, work, away 2.5, 5, 10
Intelligent device contribution factor 20%
Dumb device contribution factor 15%
Cumulative dumb device upper bound 30%
Period degradation factor 2%
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assumed to be requested and successfully completed with an
average level 3 method (such as a mixed case and alpha-
numeric password of more than eight characters) and so
confidence was set to the associated maximum threshold of
80%. It should be noted that in reality this figure would vary
upon differing authentication techniques being invoked.
The location multipliers were set at home ¼ 2.5, work ¼ 5
and away¼ 10 (reflecting the progressively less trusted nature
of each environment), thus for each 10-min time segment
confidence was reduced by the 2% degradation factor multi-
plied by the location multiplier. For dumb devices the contri-
bution factor was set at 15% with their cumulative total
bounded at 30%, and the contribution portion for intelligent
devices trialled at 20%.
For comparison, Fig. 5 illustrates the performance expected
from amobile device employing current PIN-based protection,
with a 10-min screen lock and an assumption of access being
required every 30 min. It should be noted, at the moment the
screen lock is invoked the host device assumes the identity of
the user to be valid, a well-documented weakness of this
approach to security (Muncaster and Turk, 2006). In this and
all succeeding plots the y-axis represents the percentage of
Aura confidence, with the time of day being plotted along the
x-axis. Additionally, plus (þ) symbols have been overlaid to
indicate the point at which access to the device wasmade and
squares have been used to show the points when the user was
required to authenticate. Each authentication is represented
by two squares, the lower indicates the time and confidence at
which authentication was invoked whist the upper illustrates
the confidence allocated immediately after the assumed suc-
cessful authentication. It should be noted that in several sit-
uations and especially in Fig. 5, a plus and a square co-exist at
the same point in time and have consequently been plotted
one on top of the other.
From this control plot the simulation indicates that the
user would be required to undergo an authentication process
32 times during the 16-h period from8amuntilmidnight. Also,
employing a traditional Boolean approach to security, when
authentication is passed confidence is set to 100% and re-
mains unchanged until the screen lock is invoked and confi-
dence drops to 0%. This gives the graph the box-wave
appearance that is exhibited in the diagram.
As an initial experiment Figs. 6 and 7 have been shown to
illustrate how introducing the proposed equation, at different
locations, with the discussed parameters but without the
positive contribution from detected devices, influences the
observed identity confidence over time. Once again, re-
authentication is demanded when service access is attemp-
ted at a confidence level below the threshold and this cut-off is
drawn in a colour dependant upon the user’s location.
Without any external Aura influence, in the ‘away’
example Fig. 6, the confidence degrades at a rate of 20% for
every 10-min period since authentication, the 2% degradation
factor multiplied by the location weighting (10 for away). Thus
it takes 30min to degrade from the authentication level of 80%
to 20% and 40 min to drop below this re-authentication
threshold. As a result, in this test simulation authentication
is required every 60 min, leading to the 16 authentications
exhibited by this default graph between 8am and the 12pm
cut-off. It should be noted that the nature of these authenti-
cations from the control set and the model are useful for
comparing and understanding how many times an authenti-
cation is required. They are not, however, directly comparable
in terms of the security they are providing, with the PIN-based
approach being significantly weaker than the approaches
utilised within the Aura.
Introducing the observed experimental data as shown in
Fig. 8 and allocating the device rankings outlined earlier in
Fig. 5 e Control plot of user identity confidence on a device with a 10-min screen lock.
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Table 2 it is possible to fully simulate the Aura’s action which
has a significant effect as presented in Fig. 9.
Immediately it is noticeable that the detected devices
provide the necessary information to ascertain the location of
the user at any given time. The default location is away but
this graph indicates the extended periods that are spent both
at home and in a work environment (as highlighted by the
colour band at the 20% threshold). Interestingly, as discussed
previously, upon activation of the core device initial authen-
tication is delayed for a period of time. Although initially the
Aura only contributes approximately 24%, a level at which
services should be extremely restricted, it is a level at which
the first simulated access can function and is a good indicator
of the influence that can be harnessed. This influence is
further illustrated by the confidence rising above the para-
meterised 80% level immediately upon each authentication.
Fig. 7 e Degrading confidence whilst at home.
Fig. 6 e Degrading confidence whilst away.
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Location of the user and the core device clearly affects the
rate of decline in confidence; with the user returning home
just before 5pm, beyond this point the gradient of the plot
significantly reduces, reflecting the relaxation of degradation
expressedwithin the Aura equation. At approximately 2.30pm
the user moves within detectable proximity of their laptop
and the added assurance of this intelligent item alone re-
verses the confidence erosion, reflected by a spike in the graph
Fig. 9 e Aura influenced results for the same user on the same day.
Fig. 8 e User’s devices detected during the day upon which the simulation graph below is based.
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at this point. This further supports the applicability of the
Aura’s approach and with the future expected to provide us
with greater numbers of intelligent devices, the potential for
security leverage is only likely to increase. Overall the number
of authentications across the 14 h of utilised experimental
data for this user on the simulated day is reduced to 7, 22% of
the baseline 32. When the simulation was run for all candi-
dates across all days and the number of authentications
recorded, the total number of simulated authentications was
26% of the baseline total; an average of 8.4 authentications per
day with an observed standard deviation of 2.9.
For comparison purposes, Fig. 10 illustrates a different
user’s simulated weekend day activity based upon their own
specific devices and personal items but using identical pa-
rameters and thresholds. From this, it is clear to see that apart
from an hour in the early afternoon the user spent their entire
day at home. In this location the Aura is most relaxed with
degradation at its slowest. During the plotted 14 h only 5 au-
thentications are required, only 16% of the baseline 32. The
home reference graph (Fig. 7) suggests that without the Aura’s
influence re-authenticationwill be expected every 2.5 h. In the
weekend graph however, this period extends to asmuch as 4 h
between 9.30am and 1.30pm as the detected devices maintain
the confidence at an operable level. There are six points during
the day at which the confidence is capped and then sustained
at its maximum level of 100%. Additional contributions from
the Aura push the confidence from the simulated authenti-
cation threshold of 80% to above the 100% for over 60 min
before the erosion finally draws the level back below the cap.
Alteration of the simulated parameters of course in-
fluences this performance, Figs. 11e13 illustrate five varia-
tions of the same user and day as Fig. 9 with different values of
intelligent device contribution.
In the examples above, the main effect of varying the
intelligent device contribution parameter is to reduce the
number of authentications during the day from nine in Fig. 11
to seven in Fig. 13. Logically, the overall confidence percentage
is maintained at a higher level for longer and is slower to
degrade. With this occurring the user would have more high-
level applications and functionality available for their use for
greater periods of time. For comparison, Figs. 14e16 present
three graphs, each with a different authentication level. They
are based on the same user and day, with an intelligent device
contribution value of 20.
Varying the authentication level is of course for illustration
purposes because in a real-life implementation the tariff of
the authentication method will depend on devices’ capabil-
ities and in-built technology. As discussed earlier, at the
weakest level (1) the associated confidence percentage will
only rise to 60% upon authentication and with the strongest
method (5) it will be 100%. In the figures the main variations
are that the number of authentications decreases from eleven
to six and at the lowest level the framework fails to maintain
the confidence percentage at 100%. Interestingly, in the
weakestmodel, Fig. 16, although the simulation authenticated
at 60%, the affect of the Aura pushed the confidence up to the
maximum. This suggests that if utilised, an Authentication
Aura approach to security would enable a low-end device that
was limited in authentication ability in its own right to
perform at a much higher level than would currently be
possible.
Finally, the period of time spent at home in the evening
does not exhibit a significant influence, however during the
day when the user is at work and away from the office, con-
fidence unsurprisingly erodesmuchmore rapidly with a lower
tariff.
The investigation and discussion of varying parameters for
each day in minute detail is beyond the scope of this paper,
however it is possible to observe how changing some of them
immediately impacts upon the performance of the
Fig. 10 e A user’s weekend Aura profile.
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authentication Aura approach to device security. As previ-
ously highlighted, altering the intelligent device contribution
and simulated level of authentication security both reduce the
number of observed authentications whilst maintaining
higher levels of confidence for longer. This will permit a user
of a mobile device to have access to more applications for
longer, making the item of equipment more usable. However,
influencing the framework in this way has the potential to
make this approach less robust to theft.
5.2. Simulating a device theft
This simulation was re-run for the original user and day as
illustrated in Figs. 8 and 9 and at 2:01pm any detection of the
user’s coat, bag, work’s mobile phone and work’s vehicle (the
items thatwere present) was blocked. The resultant plot of the
Aura’s confidence is shown in Fig. 17.
Upon theft the Aura immediately reverts to the default
location of away and it can be seen that without the influence
Fig. 11 e Intelligent device contribution 10.
Fig. 12 e Intelligent device contribution 30.
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of known devices within 12 min the confidence has fallen
below 20% and it takes 25 min in total for the confidence to
plummet frommaximum confidence (100%) and flatten out at
zero. As the Aura reaches this point all potential services and
applications would have been barred and without re-
authentication, the simulated device rendered unusable. It
should be remembered that for the simulations within this
paper the Aura calculations have been re-run every 10 min. In
a real-life application it is anticipated that this will occurmore
frequently and so the response to theft would be quicker. Even
so, in comparison to an unlocked and unprotected mobile
phone, this is a significant improvement over being blocked
only when the battery’s charge is spent and the device shuts
down.
Fig. 13 e Intelligent device contribution 50.
Fig. 14 e Authentication level parameter set to 1.
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6. Conclusion
From an authentication perspective, our increasing utilisation
of IT multiple devices has only served to increase the burden
placed upon end users, who consequently find themselves
having to prove their identity to an increasing range of devices
on a fairly frequent basis. The concept of the Authentication
Aura aims to use the very fact of having multiple devices to
the opposite effect; reducing the burden on the user while
aiming to improve the overall level of authentication
confidence in the process (taking it beyond a point of entry
mechanism into a more continuous mode based upon coop-
eration between the user’s devices).
The investigation into inherited confidence has demon-
strated that there is indeed scope for an approach such as the
Authentication Aura methodology to positively contribute
towards device security. The simulation results have indi-
cated the advantage that this technique can offer when
identity confidence measures are coupled with a positive in-
fluence from known devices. Awareness of surroundings and
other objects can also be leveraged both unilaterally and
Fig. 15 e Authentication level parameter set to 3.
Fig. 16 e Authentication level parameter set to 5.
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within a co-operative set of devices to further boost identity
confidence and even circumvent the need for authentication.
Significant value can also be drawn from considering dumb
possessions that wemight not readily expect, especially those
that are not immediately visible but are carried on a daily
basis. With the placement of RFID tags in clothing being pro-
posed, even what we are unconsciously wearing might
contribute to security in the future.
A significant 74% reduction in the number of daily au-
thentications required by a smartphone user when compared
with one who accesses their device once every 30 min, with a
10-min PIN-protected screen lock in place, was also observed.
Reducing this repetitive and onerous task, whilst maintaining
a high level of security, should be of interest to purchasers and
producers of such devices alike.
An additional benefit of such an approach is the reaction to
theft, and the short timescale the Aura takes to block appli-
cation usage and render the device unusable. Governments
and renowned design agencies are calling for the greater
protection of mobile devices; the results suggest that imple-
menting an Authentication Aura has the potential to meet
such demands.
Utilising the findings of the simulation as a foundation for
the next stage of investigation it is now possible to develop a
working prototype based upon the concepts outlined in this
paper. Functioning agent software will now be written and
tested to further establish the validity of this method and if
there are practical or operational restrictions that are
currently unforeseen. Beyond this, it is acknowledged that
there is also a need to consider the threat model that would
apply to the Aura approach, including identifying and man-
aging any potential for gaming of the system in order to pre-
vent manipulation and misuse in order to fool or circumvent
the controls. This will consequently form part of the future
work once the viability of the underlying authentication
concept has been more fully validated.
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Appendix D. Experiment Instructions 
These instructions were given to each of the volunteers who agreed to perform the research 
experiment. They were explained in detail prior to each subject signing an agreement 
confirming their willingness to partake. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Name of Principal Investigator 
Chris Hocking 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Title of Research  
Authentication Aura 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Brief statement of purpose of work 
This research experiment aims to establish if security of mobile devices such as laptop computers 
and mobile phones can be improved by making them aware of their environment and other devices 
that are close to them at any given time. To help achieve this it is necessary to carry out a continuous 
survey over a two week period to ascertain what equipment is close to the participant and in what 
environment they are. Mini radio transmitters/beacons (15 per person) will be issued to each 
volunteer and they will be required to position these throughout their working and home environment. 
Each one will represent a single device. A small data gathering device will then be carried constantly 
for the duration of the experiment which will record all nearby radio beacons on a minute by minute 
basis. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my data 
to be destroyed if I wish.  
I understand that my anonymity is guaranteed, unless I expressly state otherwise.  
I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far as 
possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been  separately 
assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH regulations).   
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 
Name:        ……………………………………….   
 





Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. This PhD research work is being undertaken 
to investigate how security of mobile devices (such as laptops and phones) can be improved. 
To participate in this study you will have been issued with a Dell Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), 
charging cable and a number of small blue plastic blocks with adhesive tape on one side. This 
equipment has been selected as a convenient and portable means of gathering information about 
your surroundings on a 24x7 basis for two weeks. 
The supplied blue plastic blocks are Radio Frequency Identity (RFID) tags that constantly transmit a 
unique 8 digit alphanumeric code. Within 10m or so, the PDA can hear the transmitted code and 
record the presence of the tag. If more than one tag is present, the PDA will hear and note all codes 
simultaneously. 
You will be required to position the tags on or close to pieces of everyday equipment that you will 
find in your home, workplace or even car. Although adhesive tape is present on the back of each tag 
it is preferable that this remains untouched, allowing the tags to be easily recovered and reused 
during follow-on experiments. The aim of this experiment is to then allow the PDA to constantly 
monitor your surroundings and record the equipment that is near to you at any given moment. With 
a significant number of participating volunteers, the observed data can be analysed to investigate if 
this concept holds potential to improve our everyday information and device security. 
Although the tags constantly transmit data via a dedicated radio frequency, they will not interfere 
with any other household equipment or indeed pose a health risk to anyone undertaking this 
experiment. 
Upon completion of the experiment the equipment will be collected and the data extracted from the 
PDA into a database for analysis. No subject will be linked to the data they have returned and at no 
point will they be required to supply their name or any other identifying information. The data will 
remain entirely anonymous at all times and not distributed to any outside parties. 
If for any reason you wish to terminate the experiment early, this can be done at anytime without 
obligation. Any data that has been gathered will be completely and securely removed from the PDA 
and extracted from any related databases. 
Once the experimental database is populated with data from all the consenting participants, trend 
analysis and device proximity investigative work will be undertaken. It is hoped to produce results 
that will be significant enough to warrant publication to a broad scientific community. As such, it is 
anticipated that this work will be published on the internet and throughout appropriate scientific 
media.  
When this tranche of research work is finalised, all associated databases will be destroyed and any 




The Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) 
Figure 1 below highlights the elements and controls of the PDA that will be referred to in this 
document. Some of them you will refer to often but most you will only use in extreme circumstances 
should the need arise. If the experiment concludes without incident, it will run continuously for two 
weeks and the only intervention that will be required is to charge the PDA to ensure it remains 
active at all times. 
On-off button this button illuminates when the PDA is active. It will glow 
green when the PDA is fully charged, orange during regular 
use and will start to flash when the battery power is getting 
critically low. If you observe this state during the experiment 
please recharge the unit as soon as possible. In the event of a 
complete power failure please note the date and time on the 
provided Power Failures sheet, connect the PDA to the mains 
and reset it to recommence operation as described in the 
Resetting the PDA section on page 4. 
 




















Figure 1. Anatomy of the PDA 
3  
 
Stylus used to perform a hard reset of the unit. See Resetting the 
PDA on page 4. 
RFID antenna this receives the communication from the tags. 
Slide lock control allows the unit to be locked inhibiting the function of any 
other PDA controls. Sliding the control to the up position will 
lock the unit, sliding it down will enable all other buttons to 
be used. Following the commencement of the experiment 
slide this control to the locked position; only unlock the PDA 
in exceptional circumstances. 
Charger connection the point at which the mains charger is connected. Refer to 
Charging the PDA below. 
Experiment launch button this button will start the application to commence the 
experiment. If during the launch of the application a message 
is displayed that suggests “The program is from an unknown 
publisher…” and asks if you want to proceed, do so by 
touching the “Yes” button in the bottom left hand corner of 
the PDA’s display. Once the application has started running 
apply the slide lock control immediately. 
Soft reset button refer to Resetting the PDA on page 4. 
Charging the PDA 
It is imperative that the PDA remains active during the course of the experiment. Although it has 
been fitted with an extended life battery pack, it will require charging once a day. Connect the PDA 
to a wall socket using the charging cable as shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. Connecting the PDA to the mains for charging 
4  
 
If possible leave the unit connected to the mains until it is fully charged at which point the on-off 
button will glow green. This process will take approximately 3 hours. 
It is best if the unit is charged overnight but if charging has to take place during the day please try to 
ensure it is during a period of little activity when you are not moving around within your 
environment and will be stationary in close proximity to the PDA. If you move away from the unit 
and fail to take it with you, the integrity of the recorded data will be compromised and the 
experiment tainted. 
Tag location 
To ensure that the experiment is as successful as possible it is necessary to position the tags in 
places that will yield the maximum coverage whilst giving the most meaningful results. Below is a list 
of devices and items that should be tagged where at all possible. If for some reason an item cannot 
be tagged or it is not owned please make a brief note in the provided comments sheet. 
Mobile phone Work PC Home PC / Laptop Work Wi-Fi point 
Home Wi-Fi Point TV (s) Car interior Car keys 
Wallet/purse mp3 player Work bag/briefcase Home telephone 
Bedside clock Fridge Hi-Fi Coat pocket 
 
If there are surplus after installing the tags following the list above, please use your own imagination 
to place any remaining tags in locations you frequent often (whilst carrying your mobile phone i.e. a 
toilet or bathroom is not deemed a significant location! ) or alternatively on frequently used pieces 
of electronic equipment. Make sure you complete the Tag Inventory sheet as accurately as possible. 
It is important to note that large amounts of metal or concrete will impinge upon the tags ability to 
communicate with the PDA so please try to avoid placing tags in positions where this likely to occur. 
Resetting the PDA 
Should the PDA become inoperable or the battery drain completely it may be necessary to rest the 
unit to enable it to function again. 
In most cases a soft reset will be sufficient. With power available (either the on-off switch is glowing 
orange or the unit has been connected to the mains for charging) ensure the slide lock control is in 
the unlocked (down) position and then press the soft reset button as indicated in Figure 1. Anatomy 
of the PDA. If this is successful the display will momentarily switch off and then a blue desktop will 
appear. At this point, to ensure the unit is ready to recommence the experiment, press the on-off 
button to turn off the unit, wait for 5 seconds and then re-press the on-off button to switch it back 
on. 
When the desktop reappears, initiate the experiment by depressing the Experiment launch button 
and then lock the PDA immediately. 
Under extreme circumstances, even with the unit unlocked, the soft reset button may not function. 




Figure 3. Performing a hard reset 
Once this has been done, follow the steps to switch the unit off and on, and then launch the 
experiment as described above. Remember to lock the unit once it is active. 
In the event that you have to perform a soft or hard reset, please note the occasion on the Power 
Failures sheet attached to the end of this document. 
If you are unsure if it is necessary to reset the PDA please contact the experiment coordinator whose 
telephone number is shown in the Help section below. 
Commencing the experiment 
Once all the tags have been installed ensure your PDA is charged, launch the experiment recording 
application and let it run for two complete weeks. Remember to recharge the PDA daily to ensure 
the continuity of the experiment and lock it to ensure it cannot be stopped inadvertently. 
Each morning and regularly throughout the day please check that the on-off switch is still glowing 
orange to ensure the unit has not gone flat. In the event it has, please connect it to the mains as 
soon as possible and follow the instructions on Resetting the PDA. 
Help 
Should you get into any difficulties or require further guidance (no matter how trivial) then please do 
not hesitate to contact Chris, the principal investigator coordinator, at any time. 
Tel: 07812 768 799 
If you are dissatisfied with the way the research is conducted, please contact the principal 
investigator in the first instance: tel. 07812 768 799.  If you feel the problem has not been resolved 
please contact the secretary to the Faculty of Science and Technology Human Ethics Committee:  
Mrs Paula Simson 01752 584503. 
 Tag Inventory 
Please fill-in the table below as you are positioning the tags (blue plastic blocks) so upon completion 
of the experiment it will be possible to analyse the data in a meaningful way. Failure to do this 
accurately will render your participation in the experiment unusable, so please take care when 
entering the information. 
Number 
Tag id code 
(code written on tag) 
Location 
(home, work, car, N/A) 
Equipment description 
(e.g. mobile phone, work PC etc.) 
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
7    
8    
9    
10    
11    
12    
13    
14    
15    
16    
17    
18    
19    
20    
 Power Failures 
Please record any time when the PDA experiences complete power failure and has to be reset. This 
will allow gaps in experimental data to be accounted for and enable analytical adjustments to be 
made. Please note details as accurately as possible and ensure the experiment is recommenced 
promptly. 






















Please enter any comments you have including reasons for not positioning tags in locations or on 
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Appendix E. Ethical Approval Form 
This appendix contains the ethical approval form that was submitted prior to the experiment 
being performed. Without the consent of the ethics committee it would not have been 
possible to proceed with this area of the research. 
 




UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Human Ethics Committee 
 
 




All applicants should read the guidelines at the end of this application 
 
This is a WORD document.  Please complete in WORD and extend space where necessary. 
 
All applications must be word processed. Handwritten applications will be returned. 
One signed hard-copy must be sent to Paula Simson. You may also send an unsigned electronic 




1. TYPE OF PROJECT 
 
1.1   What is the type of project?  (Tick 1 only) 
 
 
STAFF should tick one of the three options below: 
 
Specific project  
 
Tick this box if you are seeking approval for a specific study, or set of studies, with methods that are 
explained fully in the following sections.  This form of approval is appropriate for funded projects with  
a clear plan of work and limited duration. 
 
Thematic programme of research         
 
Tick this box if you are seeking approval for a programme of work using a single paradigm.  This form  
Of approval is appropriate for pilot work, or routine work that is ethically straightforward.  Note, the 
maximum period of approval for thematic ethical clearance is 3 years.  
 
Practical / Laboratory Class 
 
Tick this box if you are seeking approval for a teaching activity which involves student involvement in 
the role of an experimental participant.          
 
1.2 Tick 1 only 
 
POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS should tick one of the options below: 
 
Taught Masters Project  
 
M.Phil / PhD by research  
 
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS should tick one of the two options below: 
 
Student research project   
 
Practical / Laboratory class where you are acting as the experimenter      
  








2.2  General summary of the proposed research for which ethical clearance is sought, briefly 
outlining the aims and objectives and providing details of interventions/procedures involving 
participants (no jargon) 
 
This research experiment aims to establish if security of mobile devices such as laptop computers and 
mobile phones can be improved by making them aware of their environment and other devices that are close 
to them at any given time. To help achieve this it is necessary to carry out a continuous survey over a two 
week period to ascertain what equipment is close to the participant and in what environment they are. Mini 
radio transmitters/beacons (15 per person) will be issued to each volunteer and they will be required to 
position these throughout their working and home environment. Each one will represent a single device. A 
small data gathering device will then be carried constantly for the duration of the experiment which will 
record all nearby radio beacons on a minute by minute basis.  
 
2.3  Physical site(s) where research will be carried out 
 
Within the University/working environment and at the willing participants home. 
 




2.5  Name, telephone number, e-mail address and position of lead person for this project (plus full 
details of Project Supervisor if applicable)  
 
Lead person:   
Chris Hocking, +44 (0) 7812768799, christopher.hocking@plymouth.ac.uk, PhD research student 
 
Project Supervisor: 
Prof. Steven Furnell, +44 (0)1752 586234, sfurnell@cscan.org, School of Computing and Mathematics - 
Head of School 
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2.8  Start and end date for research for which ethical clearance is sought (NB maximum period is 3 
years) 
 
Start date: 01.01.2011      End date: 31.03.2011 
 












2.12  If yes, do you want Chairman’s action? 
 
N/A    
 
If yes, please include other application and approval letter and STOP HERE.  If no, please continue 
 
  




3.1  Describe procedures that participants will engage in,  Please do not use jargon 
 
Each participant will be issued with 15 mini radio transmitters/beacons and asked to position these on pieces 
of equipment that they regularly come into contact with at home, work and in the car. Each one is numbered 
and they will record on paper the position of each beacon. They will then carry a Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) with them at all times for 14 days, charging their PDA daily. Each minute the PDA will listen to the 
close environment sensing all beacons that are within range and recording the identities of those found. The 
gathered data will be saved on the PDA for later analysis. 
 
3.2 How long will the procedures take? Give details 
 
Positioning the beacons and filling in the appropriate paperwork will take 1 hour. Carrying the PDA will be 
continuous for 14 days. 
 




3.4  If yes, please explain why the following conditions apply to your research: 










c)   Any potential harm arising from the proposed deception can be effectively neutralised or 





3.5  Describe how you will debrief your participants 
 
Participants will be verbally debriefed at the end of the experiment. This final debrief will repeat the nature 
and purpose of the study, confidentiality and include contact information should the individuals have any 
further questions. 
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 4.  BREAKDOWN OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
4.1 Summary of participants 
 
































4.2  How were the sample sizes determined? 
 
Funding for 5 sets of equipment has been received and it was decided to run 4 contiguous experiment 
groups, each with 5 volunteers.  
 
 
4.3  How will subjects be recruited? 
 
Via personal contacts.  
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5. NON-VULNERABLE ADULTS 
 
5.1  Are some or all of the participants non-vulnerable adults? 
 
All participants are non-vulnerable adults.     
 
5.2  How will participants be recruited?  Name any other institution(s) involved 
 
Via personal contacts.  
 
5.3  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
 
Participants should be over 18 and students or employees who are willing to participate. 
 
5.4  How will participants give informed consent? 
 
Each potential candidate will be approached and briefed about the experiment. Only if they consent by 
signing an appropriate form will they be issued with the relevant equipment. 
 
5.5  Consent form(s) attached 
 
Yes – at end of information sheets. 
 
If no, why not? 
 
 
5.6  Information sheet(s) attached 
     
 Yes. 
 




5.7  How will participants be made aware of their right to withdraw at any time? 
 
By an information sheet that will be issued with the equipment as part of the experiment. 
  
 
5.8  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary data where 
appropriate, and how will the security of the data be maintained? 
 
No personal, sensitive or identifiable data will be collected from participants. Users will be issued with a 
sequential number (1..20) but no cross reference between this and their identity will be held. Experimental 
results will be stored securely on the University’s servers and on a password protected laptop computer. 
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6. MINORS <16 YEARS 
 
6.1  Are some or all of the participants under the age of 16? 
 
No. 
If yes, please consult special guidelines for working with minors.  If no, please continue. 
 
6.2  Age range(s) of minors 
 
 














6.5  How will minors give informed consent? Please tick appropriate box and explain (See guidelines) 








6.6  Consent form(s) for minor attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.7  Information sheet(s) for minor attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
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6.8  Consent form(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 






6.9  Information sheet(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 












6.11  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary data where 
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7. MINORS 16-18 YEARS OLD 
 




If yes, please consult special guidelines for working with minors.  If no, please continue. 
 




















7.5  Consent form(s) for minor attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 






7.6  Information sheet(s) for minor attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 






7.7  Consent form(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
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7.8  Information sheet(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 












7.10  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary data where 
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8. VULNERABLE GROUPS 
 




If yes, please consult special guidelines for working with vulnerable groups.  If no, please continue. 
 
























8.6  Consent form(s) for vulnerable person attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 






8.7  Information sheet(s) for vulnerable person attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 





8.8  Consent form(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
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8.9  Information sheet(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
   No     □    Yes     □ 
 












8.11  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary data where 
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9. EXTERNAL CLEARANCES 
 
Investigators working with children and vulnerable adults legally require clearance from the 
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) 
 
9.1  Do ALL experimenters in contact with children and vulnerable adults have current CRB 
clearance?  Please include photocopies. 
 
 





9.3  If your research involves external institutions (school, social service, prison, hospital etc) please 
provide cover letter(s) from institutional heads permitting you to carry out research on their clients, 
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10. PHYSICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
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11. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
11.1  Will participants be at risk of psychological harm (e.g. viewing explicit or emotionally sensitive 
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  12.  RESEARCH OVER THE INTERNET 
 




12.2  If yes, please explain protocol in detail, explaining how informed consent will be given, right to 
withdraw maintained, and confidentiality maintained.  Give details of how you will guard against 
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13.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & THIRD PARTY INTERESTS 
 










13.3  Are there any third parties involved?   (See guidelines) 
 
No.          
 






13.5  Do any of the third parties have a conflict of interest?   
 
   No   □      Yes     □ 
 







Faculty of Science and Technology Ethical Application Form cmh/2009 Final 
 18 
14. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
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15. ETHICAL PROTOCOL & DECLARATION 
 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, this research conforms to the ethical principles laid down by the 
University of Plymouth and by any professional body specified in section 14 above. 
 
This research conforms to the University’s Ethical Principles for Research Involving Human Participants with 
regard to openness and honesty, protection from harm, right to withdraw, debriefing, confidentiality, and 
informed consent 
 
Sign below where appropriate: 
 
STAFF / RESEARCH POSTGRADUATES 
 
        Signature   Date 
 
Principal Investigator:     ______________________ _____________ 
 
Other researchers:     ______________________ _____________ 
 
        ______________________ _____________ 
 
        ______________________ _____________ 
 
 
Staff and Research Postgraduates should send the completed and signed copy of this form to Paula 
Simson, Secretary to the Science and Technology Human Research Ethics Committee, A106 Portland 
Square. 
 
UG / TAUGHT POSTGRADUATES 
 
        Signature   Date 
 
Student:      ______________________ _____________ 
    
Supervisor / Advisor:     ______________________ _____________ 
 
     
 
Undergraduate and Taught Postgraduate students should pass on the completed and signed copy of 
this form to their School Representative on the Science and Technology Human Ethics Committee. 
 
        Signature   Date 
 
School Representative on Science and 
Technology Faculty Human Ethics Committee                ______________________ _____________ 
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School of Psychology   Prof Chris Harris (Chair) 
     Prof Judy Edworthy 
 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Dr Rupert Hodder 
     Dr Sanzidur Rahman 
 
School of Biomedical & Biological Sciences  Dr David J. Price 
 
School of Marine Science & Engineering  Dr Matthew Barlow 
 
School of Computing & Mathematics   Mr Martin Beck 
 
External Representative   Dr Jane Grose 
          
Lay Member   Rev. David Evans 
 
Committee Secretary:  Mrs Paula Simson   
email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk 
tel: 01752 584503 
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Appendix F. Data Disc Index 
Supplied with this thesis is a supplementary data disc containing the experiment data and 
diagrams that were produced during the simulation and subsequent analysis. For clarity an 
index of the disc is outlined below. 
Simulation IDC=10 Intelligent Device Contribution of 10 
(Baseline Intelligent Device Contribution of 20) 
Simulation IDC=30 Intelligent Device Contribution of 30 
Simulation IDC=40 Intelligent Device Contribution of 40 
Simulation IDC=50 Intelligent Device Contribution of 50 
 
Simulation TDC=0pt75 Token Device Contribution of 0.75 
(Baseline Token Device Contribution of 1.5) 
Simulation TDC=2pt25 Token Device Contribution of 2.25 
Simulation TDC=3pt0 Token Device Contribution of 3.0 
 
Simulation MTC=10 Maximum Token Contribution of 10 
Simulation MTC=20 Maximum Token Contribution of 20 
(Baseline Maximum Token Contribution of 30) 
Simulation MTC=40 Maximum Token Contribution of 40 
Simulation MTC=50 Maximum Token Contribution of 50 
 
Simulation Baseline  
High Location Multipliers Location weightings of 2.5, 10 and 30 
Simulation Baseline Location weightings of 2.5, 5 and 10 
 
(Baseline Authentication Threshold set at 20%) 
Simulation AT=60 Authentication Threshold set at 60% 
Simulation AT=Var Authentication Threshold varies with location to 20%, 40% and 
60% 
 
 
